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Abstract 
Container shipping is of immense importance to global industry, and one of the 
critical enablers of globalisation. Analysis of the global container shipping 
industry suggests the potential for significant economies of scope and scale, and 
hence low costs and high efficiency, both recognised benefits of a global 
strategy. However, the global activities of container shipping lines are subject to 
a series of countervailing pressures, in particular, state regulation, shipper 
power, and the constant threat of competition. In an industry where 
differentiation has been absent, or at best difficult to achieve, there exists a 
growing belief amongst industry leaders that competitive advantage can be 
secured through providing a higher level intermodal service with a global 
network. This project identifies these and other important strategic management 
issues relating to container shipping. it compares strategies adopted by industry 
leaders Sea-Land Service Inc. and Evergreen Line, two firms appearing to 
exhibit different modes of operation. Key differences in the strategies adopted 
by these lines' are identified. Through application of an established theoretical 
framework to help finther analyse the strategies of these competitors, and aided 
by in-depth interviews with executives from each firm, it has been possible to 
identify specific organisational pressures associated with the conflicting needs 
for global operational integration of activities and for local responsiveness. The 
study has found that, in the global container shipping industry, competitors must 
implement strategies that facilitate a capability for both global integration and 
for local responsiveness. This means that firms participating in the global 
container shipping industry must be multifocal; they must seek to develop the 
capability to manage both sets of demands simultaneously. Nevertheless, it is 
evident that whilst each firm is subject to broadly similar pressures in respect of 
the needs for integration and responsiveness, they adopt rather different 
strategies in attempting to meet these needs. With Sea-Land there is clearly an 
intermodal orientation, with more emphasis placed on intermodal capabilities 
and landside activities than on maritime aspects. Conversely, Evergreen Line 
was found to have a predominantly maritime orientation, placing greater 
emphasis on ships and containers and rather less emphasis on landside activities. 
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These and other differences between carrier strategies relate to the series of 
strategic choices global liner shipping companies must make regarding the 
specific assets and operations necessary to provide a global container service. 
Using the grounded theory approach, a theoretical framework specific to the 
global container shipping industry has been developed that outlines these 
choices, illustrating the various options open to industry competitors. Entitled 
Strategic Choice in Container Shipping, the framework can be used as a 
teaching instrument to help explain industry complexity, and as an analytical 
tool to aid management decision-making and strategic planning. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Introduction 
The scale of worldwide multinational activity today would be unthinkable 
without the benefits brought about by containerisation, and its impact on world 
trade (Dicken, 1998). Benefits resulting from containerisation include faster 
service, more extensive geographic coverage, greater scale economies, and 
lower transport costs. Alongside factors such as jet air travel, 
telecommunications, and the liberalisation of financial markets, containerisation 
can rightly be considered one of the most important enablers of industry 
globalisation. 
Strategic management in liner shipping has significantly altered since 
containerisation was first introduced to many of the world's major trade routes 
in the 1960's and 1970's (Rinaldi, 1972; Lim, 1996). Liner shipping managers 
are nowadays forced to consider the needs of global customers, and this implies 
a need to offer a global service network, with all the added resource 
commitments this entails. Providing a sophisticated global container 
transportation service has resulted in new demands being placed on service 
providers, and this has forced new strategies to be developed. 
Employing a phenomenological comparative case study research approach 
(Yin, 1984; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991), this study investigates and analyses 
strategic management in the global container shipping industry. Based on 
application of an existing theoretical framework (Prahalad & Doz, 1987), the 
study provides in-depth assessment of the organisational implications resulting 
from the conflicting needs for global operational integration and for local 
responsiveness. 
Using the grounded theory method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), theory is 
developed outlining a framework that demonstrates strategic choices industry 
participants can select from when deciding on their preferred modes of 
operation. The choices made will thereafter reflect the strategy a competitor 
employs in seeking to secure competitive advantage in the industry. The 
theoretical framework helps facilitate greater understanding of the industry. It 
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may also be employed by management to assist strategic planning, and can be 
used as a teaching tool. 
1.2 Context of the research 
Strategic management issues in liner shipping have fundamentally altered since 
the days of conventional shipping methods. Capital investment needs in terms of 
ships, terminals, and equipment are much greater, minimum efficient scale of 
operation is vast, and port and landside productivity has dramatically improved. 
Methods of cooperation between lines has altered, as have transport service 
networks, and the changing regulations liner shipping companies must consider 
in different parts of the world require constant monitoring. These and other 
influences will inevitably impact on the way in which a global organisation 
chooses to configure its resources in an effort to achieve competitive advantage. 
A key issue for industry competitors also relates to the strategies of major 
customers, or shippers. Container liner operators must go where shippers want 
them to go, and it is shippers who are driving many of the changes in the 
industry (Cooper, 1993). Globalisation of industry is a key driver in this respect, 
forcing lines to provide more services, faster services, and extend their global 
geographic reach. Liner shipping managers must therefore be capable of 
implementing strategies, creating organisation structures, and developing 
capabilities which can best meet the needs of shippers, as well as generate 
competitive advantage. 
It is the many pressures resulting from this dynamic business environment, and 
which are faced by global liner shipping organisations, coupled with corporate 
responses to such pressures, that this study has sought to identify and analyse 
further. This represents a significant challenge for the researcher. However, the 
study has benefited from collaboration with one of the world's largest container 
lines, Sea-Land Service Inc. This collaboration has facilitated access to senior 
managers in Europe and the United States. 
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1.3 Aims and objectives 
The aim of the study is to investigate, and enhance, understanding of strategic 
management in the global container shipping industry. Corresponding with this 
aim the study has three objectives: 
u To identify and analyse strategic management issues in the global container 
shipping industry; 
c3 To compare and contrast different approaches to strategic management in 
the global container shipping industry; 
c3 To identify and analyse organisational pressures facing competitors in the 
global container shipping industry. 
These three objectives are clearly interrelated and, when combined, are 
considered sufficient to meet the overall aim of the work. For example, initial 
identification of strategic management issues relating to the industry in question 
is necessary to thereafter compare, and contrast, the different approaches to 
strategic management. Thereafter, by applying an appropriate theoretical 
framework (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) as a template to aid analysis (Yin, 1984), the 
study identifies and investigates key organisational. and competitive pressures 
faced by global liner shipping companies, and illustrates corporate responses to 
such pressures. 
The main contribution made by the thesis is the demonstration, predominantly 
through the use of qualitative data, that the Prahalad & Doz framework can be 
adapted and applied to the global container shipping industry in order to help 
understand how firms evolved distinct strategies despite competing in the same 
industry. In addition, the thesis develops, from the data collected, a new 
theoretical framework which sets out strategic choices facing competitors in 
container shipping. 
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1.4 Outline of the chapters 
Aside from the introduction and conclusions sections, this thesis contains six 
main chapters. Chapter 2 provides the methodological outline of the work, and 
justification for the research methods adopted. This chapter also highlights 
potential alternative research approaches which could have been selected, and 
gives reasons for their rejection. Thq methodology chapter also provides a 
detailed explanation of sampling, data collection, and analytical techniques 
used. A further section discusses the limitations of the chosen case study, and in 
particular the difficulties associated with making generalisations to the whole 
sector from a small sample. 
Chapter 3 offers a macro analysis of the global container shipping industry. 
The chapter considers both supply side and demand side issues. Supply side 
aspects considered include world container trade flows, the structure of the 
container shipping industry, and the nature of competition. Key demand side 
aspects are then evaluated, including analysis of shipper requirements through a 
review of previous surveys investigating shipper needs. Pressure for global 
shipper contracts is also assessed, as is the role and significance of Shippers' 
Councils. 
Chapter 4 contains a literature review of globalisation theory from a strategic 
management perspective. This chapter considers the pressures forcing industry 
to globalise, the benefits and disadvantages of a global strategy, and issues 
related to economic regulation. Thereafter it assesses alternative global or 
multidomestic strategies that firms may adopt, and the resulting organisational 
implications. 
Chapters 5 and 6 employ a comparative case study approach (Yin, 1984; 
Jankowicz, 1995) to identify and analyse contrasting strategies adopted in the 
industry, and to assess pressures (for global operational integration and for local 
responsiveness) faced by two leading global container operators, Sea-Land 
Service Inc. (the collaborating organisation) and Evergreen Marine Corporation. 
Chapter 5 investigates each operator in terms of ships employed and routes 
serviced, container fleets and terminals, organisation structure, and respective 
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conference affiliation. This chapter also provides a review of the origins of each 
line, in addition to analysing respective market shares on the main East-West 
global trade lanes, and comparing company profitability. 
Chapter 6 extends the analysis through investigation of conflicting pressures 
for global operational integration and for local responsiveness faced by Sea- 
Land and Evergreen. A theoretical framework (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) is 
employed as a template (Yin, 1984) to aid categorisation of data collected, and 
to facilitate analysis in a structured manner. Multiple methods of data collection 
are employed, including interviews with industry managers, accessing company 
reports, and sourcing industry press articles. 
Chapter 7 presents a new theoretical framework, developed on the basis of 
findings from this study. The framework sets out strategic choices and resulting 
alternative modes of operation (Jankowicz, 1995) in the global container 
shipping industry. The framework builds on earlier findings identifying key 
strategic management issues and business environment pressures faced by 
global carriers. There are two main component parts to the framework, assets 
and operations. Under each heading a range of choices are provided, illustrating 
the different options from which a carrier may select in seeking to develop 
competitive advantage. Chapter 7 concludes by proposing potential practical 
applications of the theoretical framework as an analytical tool. Chapter 8 
summarises the thesis and brings together conclusions from the work. 
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CHAPTER2 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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2.1 Introduction 
This research methodology chapter contains six main sections, beginning with a 
review of different research approaches and research forms. Further sections 
emphasise and elaborate, within the context of this study, the differences 
between positivist and phenomenological traditions, and quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches. Thereafter, the chapter outlines choice of 
survey method selected, sampling issues, data collection and analytical 
techniques used, and limitations of the research. 
Throughout the chapter, reference is made to the industry/firms under 
examination, and in particular to the way in which the research methodology has 
been applied. In addition, justification is provided for the particular research 
approach adopted, with explanation given for rejection of other research 
methods. 
2.2 Research approaches 
2.2.1 Forms of research 
Research studies can take a number of forms, each depending to a large degree 
on the type of research, and the objectives of the work involved. Generally, 
however, there are three main recognised forms of research: 
u Pure research: in which the research is intended to lead to theoretical 
developments and may not have any practical implications. Examples of 
pure research include: 
* research leading to discovery of a totally new idea, or explanation; 
iresearch leading to invention of a new technique or method, and; 
* research resulting in reflection, for instance examination of an existing 
theory, technique or group of ideas. 
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Applied research: where research is intended to lead to the solution of 
specific problems. In this form of research the idea is to explain 'why' a 
situation or event occurs (Phillips & Pugh, 1987); 
u Action research: this implies that in order to understand something well you 
should try to change it. For example, such research could involve 
implementation of a trial scheme of some kind in an organisation, using the 
latter as a laboratory. 
(Based on Easterby-Smith et al, 1991: 6-8) 
This study demonstrates elements of both pure and applied research forms. It 
is pure research in the sense that the study offers reflection through examination 
of an existing theory; and it is applied in the sense that the research explains, 
how and why flrms pursue different strategies in endeavouring to provide a 
global container shipping service. 
2.2.2 Quantitative and qualitative research 
Among the different research methods employed in the social sciences, most 
debate has centred on the issue of whether to employ a quantitative or 
qualitative methodology. Bryman (1988) points out that it was the growing 
disillusionment with quantitative (i. e. statistical or scientific) research, which 
resulted in greater interest in qualitative methods. 
Whether quantitative or qualitative, each approach encompasses more than 
simply data gathering techniques, for instance: 
"When we speak of 'quantitative' or 'qualitative' methodologies, we are in the 
final analysis speaking of an interrelated set of assumptions about the social 
world which are philosophical, ideological, and epistemological. " 
(Rist, 1977: 62). 
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One of the intellectual precursors of the qualitative research approach is 
considered to be Weber's idea of verstehen, which means 'to understand' 
(Filstead, 1970: 4). At the forefront of this view, sociology was deemed to 
entail: 
...... a science which attempts the interpretative understanding ofsocial action in 
order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects. " 
(Weber, 1947: 90). 
The two main methods of qualitative data collection are participant 
observation or ethnography, and qualitative, depth or unstructured interviewing 
(Allan, 1991). One aspect of the contrast between qualitative and quantitative 
research methods concerns the mode of data analysis used. Quantitative 
approaches assume interval or ordinal data which are amenable to statistical 
formulation, whilst data from qualitative methods typically require a different 
mode of exposition. A qualitative approach may nonetheless yield nominal or 
ordinal data which can be analysed statistically. However, differences can go 
further than this, reflecting different theoretical underpinnings and views as to 
what actually counts as valid data (Bryman, 1988). 
A key feature of qualitative research methods is that satisfactory explanations 
of social activities require a detailed appreciation of the perspectives, culture 
and 'world-views' of the actors involved (Allan, 1991). This will inevitably 
require a more in-depth examination of phenomena. As Burgess (1984) notes, 
prominence needs to be given to: 
.......... understanding the actions of participants on the basis of their active 
experience of the world and the wqys in which their actions arise from and 
reflect back on experience. " 
(Burgess, 1984: 3) 
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The use of participant interviews in gathering data that helps facilitate 
understanding of phenomena represents an important element in many 
qualitative studies (Jankowicz, 1995). Participant interviews form a key part of 
primary data collection in this study. 
2.2.3 Positivism and phenomenology 
It is argued that there are two philosophical positions, or paradigms, from which 
research methods are derived, these being phenomenology and positivism 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991; Hussey & Hussey, 1997). However, there does 
appear to be some blurring between the two paradigms. The term paradigm in 
this context refers to: 
the progress of scientific practice hased on people's philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature ofknowledge. " 
(Hussey & Hussey, 1997: 47) 
An extensive array of assumptions and methodological implications can be 
associated with each of these positions, although Creswell (1994) merely refers 
to the positivist paradigm as quantitative, and to the phenomenological 
paradigm as qualitative. However, even extremists do not hold consistently to 
one position or the other, and a more enlightened approach may be to combine 
methods drawn from both traditions, as is the case with this study. Table 2.1 
outlines key features of the positivist and phenomenological paradigms. 
Reflecting the key features noted in Table 2.1, it is evident that this study 
conforms rather more to the phenomenological than to the positivist paradigm. 
The basic starting point (in this study) is that the 'world' in question (i. e. the 
global container shipping industry) is socially constructed and subjective. An 
attempt is therefore made to focus on understanding events, and to do so by 
developing ideas through induction from data collected. The research approach 
employs multiple methods, with a necessary focus on small samples 
investigated in depth. This also reflects the phenomenological paradigm. 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 16 
Chapter 2- Research Methodoloev 
Table 2.1 Key features of positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
Positivist paradigm Phenomenological paradigm 
Basic beliefs: The world is external and The world is socially 
objective constructed and subjective 
Observer is independent 
Science is value-free 
Observer is part of what 
observed 
Science is driven by human 
interest 
Researcher Focus on facts Focus on meanings 
should: 
Look for causality and Try to understand what is 
fundamental laws happening 
Reduce phenomena to Look at the totality of each 
simplest elements situation 
Formulate hypotheses and Develop ideas through 
then test them induction from data 
Preferred Operationalising concepts Using multiple methods to 
methods include: so that they can be establish different views of 
measured phenomena 
Taking large samples Small samples investigated in 
depth over time 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al (1991), p. 27 
Positivists, conversely, are more likely to be concerned with ensuring that any 
concepts they use can be operationalised; that is, described or evaluated in such 
a way that they can be measured. In this respect, large samples help to reduce 
phenomena under examination into their simplest parts; the focus is on objective 
facts and formulation of hypotheses, with analysis tending to look for 
associations or causality (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). 
Conversely, phenomenologists examine small samples, using various research 
methods to obtain different perceptions of phenomena. A phenomenological 
analysis will seek to understand, as in the qualitative approach noted above, 
what is happening in a situation, as well as search for patterns that may be 
repeated in other similar situations (Creswell, 1994). The last point is important 
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in the context of this research, as here a theoretical framework' is developed that 
can help illustrate such patterns. 
The main reason it is better to use the term positivist rather than quantitative, 
and phenomenological rather than qualitative, for the paradigms, is because it is 
possible for a positivist paradigm to produce qualitative data and vice versa 
(Hussey & Hussey, 1997). It nevertheless appears to be more usual to associate 
a positivist paradigm with measurement. 
Yet there are certainly also aspects of the positivist paradigm in this study. 
Here, an existing theoretical framework (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) has been used 
to aid examination and subsequent analyses of environmental pressures facing 
two firms competing in the global container shipping industry. Use of an 
existing theory in this way corresponds more towards the positivist paradigm. 
However, a phenomenological approach is also employed, whereby a theoretical 
framework is constructed to further explain phenomena under examination, and 
to more adequately describe the different patterns emerging from the data. 
2.2.4 Positivist tradition 
With positivists, it is assumed that the world exists externally, and that it should 
be measured through objective methods, rather than through sensation or 
reflection. Positivists therefore assume that real knowledge can only be based on 
observed fact. In essence, major scientific advances, according to positivists: 
....... are not produced by a logical and rational application ofscientific method: 
they result ftom independent and creative thinking which goes outside the 
boundaries ofexisting ideas. " 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991: 24) 
In practice, both the positivist and phenomenological approaches exhibit a 
number of strengths and weaknesses. The main strengths and weaknesses of the 
positivist/quantitative paradigm are shown in Table 2.2. 
1 The term 'theory' means 'an explanation or system of anything', whilst 'framework' means 'a skeleton 
or outline of anything' (Chambers English Dictionary). 
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Table 2.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the positivist/quantitative para 
Wpnknp, -. 4zp,. q 
Provides wide coverage of a range of 
situations 
C3 Can be fast and economical 
u May be of relevance to policymakers when 
statistics are aggregated from large samples 
C) Permits statistical verification 
L3 Methods tend to be inflexible and 
artificial 
U Not effective in understanding processes 
or the significance people attach to 
actions 
E3 Not very helpful in generating theories 
(Legge, 1984) 
Source: Based on Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; 32) 
A rather more dominant positivist/quantitative approach was not considered 
appropriate in this research study for a number of reasons. First, in relation to 
the main aim of the research - to investigate and improve understanding of 
strategic management in the global container shipping industry - it was 
recognised that an issue such as this cannot be answered by measurement alone. 
It requires more in-depth examination of the key activities, competitive 
strategies, and choices available to and adopted by competitors. In other words, 
the type of information required was not considered amenable to statistical 
analysis. 
Second, the form of questions asked of interviewees during this study are not 
so straightforward that they could be sent (or more importantly answered) by 
postal questionnaire. The in-depth questionnaire used (with a necessary focus on 
management) generally demanded interviews of over two hours duration; 
inevitably, a postal questionnaire of this nature would have resulted in a very 
low response rate, more especially as it is directed at management whose time 
tends to be limited. 
Furthermore, in a descriptive study, the use of quantitative methods may allow 
for rather limited objectivity, leading to reductionism. tendencies (Hussey & 
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Hussey, 1997). This means that the richness of the data and its contextual 
implications may be lost, thus contributing to a narrower and less 'real' 
interpretation of the phenomena. 
2.2.5 Phenomenological tradition 
Phenomenologists assume, therefore, that the world and reality are not objective 
and exterior, but are socially constructed. In essence, the main task in 
phenomenology: 
....... is not to gather facts and measure (quantitatively) how certain patterns 
occur. The task is to appreciate the different constructions and meanings people 
place upon their experience .... and to understand and explain why people 
have 
different experiences rather than search for external causes and fundamental 
laws to explain their behaviour. " 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991: 24) 
Phenomenologisin assumes that human action arises from whatever sense 
people make of a given situation, as opposed to any direct response from, for 
example, external stimuli. The main strengths and weaknesses of the 
phenomenological (qualitative) paradigm are shown in Table 2.3. 
Taking the key features of the positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
noted above, the main emphasis of this research study is described in Table 2.4. 
The dominant, but not the sole approach taken in the study, is 
phenomenological. The basic assumption, therefore, is that the 'world' under 
examination is socially constructed, and is driven by human interest. 
The study has therefore sought to identify meanings people attribute to certain 
phenomena. The aim is to understand what is happening in regard to how firms 
manage, in a strategic sense, a global container shipping service, and to identify 
differences in strategic approach/choices. Resulting from this analysis, the study 
has generated (or 'ground') theory through construction of an industry specific 
theoretical framework by developing ideas through induction of data. During 
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this process, multiple methods are employed to establish different views of 
phenomena, with a focus on small samples, investigated in depth, and over a 
considerable period of time. 
Table 2.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the phenomenological/qualitative 
paradigm 
Strengths Weaknesses 
(3 Ability to look at change processes over time U Data collection can take up a great deal 
(3 To understand people's meanings of time and resources 
Li To adjust to new issues and ideas as they E3 Analysis and interpretation of data may 
emerge be very difficult 
13 To contribute to the evolution of new C3 Qualitative studies often feel very untidy 
theories 
13 Provides a way of gathering data which is 
seen as natural rather than artificial 
L3 Takes a holistic view 
because it is harder to control their pace, 
progress and end-points 
People (especially policy makers) may 
give low credibility to studies based on 
13 Accepts involvement of the researcher 
Source: Based on Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; 32) 
a phenomenological approach 
Table 2.4 Key features of phenomenological paradigm exhibited in 
this study 
Basic beliefs: The world is socially constructed and subjective 
Science is driven by human interests 
Researcher has: Focused on meanings 
Tried to understand what is happening 
Looked at totality of each situation 
Developed ideas through induction from data 
Research methods: Multiple methods to establish different views of 
phenomena 
Small samples investigated in depth and over time 
Source: Adapted from Easterby-Smith et al (199 1), p. 27 
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2.2.6 Issues in qualitative research 
As the literature suggests, it can be quite difficult to distinguish between 
phenomenological and qualitative research (Creswell, 1994). However, the 
essence of the qualitative approach is well expressed in Evered and Lewis's 
(198 1) categorisation of it as "inquiryfrom the inside" rather than "inquiryftom 
the outside" (cited in Bryman, 1988a: 3). 
According to Allan (1991), the way the research problem is formulated, and 
the research agenda specified, actually makes it increasingly obvious which 
approach is most suitable in any given instance. For example, considering the 
way in which ethnicity and gender affect children's educational performance are 
questions best answered using quantitative methods which allow for large, 
representative samples. On the other hand, if the objective was to establish how 
and why it is that children from certain backgrounds do less well than others, a 
qualitative approach is more appropriate. Perhaps at its most basic level, 
qualitative research is about asking the question "what is going on here? " (Rist, 
1977: 161). 
There are, however, a number of aspects specific to qualitative research 
(Allan, 1991). 
u First, there is a need to rely on different research methods, such as 
observation, depth interviews, records and reports. Using different methods 
may also offer some possibility for triangulation - that is, using different 
methods in combination to compensate for the biases of any one (Denzin, 
1970); 
Second, in certain instances, observation or detailed questioning of different 
actors over time may be the only way in which adequate data can be 
collected. This factor was important during this research given that the study 
was undertaken on a part-time basis, and interviewing of executives 
responsible for deciding and implementing corporate strategy took place in 
different parts of the world, and; 
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u Third, when the unit of analysis may not be an individual, but a social 
organisation, a holistic approach to the organisation is required which makes 
using standard quantitative techniques in isolation less suitable. 
Combined, it is argued that these three reasons offer sufficient justification for 
the phenomenological/qualitative approach adopted in this study, as opposed to 
a positivist/quantitative approach. 
The literature further suggests that qualitative researchers invariably seek to go 
beyond pure description of events, and this means there tends to be a substantial 
attention to detail in such research (Burgess, 1983). For instance, Burgess's 
(1983) ethnographic study of a comprehensive school revealed in great detail 
such topics as - the physical and social structure of the school, the curriculum, 
patterns of relationships among the teachers, and the headmaster's conception of 
the school. One of the reasons given for such descriptive detail was to allow a 
backdrop whereby events and situations can be viewed within a social context 
(Burgess, 1983: 238). The basic message qualitative researchers convey is that 
whatever the sphere in which data are being collected, we can understand events 
only when they are situated in the wider social and historical context (Bryman, 
1988). 
This study contains just such a 'backdrop', in that the industry in question is 
considered to begin with (Chapter 3), followed by a more specific appraisal of 
the history and development (Chapter 5) and then in-depth analysis (Chapter 6) 
of the subject firms themselves. Indeed, such an approach is necessary as: 
....... qualitative research exhibits a preference for contextualism in its 
commitment to understanding events, behaviour, etc. in their context It is 
almost inseparable from another theme in qualitative research, namely holism 
which entails an undertaking to examine social entities - schools, tribes, firms, 
slums, delinquent groups, communities, or whatever - as wholes to be explicated 
and understood in their entirety. " (Bryman, 1988: 64) 
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2.3 Choice of survey method 
2.3.1 Rationale 
In large part corresponding with the phenomenological philosophy, this research 
employs a comparative case study methodological approach, in which issues are 
explored as they affect two firms in the same industry. Irrespective of which 
research approach is preferred, Jankowicz (1995) defines research method as: 
...... a systematic and orderly approach taken towards the collection of data so 
that information can be obtainedfrom those data. " 
(Jankowicz, 1995: 172) 
Organisations chosen for a comparative case study must ideally represent 
different positions or stances, regardless of the relative frequencies of those 
stances in the population (Yin, 1984; Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). This is the 
approach taken here, in that the two firms selected for ftuther examination, 
Evergreen and Sea-Land, are considered to be representative of the two main 
modes of operation (see section 2.4.2) typically employed in liner container 
shipping (Sletmo & Williams, 1981; Kim, 1987; Baird & Lindsay, 1994; Lim, 
1996). 
For example, key differences identified in relation to the main strategic 
approach of both lines are as follows: 
u Sea-Land is a member of relevant liner shipping conferences or rate making 
agreements, whereas Evergreen operates independently from such 
agreements, and; 
c3 Sea-Land operates within consortia or alliances, whereas Evergreen prefers 
to function independently. 
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Doctoral research work is required to ultimately produce theoretical outcomes 
and suggested ways to do this are: 
L3 To replicate known studies, with one or two variables being changed (e. g. 
country or industry); or 
u To look at a practical problem from two different theoretical perspectives. 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991: 9) 
In this study, first an established theoretical framework (Prahalad & Doz, 
1987) is used to help identify and analyse organisational pressures for global 
operational integration and for local responsiveness facing management of 
container shipping lines (see Table 4.1 and APPENDIX B). Second, as the two 
firms under examination appear to adopt different modes of operation enabling 
each of them to compete in the same global industry, this permits the researcher 
to assess the problem/issue from two different theoretical perspectives. 
The literature suggests it is through such contrasts that new ideas and insights 
are most easily created (Yin, 1984). In addition, the chances of success are 
increased when one incorporates both pure and applied elements in the research 
(Jankowicz, 1995), as is the case with this study. 
The methodological approach employed here is thus a qualitative case study 
analysis, with a necessary focus on micro aspects. Not, however, at the 
exclusion of macro issues: the research is enhanced through macro analysis of 
the industry in question (see Chapter 3), via investigation of relevant secondary 
data, supported by primary data collected. 
In terms of a theoretical rationale underpinning a qualitative approach, it has 
been argued that: 
..... ... ... ... it is through micro-social approaches that we will learn most about 
the macro-order, for it is these approaches which, through their unashamed 
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empiricism, afford us a glimpse of the reality about which we speak Certainly, 
we will not get a grasp of whatever is the whole of the matter by a microscopic 
recording offace-to-jace interaction. However, it may be enough to begin with 
ifwe can -for thefirst time - hear the macro-order tick " 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1981: 41,42) 
It can therefore be argued that small-scale research studies are important in 
attempting to more fully aid understand of the nature and structure of larger 
orders. Indeed: 
"It is within micro-situations that we find both the glue and the transforming 
energies ofthese structures. Any other view ofthem remains metaphorical. - 
(Collins, 1981: 105) 
And it follows that: 
"The emphasis is therefore on examining micro results in order to identify 
processes which construct difference and which may inform macro level 
conceptualisations. " 
(Callaghan, 1997: 27) 
1 
In this study, the subsequent development of a theoretical framework outlining 
the principal strategic management choices facing competitors in liner container 
shipping, reflects such a macro level conceptualisation. 
2.3.2 Criticisms of qualitative research 
A number of criticisms have been levelled at qualitative research methods and 
the researcher needs to be aware of such criticisms, and counter views, when 
deciding the best approach to take. For instance, a common criticism relates to 
such research being impressionistic and anecdotal (Bryman, 1988). However, 
Allan (1991) suggests it is actually good practice in the early phase of 
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qualitative research to be impressionistic. This does not mean that 'anything 
goes'. Rather, the researcher should keep an open mind and reflect upon 
processes and actions being observed or discussed. Simultaneously, the 
collection of data and testing of ideas need to become as systematic as possible, 
thereby ensuring a sufficient degree of analytical rigour. 
Empirical investigation should ideally be capable of being replicated by others 
so that the results of a study can be confirmed or refuted. However, the 
difficulty that qualitative methods pose is that the precise procedures used to 
achieve the data cannot be repeated in all their detail. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the point of qualitative methods is their flexibility: the fact that the 
researcher can develop themes with respondents as they emerge (Allan, 1991). 
There are, of course, many difficulties with replication in any event. First, 
changes can obviously occur in a community, organisation, or whatever in the 
time between first and later studies (Lewis, 1951). There is also the strong 
possibility that the researcher's own assumptions affect what she or he 
perceives, records and reports (Freeman, 1984), although much will depend on 
the nature of the interview (e. g. whether structured or not). 
Furthermore, there is what Measor (1985) refers to as 'rambling', where an 
interviewee will move away from the designated area of discussion. Rambling is 
nonetheless important, in that it may provide additional data to the researcher, 
and data which is of importance to the interviewee. This was certainly the case 
during this study, with interviewees offering additional unsolicited information 
of value on a number of occasions. 
However, such criticisms of qualitative approaches do not undermine the case 
for using them. If anything, they highlight the need for replication in order to 
test and develop the analyses generated in qualitative studies. As Allan (199 1) 
points out: 
"Crucially, those who favour qualitative approaches would accept that the 
perspective a researcher brings to the research does influence the resultant 
findings', but that theflexibility of the methods, their time-span and the quality 
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of the data collected allowsforfar greater reflexivity about the theoretical and 
conceptual assumptions being made than do those methods which produce 
apparently more reliable, highly structured data. " 
(Allan, 1991: 182) 
Given that this research was undertaken as a part-time doctoral study, the 
lengthy time span involved has allowed for greater reflection than would have 
been possible with study of similar phenomena demanding much earlier 
completion. This, it is argued, has permitted a far more comprehensive and 
detailed study to be achieved. 
Easterby-Smith et al (199 1) view the phenomenological approach in a similar 
way to that of grounded theory, as proposed by Glaser & Strauss (1967). With 
grounded theory, Glaser & Strauss (1967) considered the key task of the 
researcher was to develop theory through comparative method; essentially, this 
means looking at the same event or process in different settings. Glaser & 
Strauss in turn proposed the following two criteria for evaluating the quality of a 
theory: 
u It should be sufficiently analytic to enable some generalisation to take place, 
and; 
ci It should be possible for people to relate the theory to their own experiences. 
The latter part of this study has involved such development of theory (i. e. 
theory in part designed for use as an analytical tool; such tools or 'frameworks' 
commonly used in the study of strategic management), in this instance outlining 
strategic choices faced by management of container shipping lines. Theory 
developed in this study may be applied as an analytical framework, and this 
conforms to the first evaluation criterion. In addition, following further primary 
research carried out during the study (i. e. interviews with carrier management), 
industry professionals can readily relate the theory to their own experiences, 
thus conforming to the second evaluation criterion. 
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In grounded theory, the theory, or theoretical framework, is developed by the 
researcher alternating between inductive and deductive thought (Hussey & 
Hussey, 1997). In this process, the researcher first inductively gains information 
which is apparent in the data collected. Next, a deductive approach is used and 
this allows the researcher to move away from the data and think rationally about 
any missing information, forming conclusions based on logic. When 
conclusions have been drawn, the researcher reverts to an inductive approach, 
and tests these tentative hypotheses with existing or new data. Through this 
inductive/deductive approach, the deducted suggestions can be supported, 
refuted or modified. (A more detailed discussion of the grounded theory 
approach in the context of this study is given in section 2.6.1) 
The contrasting view would be that one should start with a theory or 
hypothesis about the nature of the world and then seek data that will confirm or 
refute the theory. A major benefit of the latter approach is initial clarity about 
what is to be investigated, and clarity of method means that it is easier for 
another researcher to replicate the study. Starting with a theoretical framework 
is nevertheless considered to be less important in a phenomenological study than 
in a positivistic study (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). 
This study is a mix of both, in that the researcher develops or constructs a 
theoretical framework, but first applies an existing theoretical framework 
(Integration and Responsiveness in Global Industries - Prahalad & Doz, 1987) 
to aid data collection and analysis, and to provide categories from which data 
can be analysed easily and effectively, and generalisations made. 
In this study such an approach is considered to be complementary. First, data 
has been analysed in a structured manner, using categories (e. g. contained in the 
Integration-Responsiveness Framework) to facilitate the process. Thereafter, 
through the inductive/deductive process, information is gradually drawn from 
the data to form a new and industry specific theoretical framework (Strategic 
Choice in the Global Container Shipping industry) that fits phenomena under 
examination. 
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2.3.3 Research design 
It is important to ensure that research results are valid and reliable. If theories 
are generated, then it is also important that they will be applicable in other 
settings. Achieving this depends on the appropriateness of the research design. 
Three criteria of research design have been proposed, namely: 
c3 Personal preference of the researcher; 
u Aims and context of the research to be carried out; 
Will the research stand up to outside scrutiny? 
(Easterby-Smith, 1991: 40) 
In this study, the researcher has gathered primary data through interviewing 
managers working in the industry in question. This has brought the researcher 
into close contact with events and views, from the perspective of senior 
managers (i. e. key decision-makers), and helped to raise awareness of and 
illuminate other potential areas of interest worthy of examination. Further, this 
also fits with the phenomenological approach adopted, which in turn 
corresponds with the objective of the research, and the nature of the research 
question. 
Whether or not the findings stand up to outside scrutiny depends to some 
extent on the accuracy of the data collected and analysed, and this is an issue 
facing all forms of research. In this study, however, triangulation has helped to 
confirm and refute a number of issues, thus aiding reliability. Validity and 
reliability tend to have different meanings that largely depend on the 
philosophical viewpoint adopted. Table 2.5 summarises some of these meanings 
in relation to the phenomenological viewpoint. 
Obtaining data through in-depth face to face interviews, added to use of 
triangulation methods (e. g. confirming/refuting data through reference to 
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industry publications, academic articles, and company documentation) to 
minimise bias and confirm statements, has aided validity. Checking statements 
made with other informants, in addition to re-checking with interviewees, has 
also helped to maintain reliability. With regard to generalisability of ideas and 
theory generated, it is argued that by investigating examples of both main modes 
of operation in the industry, ideas and theories generated may also be applicable 
to other industry participants. 
Table 2.5 Questions of reliability, validity and generalisability 
Phenomenological viewpoint 
Validity Has the researcher gained full access to the knowledge and 
meanings of informants? 
Reliability Will similar observations be made by different researchers 
on different occasions? 
Generalisability How likely is it that ideas and theories generated in one 
setting will also apply in other settings? 
Source: Adapted from Easterby-Smith (199 1), p. 41 
2.3.4 Case study research 
In this study, an explanatory case study approach is used in which existing 
theory is applied to help understand and explain what is happening (Scapens, 
1990). The literature review of globalisation theory from a strategic 
management perspective (see Chapter 4), highlights the main benefits to be 
derived from a global strategy, as well as some of the barriers to globalisation. 
The study has sought to investigate these issues further in the specific context 
of the global container shipping industry. A theoretical framework has been 
applied in order to effectively categorise and analyse data collected. Using a 
case study approach, the framework employed has facilitated examination and 
analysis of specific organisational pressures, pressures for global integration and 
for local responsiveness, facing firms competing in a global industry (Prahalad 
& Doz, 1987). 
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Eisenhardt (1989) refers to the case study as: 
....... a research study which focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within a single setting. " 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 534) 
Mitchell (1983) goes a little further, characterising a case study as: 
...... a detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which the 
analyst believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general 
theoretical principle... " 
(Mitchell, 1983: 192) 
A solution to the question of generalisability (and hence representation) is to 
study more than one case (Skolnick, 1966). This is the approach taken in this 
study in which, although the main focus is directed towards one 
(collaborating) organisation, sufficient data was collected on a competing firm 
in order to compare, contrast, and analyse differences (and similarities) relating 
to both firms. 
A unit case (study) may be a person, a small group, a community, an event or 
an episode (Platt, 1988). Very little attention has been given in the literature as 
to how cases are chosen, except in the suggestion that a series of related case 
studies, each of which looks at a different set of conditions, can be useful in 
building theory (Eckstein, 1975). There seems to be an agreed definition of a 
case as a 'bounded' system, with an understanding that it will be at the very 
least a single case studied intensively (Simons, 1980). With a view such as this, 
non-academics and practitioners are arguably less interested in the general 
propositions, than in the cases on which they have to act. Validity, too, is seen 
as residing in the nature of the direct experience (Platt, 1988). The emphasis, 
therefore, is on 'understanding' and 'tacit knowledge' rather than formal method 
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and explicit theorising. Moreover, the case study method is holistic and 
examines interaction between many variables. 
Logically following on from this, Runyan (1982) defines case study method 
as: 
...... the presentation and interpretation of detailed information about a single 
subject, whether an event, a culture, or .. an individual life. " 
(Runyan, 1982: 121) 
However, Runyan's real focus was on individual persons, and, according to 
Platt (1988) his criteria for a good case study are skewed towards insight, 
empathy and the rhetorical virtues rather than 'explanation'. By contrast, Yin 
(1984) considers case studies ideal for analysis of organisational processes, 
defining a case study as: 
"... an empirical inquiry that: - investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context; when - the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and in which - multiple sources ofevidence are used " 
(Yin, 1984: 23) 
This definition seems to suggest, at least as far as organisational research is 
concerned, a need for in-depth inquiry 'within' the subject area. Further, it is 
distinguishable from other approaches such as a history, experiment or survey. 
The additional value of a case study is that it may suggest hypotheses or 
interpretations which facilitate direction towards future (perhaps quantitative) 
investigations. 
Inevitably, however, the appropriateness of any research approach: 
"... derivesfrom the nature of the social phenomena to be explored. " 
(Morgan & Smircich, 1980: 49 1) 
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One criticism of qualitative case studies is that they are not always 
representative, but as Mitchell (1983) and Yin (1984) argue, this is based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of case study analysis. As Eckstein (1975) points 
out, a qualitative case study research method can be: 
deliberately used to stimulate the imagination towards discerning important 
generalproblems andpossible theoretical solutions 
(Eckstein, 1975: 104, from Mitchell, 1983: 196) 
While it has been assumed (albeit rather narrowly) that generalising theory is 
the only worthwhile goal of a case study (e. g. Stake, 1980), it is also evident that 
a case study is an ideal source of description about a particular case seen as 
inherently interesting in its own right. Nevertheless, the question remains - how 
representative are the findings from a study of a particular firm, industrial 
sector, or whatever (Woods, 1979; Ball, 19 8 1; Burgess, 1983)? 
A solution to this dilemma is obviously to study more than one case. Skolnick 
(1966), for example, conducted the bulk of his participant observation of police 
officers in one US city and, for the sake of broad comparison, two weeks 
were also spent in another US city of comparable size, non-white population, 
industry and commerce. This extra case allowed Skolnick to place his 
observations in perspective, and to develop a number of contrasts between the 
two police forces. A similar approach has been adopted in this study, in which a 
greater number of interviews were conducted with managers from the 
collaborating organisation, than with managers from the comparison 
organisation. 
Powell's (1985) study contrasted two publishing houses that adopted different 
approaches to the process of publishing. Powell proposed that if the cases 
studied are extremes, it suggests more confident coverage of the whole field, but 
this also raises the problem that extremes could have special characteristics. The 
argument may however be more persuasive where cases are drawn from 'varied 
settings' (Platt, 1988). 
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The approach taken here is similar to Powell's (1985) study in that two firms 
from the same industry (i. e. Sea-Land and Evergreen Line), each appearing to 
adopt 'contrasting approaches' in the way they meet the needs of customers, 
here described as 'contrasting modes of operation' (Yankowicz, 1995), have 
been selected for further examination. 
2.4 Sampling frame/method 
2.4.1 Research design 
A characteristic of phenomenological studies is that research questions often 
evolve during the process of the research (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). In some 
phenomenological studies the research question may even take the form of a 
grand tour question (Werner & Schoepfle, 1987), i. e. a single research question 
posed in its most general form. The benefits of this are: 
The researcher does not block off any other potential lines of enquiry; and 
u The aim is not to set a question which might restrict enquiries. 
The aim posed for this study - To investigate and improve understanding of 
strategic management in the global container shipping industry - corresponds to 
some extent with the notion of a grand tour question. Nevertheless, an 
appropriate design is still necessary, primarily because different kinds of issues 
logically demand different kinds of data-gathering arrangements. 
The choice of design approach in this study involves selection of companies 
practising forms of trade which represent examples of what appear to be the 
main modes of operation adopted by industry participants; this represents a 
design decision which involves contrasting modes of operation (Jankowicz, 
1995: 154). The study therefore involves examining contrasting modes of 
operation in what is a descriptive, analytic and explanatory project. 
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2.4.2 Sampling 
A comparative case study analysis is employed here to help identify and explore 
similarities and differences, and to identify common patterns. However, this still 
leaves the decision relating to which subjects to select for study, in other words, 
the sample. Sampling can be defined as: 
the deliberate choice of a number of people, the sample, who are to 
provide you with dataftom which you will draw conclusions about some larger 
group, the population, whom these people represent. " 
(Jankowicz, 1991: 154) 
From the sample one must first establish a sampling frame (i. e. all the 
population from which the sampling units are drawn). This implies the 
researcher needs to know: 
t3 How many people/organisations are in the population; and 
u How this total is made up from people/organisations falling into various 
subgroups in which the researcher may be interested. 
The total population of firms offering global container services amounts to 
approximately twenty companies (as identified in Chapter 3), which means the 
sample chosen is equivalent to 10 per cent of the population (i. e. 10 per cent of 
firms, not capacity). In this sense, it is important to ensure the sample is not 
biased, and is representative of the population from which it is drawn. 
As it would be impractical to undertake an in-depth qualitative study of this 
type into all global shipping lines, a more realistic approach was to identify 
firms which demonstrated aspects of strategic management that represented 
examples of the principal modes of operation adopted in the industry, and then 
to analyse these firms in more detail (Kennedy, 1979). 
Sea-Land, the collaborating organisation, suggested at the beginning of the 
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study the presence of two quite different modes of operation adopted by industry 
participants. Such a view also corresponded with research findings of various 
writers on the containerisation phenomenon (e. g. Sletmo & Williams, 1981; 
Kim, 1987; Lim, 1996). These writers cite what might be described as 
4 establishment lines', companies that had been in existence for many years, are 
members of liner conferences, and generally worked together with other 
A establishment' lines within strategic alliances. Sea-Land gave, as an example of 
an establishment line, the Peninsular & Oriental Steamship Company (P&O). 
Sea-Land also believed its own mode of operation to be somewhat similar to 
P&O and other establishment lines given its commitment to liner conferences 
and to strategic alliances with competitors (this notwithstanding the fact that the 
former had itself only been in existence since the early 1960's). 
Then there were the 'independents, lines with relatively recent histories, 
which tended to be non-conference 'outsiders', and who generally preferred not 
to enter into strategic alliances with competing carriers. Sea-Land gave as an 
example of an independent line Evergreen Marine Corporation, based in Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
In this sense, it is argued that an in-depth study of two firms (i. e. Sea-Land and 
Evergreen), each representing examples of the two main modes of operation 
adopted by competitors in the industry, will help identify patterns which may be 
repeated in other similar situations (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). 
In addition to the decision concerning the sample of firms, the researcher also 
needed to identify people who were to be selected for interview within each 
firm. In this study, a purposive sampling strategy has been employed 
(Jankowicz, 1995). This involved choosing people whose views are relevant to 
an issue either because the researcher made a judgement, or the collaborator 
persuaded the researcher that their views were particularly worth obtaining and 
typified important varieties of viewpoint. The study has also employed what is 
termed a key informant technique (Temblay, 1982), whereby people with 
specialised knowledge about the issue in question are selected for interview. A 
limitation of the purposive sampling method, however, may be that the 
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researcher is never quite sure whether some people are 'typical', more especially 
when some part of the organisation may be undergoing changes (Jankowicz, 
1995). 
The interview sample size depended to some extent on the kind of questions to 
be asked, and the form of sampling adopted. In purposive sampling, the sample 
size is determined by the researchers feeling that all or sufficient numbers of 
relevant people have been approached (Jankowicz, 1995). 
Information concerning the interview programme is provided in Table 2.6 and 
in APPENDIX A. In total, 25 interviews were completed, details of which are 
set out in Table 2.6 below. The first 4 interviews held with managers of the 
collaborating organisation (Sea-Land) each involved discussions concerning the 
firm's agreement to collaborate with the research. They were largely used to 
identify key strategic management issues facing industry competitors, and to 
check the relevance and appropriateness of the Prahalad & Doz framework for 
application in research of the container shipping industry (this framework was 
subsequently used as the basis for the questionnaire). 
After designing the questionnaire (see APPENDIX B), based on the Prahalad 
& Doz framework headings, with questions set to fit issues relevant to the 
container shipping industry, interviews were arranged with the collaborating 
organisation (Sea-Land), and with the comparison organisation (Evergreen 
Line). A total of 8 interviews with Sea-Land and 4 interviews with Evergreen 
Line were conducted using the questionnaire designed to establish, and 
compare, organisational pressures for global operational integration and for 
local responsiveness. 
Finally, a further 9 interviews were conducted with Sea-Land management at 
its global headquarters in North Carolina. The purpose of these later interviews 
was: 
To confirm/refute and refine findings from earlier interviews; 
u To gather new data, and; 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 38 
Chanter 2- Research Methodoloev 
u To establish the accuracy and relevance of the strategic choice theoretical 
framework developed during the study. 
Table 2.6 Interview schedule and purpose 
Year Purpose of interview Organisation Number of 
interviews 
1993-94 13 Confirm industrial collaboration Sea-Land 4 
agreement 
11 Identifying key industry and 
strategic management issues 
U Agree research methodology 
E3 Check appropriateness of Prahalad 
& Doz framework 
1994 0 Undertake interviews using Sea-Land 8 
questionnaire based on Prahalad & 
Doz framework to assess pressures 
for global integration/local 
responsiveness 
1994 0 Undertake interviews using Evergreen 4 
questionnaire based on Prahalad & 
Doz fi-amework to assess pressures 
for global integration/local 
responsiveness 
1996 0 Undertake interviews to check and Sea-Land 9 
refine findings from interview 
programme/gather new data 
Q Undertake interviews to confirm 
relevance of Strategic Choice 
theoretical framework 
Whatever the unit of analysis, it will still be necessary to understand events 
leading up to the present (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). Hence this study contains 
one chapter (Chapter 3) relating to the global container shipping industry in 
general, and a further chapter (Chapter 5) which provides a necessary focus on 
the history and development of the two firms under examination. Collection of 
this data, and subsequent writing up of these two, mainly but not exclusively 
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descriptive (i. e. 'scene setting') chapters, aided the researcher in identification 
and facilitating awareness of the key issues facing competitors in the container 
shipping industry. Knowledge gained through this process was also highly 
beneficial in selecting an appropriate strategic management theoretical 
framework to aid data collection and analysis, in helping to design interview 
questions, in identifying key informants, and hence to probe more deeply into 
critical industry events and issues. 
2.4.3 Pilot study 
In order to test the issue of contrasting modes of operation in liner container 
shipping further, and to ensure that the main research work would be correctly 
focused, a pilot study was undertaken. The focus of the pilot (case) study, after 
discussion with Sea-Land, concentrated on two of the major container shipping 
lines, P&O and Evergreen Line. These firms were, according to Sea-Land, 
representative of the two principal contrasting modes of operation adopted by 
industry participants. The aim of the pilot study was to identify and explore 
these contrasting modes of operation further. 
Criteria employed to aid analysis of each company's mode of operation 
included: a review of corporate histories'; analysis of service networks, 
schedules, and fleet/equipment; and an overview of the prevailing strategies, 
which each carrier employed to maintain competitive advantage. The methods 
of data collection used (in the pilot study) included accessing secondary sources 
such as industry/trade press articles, company publications and reports. 
This was supplemented by telephone interviews with managers from each 
operator. This approach differs from the subsequent method adopted later in the 
main research programme in that no face-to-face interviews took place during 
the pilot study (apart from with the collaborating organisation, Sea-Land). 
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A draft of the prepared case study was sent to both P&O and to Evergreen for 
comments as to the accuracy of the written work. Various comments were 
received, and the case study was amended accordingl Y2. 
Significantly, the pilot study helped to identify, and confirm, a number of key 
differences between P&O and Evergreen. These differences mainly related to 
issues noted above such as company origins and history, conference affiliation, 
and in their different approaches to working with other carriers, thus 
substantiating the argument that contrasting modes of operation existed in the 
industry. 
However, the case study also highlighted other differences between the carriers 
in terms of asset configuration, route networks, and growth strategies. For 
example, the study found that Evergreen was more than twice the size of P&O 
(in terms of vessel capacity), and P&O (at the time) had no presence in the 
Transpacific trade, which rather suggested it was not quite as 'global 0 as 
Evergreen or indeed other carriers. 
Whilst the pilot study was informative, it suggested several changes in 
approach were necessary in respect of the main study. These changes primarily 
concerned: 
The need to select two more compatible firms in terms of fleet size and 
geographic (i. e. global) coverage; 
u The need to select firms representing contrasting modes of operation 
identified in the container shipping business. (P&O and Evergreen were 
nevertheless considered to be representative of aspects which were 'typical' 
of the above mentioned cluster of characteristics (Woods, 1979)), and; 
2 The case was subsequently published by Cranfield Case Clearing House as The Global Container 
Shipping Industry (Baird & Lindsay, 1994), and is used as a teaching aid demonstrating to business 
students the different strategies management may adopt when participating in the same global industry. 
3 'Global' in this sense means a carrier maintains services on all three main East-West trades (i. e. 
Transatlantic, Transpacific, Europe-Far East), in addition to a significant network within each of the 
three main global trading regions (i. e. Europe, North America, and Asia), plus services connecting these 
regions into North-South trades (e. g. with South American and African markets). 
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The need to undertake in-depth interviews with company managers in order 
to seek out explanations and especially to further clarify the ways in which 
modes of operation/strategies differed. 
Nevertheless, use of a comparative perspective in the pilot study clearly helped 
to establish differences between each firm, and hence illustrate the 
distinctiveness of each. The case study research approach was therefore adapted 
accordingly in respect of the main study. 
2.5 Data collection 
2.5.1 Management research 
Management research tends to differ in a number of ways from other social 
science research. Such differences will inevitably impact on the data collection 
process. In particular, management research demonstrates two major features: 
u Management is essentially about controlling, influencing, and structuring the 
awareness of others, and this means that political issues will rarely be far 
removed from the research process, and; 
oA considerable amount of empirical research in the social sciences is carried 
out on members of society who may be (or may be perceived to be) less 
powerfid than the researchers. In management research this is generally not 
the case. 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991: 44) 
Research of managers and management results in a situation where the 
subjects of research are very likely to be more powerful than the researchers 
themselves. Consequently, gaining access to senior managers is generally 
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exceedingly difficult for most researchers (Bonoma, 1985). 
During the research study, it was essential to consider the priorities of the 
collaborating organisation, Sea-Land, if adequate management access was to be 
gained. Various methods were employed over the period of the research in an 
effort to enhance the attractiveness of the research to the collaborating 
organisation and to maintain interest. This included: 
u Undertaking extensive background reading of the industry to ensure relevant 
discussion of contemporary issues of importance during meetings and 
correspondence; 
a Submitting draft questionnaires for comment and approval, and; 
0 Submission of the draft pilot case study to the collaborating organisation 
requesting comments, contributions and advice. 
Nevertheless, in management research, and where the emphasis is on 
qualitative methods, the researcher needs to be aware that access to managers 
may in some situations be obstructed if deemed harmful (Easterby-Smith et al, 
1991: 2). Moreover, managers are unlikely to allow research access to their 
organisations unless they can see advantages derived from it. Managers will also 
wish to see practical consequences from any research, and more especially 
consequences that they are capable of exploiting. 
In this study there was never any suggestion that the research findings would 
necessarily be ground-breaking, or might result in recommendations leading to 
significant competitive advantage of one firm over another. Rather, the 
collaborating organisation accepted that the aim (of the study) was to undertake 
in-depth analysis and comparison of key players in the industry in an effort to 
identify and analyse differences in business approach to providing a global 
container service. At the very least, findings were therefore expected to aid and 
improve understanding of strategic management in the global container shipping 
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industry. 
2.5.2 Access to management 
Access to Sea-Land management was obtained through Mr. Nick Wilde, 
Marketing Director (UK and Ireland), based in the UK head office located in 
Watford, England. This contact had managed to obtain the company's 
agreement to collaborate with the research, under certain conditions. Container 
shipping is a very competitive industry, where service differentiation is hard to 
achieve, and in which the slightest advantage a firm can develop over its 
adversaries may have great significance. 
Access to Evergreen managers proved to be more difficult. Thus, a reduced 
level of access consequently led to fewer interviews being held with Evergreen 
managers (4 interviews using the Prahalad & Doz questionnaire, compared to 8 
interviews with Sea-Land managers). This was not viewed as a particular 
problem, given the primary focus of the research was inevitably towards Sea- 
Land, as the collaborating organisation. However, the fact that interviews (using 
the questionnaire) were also undertaken with Evergreen executives, arguably 
permitted better than a broad comparison (as in Skolnick, 1966) to be achieved. 
Interviews held with Evergreen managers therefore generated sufficient 
primary data in order to ensure a degree of valid comparison. In addition, a 
significant amount of secondary data pertaining to Evergreen's strategy and 
container shipping operations had already been collected during preparation of 
the pilot study, and much of this data was used and added to during the main 
part of the research. 
2.5.3 Interviews 
Of all qualitative research approaches, the in-depth interview is considered to be 
the most fundamental qualitative research method (Jankowicz, 1995). The 
interview provides an opportunity for the researcher to: 
....... probe deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem 
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and to secure vivid, accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal 
experience. " 
(Burgess, 1982: 107) 
In preparing for interviews a researcher will need to have at least some broad 
questions in mind. During the study, 12 of the 25 interviews (i. e. 8 with Sea- 
Land, 4 with Evergreen; a 2: 1 ratio) involved use of a semi-structured 
questionnaire (see Appendix B) adapted from the theoretical framework used to 
assess and analyse pressures (for global integration and for local responsiveness) 
faced by global businesses (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). The remaining 13 
interviews also had specific purposes (see Table 2.6). Substantial preparation 
was therefore necessary prior to each meeting. 
As more interviews were completed, so more evident became the patterns that 
developed (Jones, 1985). There was also a need to be perceptive and sensitive to 
events so that lines of inquiry could be changed and adapted during an 
interview. 
The issue of social interaction is important in this type of research. For 
example, an interviewee may feign interest and seek to get the interview over 
with quickly. In an effort to avoid some of these pitfalls, several methods were 
employed during the interview programme, including: 
E3 Ensure sufficient knowledge about the company and its activities; 
u Initial phone call is better than a letter (managers are often surprisingly ready 
to talk); 
c3 Use appropriate language (not too theoretical), and; 
Follow up by letter as this gives credibility and an opportunity to provide 
more information about the research. 
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Although using a tape recorder aids the listening process, it is also argued that 
it can be counterproductive to lose potentially revealing insights through its use 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). This implies that interviewees may withhold 
information due to the presence of a tape recorder. A tape recorder was not 
employed during interviews carried out for this study. Instead, the semi- 
structured questionnaire employed contained sufficient space for the researcher 
to note down comments as they were made. 
A total of 21 interviews were held with Sea-Land executives in the UK, the 
Netherlands, and in the United States over a three year period between 1993 and 
1996 (see APPENDIX A). Twelve of these interviews were held in Europe, 8 of 
which involved the use of the semi-structured questionnaire specifically related 
to the Prahalad & Doz (1987) framework (see APPENDIX B). The other 4 
management interviews involved general discussions about the research aims 
and methodology, the container shipping industry, and related issues. Eight of 
the Sea-Land interviews were conducted with staff in various UK offices, and 4 
in the European Regional Headquarters located in Rotterdam. Interviewees were 
representative of all key management functions within the company, including 
sales and marketing, vessels and equipment, terminals, finance, and IT. 
Four executives in Evergreen were interviewed using the semi-structured 
questionnaire based on the Prahalad & Doz framework, all in the UK, and 
mainly from the sales and marketing functions. One interview was held in the 
Glasgow regional office, and 3 in the former European Regional Headquarters 
in London. All Evergreen interviews involved the use of the semi-structured 
questionnaire modelled on the Prahalad & Doz (1987) framework. This made 
for a total of 12 semi-structured interviews (8 Sea-Land, 4 Evergreen) 
specifically relating to primary data collection in relation to the theoretical 
framework, a ratio of 2: 1 in favour of the collaborating organisation Sea-Land. 
Nine further interviews were subsequently held during 1996 with senior staff 
representing all key management functions in Sea-Land's global headquarters in 
Charlotte, North Carolina. These final interviews were used to: 
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u Seek confirmation (and validation) of much of the data analysed; 
u Present and discuss the industry theoretical framework concerning strategic 
choice in liner container shipping developed during the research, and; 
u Generally discuss major issues/challenges faced by the company and its 
global adversaries now and in the foreseeable future. 
In general, the questionnaire modelled on the Prahalad & Doz framework 
presented few problems for respondents, with each interview lasting between 2 
and 3 hours. Interviews began with an explanation of the aims of the research 
project, which in turn made the interviewees more relaxed and positive once 
they knew the purpose of the questions (Whyte, 1982; Buchanan et al., 1988; 
Jones, 1991). On occasions, it was found that interviewees would offer 
additional information not specifically requested as part of the framework. This 
necessitated a "need to offer a listening ear" (Crompton & Jones, 1988: 70), at 
times, and indeed in some instances was most valuable in highlighting potential 
new lines of inquiry. 
The interviews were not tape recorded, as noted above. The researcher had 
previously conducted a number of face-to-face interviews in the ports and 
shipping industry, using questionnaires, and found from experience that he was 
able to note down all salient points in long hand. Sufficient space was left under 
each question on the questionnaire sheets to write in the responses. The 
researcher employed improvised shorthand where time was short. After each 
interview ended it was generally necessary to go over the responses to each 
question in order to include any comments made which had not been noted. In 
several instances, follow-up telephone and fax contact was necessary to seek 
confirmation or otherwise of certain statements, issues or events. 
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2.5.4 Validation and reducing bias 
The more accurate the data is, the less likely bias will be an issue. In order to 
reduce interview bias, it was necessary in some instances to: 
o Repeat the question (i. e. 'basic probe') and ask interviewees to provide 
examples of what they meant (i. e. explanatory probe"), and; 
L3 Send interviewees copies of written papers to gain new insights. 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991: 79) 
In addition to qualitative data collection and analysis, a considerable amount 
of quantitative secondary data is also included throughout this work. 
Quantitative data has been extracted from a wide range of secondary sources 
including academic journals, specialised industry/trade publications, as well as 
data emanating from interviewees themselves. 
The quantitative data is essential in order to help place the subject 
organisations; in context, to highlight movement (of firms) within the industry, 
to assess the extent of assets employed, and in identifying the general structure 
of the industry. It sets a useful context upon which a qualitative approach is then 
necessary in order to go a little deeper and to ask key questions (Callaghan, 
1997). 
A further reason for employing multiple data sources is the need for one data 
source to be corroborated by another (Woods, 1986). Extensive secondary data 
has also therefore been collected to aid the process of triangulation, and hence 
verification. This was necessary because there were occasions during the study 
when published data was used to confirm (and in some instances to refute) 
primary data. 
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2.6 Analytical techniques 
2.6.1 Grounded theory 
A major task in this or any other similar qualitative research study concerns how 
to analyse the substantial volume of qualitative data collected. There are two 
basic ways of analysing qualitative data: 
Content analysis, in which the researcher 'goes by numbers' and 
'frequency'; and 
u Grounded theory, where the researcher 'goes by feel' and 'intuition', aiming 
to produce common or contradictory themes or patterns from the data which 
can be used as a basis for interpretation. 
(Easterby-Smith, 1991: 105) 
Table 2.7 illustrates some of the differences between content analysis and 
grounded theory. Bulmer (1979) questioned the grounded theory method by 
laying doubt on the potential of the researcher suspending his or her awareness 
of relevant theories and concepts until a relatively late stage in the process as 
this may lead to unstructured data collection. However, this need not be the case 
in all research. In this study, an established theoretical framework is employed 
in order to aid analysis of data in a structured manner, using the categories 
contained within the framework. Yet, as the study demonstrates, it has still 
proved possible to develop theory based on data collected, following subsequent 
analysis of that data using a structured approach. 
Content analysis is more commonly used when frequencies are required from 
qualitative or unstructured data to be added to a computer model. A weakness of 
this approach is that while the researcher will be able to understand what the 
concepts are, this does not allow for understanding of why ideas occur and why 
individuals interpret events or issues in different ways (Easterby-Smith et a], 
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1991). 
Table 2.7 Differences between 'content analysis' and 'grounded 
theory' 
Content analysis Grounded theory 
Bitty Holistic 
Go by frequency Go by feel 
Objectivity Closer to the data, open much longer 
Deductive Inductive 
Testing hypothesis Testing out themes, developing patterns 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al (199 1), p. 106 
Grounded theory, on the other hand, provides for a more open approach to data 
analysis, and recognises that large amounts of data produced by qualitative 
studies makes data analysis problematic. Correctly analysing qualitative data 
involves systematically establishing themes, patterns and categories (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Furthermore, grounded theory is considered to be effective 
because: 
....... rather thanforcing data within logico-deductively derived assumptions and 
categories, research should be used to generate grounded theory, which : fits' 
and 'works' because it is derived from the concepts and categories used by 
social actors themselves, to interpret and organise their worlds. " 
(Jones, 1987: 25) 
Grounded theory is regarded as one of the interpretive methods that share the 
common philosophy of phenomenology (Stem, 1994). It is about developing 
inductively a derived theory about a phenomenon whereby the findings of the 
research constitute a theoretical formulation of the reality under investigation 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Thus, in practice theory can be generated by 
observations made during the study, as opposed to being decided beforehand. 
The purpose of grounded theory is therefore to build theory that is faithful to, 
and which serves to illuminate, the area under investigation (Hussey & Hussey, 
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1997). Moreover, the intention must be to ensure the theory is intelligible to and 
usable by those in the situation being studied, and is open to comment and 
correction by them (Turner, 198 1). Particular attention has been paid to the last 
point, with the final 9 interviews undertaken at Sea-Land Global Headquarters 
in Charlotte used to discuss the theoretical framework developed during the 
study with executives representing all key management functions. 
2.6.2 Data analysis 
To facilitate data collection and analysis an existing strategic management 
theoretical framework (Integration-Responsiveness Framework - Prahalad & 
Doz, 1987) has been used in the study. The framework is designed to help 
establish the often conflicting pressures for global operational integration, and 
for local responsiveness in an industry. The framework offers categories for data 
collection and analysis, based on derived assumptions. The strategic 
management/globalisation literature review (Chapter 4) identified this as the 
only framework that permits analysis of such pressures facing global businesses, 
other (strategy) frameworks tending to offer potential for evaluation of issues 
relating to competitive advantage of the fmn (e. g. Porter's (1986) Generic 
Strategies and Value Chain). 
However, the study has also used the grounded approach in that theory is 
generated, derived from information provided by social actors themselves, and 
corresponding fully with the way in which they interpret their world (i. e. tested 
through subsequent interviews with collaborating organisation management). 
One of the accusations that is periodically levelled at qualitative researchers is 
that they are disinclined to instil theoretical elements into their research (Rock, 
1973). Yet using existing theory can allow the researcher to maintain order and 
rigour with regard to data collection, and help facilitate the data analysis 
process. The theoretical framework employed here is used as a template (Yin, 
1984), with headings taken from it aiding categorisation, and thereafter analysis 
and presentation of qualitative data. Furthermore, the interview questionnaire 
used to gather qualitative data (see APPENDIX B) was partially designed on the 
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basis of the general theoretical framework itself, albeit modified to take account 
of specific issues relevant to the container shipping industry. This form of 
approach significantly eased problems normally associated with data analysis in 
that much of the data collected was labelled and categorised virtually straight 
away. 
The purpose of the Prahalad & Doz framework itself is to help identify, 
categorise and analyse organisational pressures faced by global businesses, 
pressures for global operational integration, and pressures for local 
responsiveness to diverse market needs. Criteria proposed by Prahalad & Doz to 
assess such pressures were initially discussed with representatives of the 
collaýorating organisation to ascertain their relevance to the global container 
shipping business. The criteria were deemed to be sufficiently comprehensive 
(by industry executives and by project supervisors), with no additional criteria 
considered necessary. 
Some view the 'imposition' of such a pre-ordained theoretical framework as 
deleterious because it may constrain the researcher and may also exhibit a poor 
fit with the participants' perspectives (Bryman, 1988; Bulmer, 1954). However, 
the 'testing' of theories should not necessarily be frowned on; Hammersley, 
Scarth & Webb (1985) advocate just such a comparative case study approach, 
whereby research sites are strategically chosen to allow theories to be tested. An 
approach of this nature is considered particularly appropriate where there is a 
need to cope with a mass of data. 
Applying a theoretical framework as a template (Yin, 1984) has also permitted 
the collection of data and the testing of ideas to become as systematic as 
possible, so that it was possible to properly address the research issue being 
investigated (Platt, 1988). Using an established theoretical framework that 
already offers useful categories facilitated the coding of data. Further, it avoided 
"everything becoming chaotic and messy' (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991: 112) as 
is typical with many qualitative studies. 
This does not imply that the researcher was unreceptive to new issues and 
undercurrents emerging in the study. Indeed, it is receptiveness to new issues 
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and ideas that has led to the development of theory in this study (i. e. the 
framework on strategic choice in container shipping, as discussed in Chapter 7). 
Although similar topics were covered during interviews with a number of 
respondents, through the use of semi-structured questionnaires an effort was 
also made to explore various occurrences of significant phenomena that may not 
have been covered within questions associated with the theoretical framework 
itself. Issues, for example, such as future plans in a specific area (e. g. new ships) 
or corporate history (i. e. 'the way things used to be done here') were further 
explored. Hence, a degree of flexibility remains a distinct advantage of 
qualitative research. 
Thus, while the Prahalad & Doz (1987) framework permitted in-depth analysis 
of the pressures for global operational integration, and for local responsiveness, 
faced by global container shipping lines, the data gathered also enabled the 
researcher to develop theory. It is this latter outcome which reflects the 
grounded theory approach. 
2.7 Limitations of the research 
2.7.1 Research design 
The methodological approach employed is thus a qualitative case study analysis, 
with a necessary focus on micro aspects. The main risk of such an approach is 
that results can be impressionistic and anecdotal (Bryman, 1988). Here the 
researcher has sought to avoid such pitfalls by using a semi-structured 
questionnaire for much of the data collection exercise, and by focussing the 
research on senior mangers with responsibility for strategic decisions. 
Three criteria for deciding on research design are the personal preference of 
the researcher, the aims and context of the research, and the question of whether 
or not the research will stand up to outside scrutiny (Easterby-Smith, 199 1). It is 
not always certain that the researcher's preference will in fact constitute the best 
approach to comply with the aims. Moreover, whether or not the findings stand 
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up to outside scrutiny will depend to some extent on the accuracy of the data 
collected and analysed. Ultimately, as is the case in this study, the researcher 
may be largely dependent on what people have said during interviews, and there 
must always be a degree of risk attached to this, even though where possible 
triangulation has been used to help compensate for biases (Denzin, 1970). 
2.7.2 Validity 
Validity may be seen as residing in the nature of one's direct experience (Platt, 
1988), and in this study the researcher has largely used informants direct 
experiences to investigate and then analyse issues. In some instances it may be 
that the researcher has been unable to gain full access to the knowledge of 
informants, thus affecting validity. The size and type of sample may have been a 
limitation in this regard. On reflection, it may have been better to focus equally 
on two (or more) organisations. However, as has been stressed earlier in this 
chapter, gaining equal access to two organisations for a study of this nature is a 
difficult challenge for the researcher to overcome. 
2.7.3 Reliability 
A further question concerns the reliability of the results. For example, would a 
different researcher have made similar observations? Research results have to be 
reliable and, if theories are generated, then it is also important that they should 
be applicable in other settings. This ideally means that the applicability of the 
findings from this study will need to be tested at some stage. Further, there is the 
added risk that interviewer/intervicwee biases can distort findings. In addition, 
informant views can change, certainly over time and as events and 
circumstances alter. This means that what information is given or statements are 
made yesterday, may not always be the same tomorrow. 
2.7.4 Genemlisability 
A question could be raised that qualitative case studies such as may not be 
representative. A possible solution to the question of generalisability (and hence 
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representation) is to study more than one case (Skolnick, 1966), and this is the 
approach adopted here. But a limiting factor in the research was that while the 
collaborating organisation provided excellent access, the comparative 
organisation did not. This is reflected in the different number of interviews 
carried out with management of each organisation, with the majority of 
interviews being conducted with management of the collaborating organisation. 
The study sought to investigate extremes in order that the population may be 
more adequately represented. However, this raises another question, that of 
whether or not the two cases are indeed extremes. Selection of what are 
perceived to be two extreme cases does suggest more confident coverage of the 
whole field, but this also raises the problem that extremes could have special 
characteristics. Again, the small sample size (i. e. two cases) may have been a 
limiting factor in this regard. 
2.7.5 Management interviews 
People with specialised knowledge about the issue in question were selected for 
interview. A limitation of this purposive sampling method, however, may be 
that the researcher is never quite sure whether some people are 'typical', more 
especially when a part of the organisation may be undergoing changes 
(Jankowicz, 1995). While several informants had been with their respective 
organisation for many years, others were relatively recent recruits, and this 
difference could have influenced their views across a range of issues. 
Gaining access to senior managers is generally exceedingly difficult for most 
researchers (Bonoma, 1985). Moreover, where the emphasis is on qualitative 
methods, the researcher needs to be aware that access to managers may in some 
situations be obstructed if deemed harmful (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). There 
is therefore an added risk that access cannot be gained to the right person(s). In 
such an event the researcher may have to make do using informants that might 
not always have the desired quality or quantity of information. 
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2.8 Summary 
This work is a mixture of both pure and applied research forms. It contains both 
examination of existing theory resulting from reflection, and explanation of why 
a situation or event occurs. 
The aim and objectives of the research demanded a predominantly 
phenomenological approach, -within which qualitative research is an associated 
variant. A comparative explanatory case study method is used, which 
investigates contemporary phenomenon using multiple sources of evidence. The 
research design decision laid the focus of the work on two firms (with 
proportionately greater emphasis on the collaborating organisation), each 
adopting seemingly contrasting modes of operation. A pilot study helped clarify 
key issues, and identify and eradicate potential weaknesses in the methodology. 
Data collection and analysis has been aided through application of a strategic 
management analytical framework. This framework (Integration- 
Responsiveness, Prahalad & Doz, 1987) is designed to facilitate identification 
and analysis of the conflicting pressures facing organisations in respect of global 
operational integration, and local responsiveness to diverse market needs. A 
questionnaire (directed at liner shipping company managers) was developed 
based on categories contained in the framework, adjusted accordingly to take 
account of factors specific to the container shipping industry. 
The research has employed a purposive sampling strategy in that only people 
considered relevant to the issues being investigated have been interviewed. 
Further, an effort has also been made to select people with specialised 
knowledge (i. e. key informant technique). Preliminary interviews with 
collaborating organisation management helped ensure the framework and 
questionnaire was appropriate, and sufficiently comprehensive to the industry in 
question. 
The study has also used the grounded theory approach in that theory has been 
developed through comparative method. A new theoretical framework 
(Strategic Choice in Container Shipping) has been developed during the 
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research study. This framework has benefited from refinement, and subsequent 
verification as to its general applicability, as a result of comments received from 
industry practitioners during interviews with senior management of the 
collaborating organisation. 
A number of limitations to the research have been highlighted. In addition to 
difficulties commonly associated with interviewing senior management of 
organisations, the principle limitations of the research relate to the relatively 
small sample size, and the dominant focus of interviews on the collaborating 
organisation. These limitations, which relate to the research design, inevitably 
raise questions concerning the validity, reliability, and generalisability of the 
results. 
However, the alternative of widening the sample was not available, given the 
resource implications this would have entailed (e. g. travel costs), in addition to 
difficulties associated with gaining access to organisations competing with the 
collaborating entity. Moreover, the very high level of management access that 
the researcher gained (within the collaborating organisation) has arguably 
resulted in collection of substantial primary data that would not have been 
possible in the absence of a collaborating organisation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE GLOBAL CONTAINER 
SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 58 
Chat)ter 3- The Global Container Shimine Industry 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 offers a macro perspective of the liner container shipping industry, 
beginning with a review of world trade developments and the effect of trade 
growth on world container traffic flows. The structure of the liner container 
shipping industry is reviewed, with particular emphasis on recent trends towards 
greater carrier concentration, and motivations for same. , 
Liner shipping is quite different from many other industries in terms of 
competition and regulation. In this context, liner conferences are explained, and 
regulation of liner shipping in the world's principle economic regions is 
investigated. Further analysis offers insight into the way carriers seek to 
differentiate their services through adoption of different competitive strategies, 
and an evaluation of carrier profitability provides explanations for the relatively 
poor financial returns achieved by the industry as a whole. 
Finally, on the demand side, a review of relevant shipper surveys investigating 
key customer requirements and decision-making criteria is provided. Recent 
developments in regard to global contracts between shippers and carriers, and 
the role of Shippers' Councils, is also considered. 
3.2 WorId container trade 
3.2.1 World trade 
Developments in world trade are driving the changes in liner shipping, hence any 
discussion of ocean container shipping requires analysis of world trade. The 
majority of world trade is conducted between and within the developed regions 
of Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim. These three regions accounted 
for 88 per cent of the value of world trade in 1995 (see Table 3.1). Between 1977 
and 1995, total world trade increased by 322 per cent from $1,200 billion to over 
$5,000 billion. 
The Pacific Rim economies have grown twice as fast as the developed 
economies of Europe and North America over the past two decades. Pacific Rim 
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exports increased from $181 billion in 1977 to $1,415 billion in 1995, a rise of 
682 per cent. EC-EFTA countries share of world trade in 1995 stood at 45 per 
cent, Pacific Rim countries at 28 per cent, and North America at 15 per cent. The 
share of world export trade held by the rest of the world was 12 per cent, a 
significant reduction from the 25 per cent of world trade recorded by these 
countries in 1977. 
Table 3.1 Trends in world exports (fob) 1977-1995 
Billion current USS 
Region 1977 1995 % growth 
1977-95 
N. America 165 14% 776 15% 371% 
EC-EFTA 560 26% 2,278 45% 307% 
Pacific Rim 181 15% 1,415 28% 682% 
Rest World 294 25% 603 12% 105% 
Total 1,200 100% 5,072 100% 322% 
Source: Euromonitor (1997) International Marketing Data and Statistics 1997.2nd edition. 
London: Euromonitor P1c. 
3.2.2 World container traffic 
According to the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH, 1999), 
world economic development has continued along the positive path that began in 
1993. The world real GDP expanded by 3% in 1996,3.2% in 1997, with 2% 
likely in 1998 due to the effects of the Asian and Russian crises. 
What is of particular interest to investors in container terminals, is the fact that 
container growth runs at a premium to GDP growth: average world container 
growth rates of 10-15% per annum over recent decades are more than double 
GDP growth (Clague, 1999). This phenomenon relating to container traffic is 
regarded as highly 'bankable' with investors keen to lend against this kind of 
trend. 
Table 3.2 shows the significant strides containerisation has made in the 
transport of world trade, from a 16.3% share in 1980 to almost 61% in 1997. 
Drewry Shipping Consultants estimate that the potential upper limit for 
containerisation of the general cargo market is 70 per cent and that this limit is 
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likely to be reached early in the next century (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 
1996). 
Table 3.2 World seaborne trade by value, 1980-1997 
% of canzo value 
Cargo Category 1980 1990 1992 1996 1997 
Oil 34.9 18.4 14.9 13.8 10.8 
Dry Bulk 14.1 12.8 10.6 9.3 9.0 
Non-Containerised 34.7 27.1 23.7 17.9 19.0 
General Cargo 
Containers 16.3 41.7 50.8 59.0 60.8 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants (1999), partially derived from UNCTAD 
Container transport is the fastest growing market in the maritime transport sector 
and is expected to continue to grow due to: 
u The continued expansion ofcontainerised shipping by developing countries; 
c3 Increased trade in higher value goods; 
c3 The trend towards globalisation by multinational manufacturers; 
u The growth in deep-sea ship size and subsequent increase in feeder traffic 
and transshipment. 
(IAPH, 1999; 16) 
Table 3.3 illustrates the growth in container traffic by geographic area. Between 
1980 and 1997 total world port container traffic throughput increased by more 
than a factor of four, from 38.7 million TEU to 170.3 million TEU. Forecasts for 
2005 suggest container traffic will grow by a approximately a further 100 million 
TEU to 271.3 million TEU, an increase of 59% over the 1997-2005 period. Over 
the 1980-2005 period container traffic will have increased by seven times. 
The world's most dominant container port region, Asia, is expected to record a 
throughput of some 117 million TEU by 2005,43% of the world total. Second 
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largest port area, Western Europe, is forecast to have 62.3 million TEU in 2005, 
23% of world container traffic. Significant growth is anticipated in South 
American ports where throughput is expected to reach over 20 million TEU in 
2005, an increase of 80% since 1997. In order to cope with this ongoing 
expansion, the IAPH estimate that more than 200 new terminals will be required 
by 2005, based on an average capacity of 500,000 containers a year per terminal. 
Table 3.3 Forecast of additional world container port throughput to 2005 
Million TEU 
Region 1980 container 1997 container 
port throughput port throughput 
Forecast additional 
throughput by 2005 
% change 
1997-2005 
Asia - 73.4 117.0 +59% 
Western Europe - 38.6 62.3 +61% 
North America - 24.5 32.3 +32% 
South America - 11.5 20.7 +80% 
Middle East -8 14.1 +76% 
Africa - 5.3 8.7 +64% 
South Asia - 4.3 9.2 +113% 
Australasia - 3.8 5.1 +34% 
Eastern Europe - 0.9 1.9 +111% 
Total 38.7 170.3 271.3 +59% 
Source: Derived from Drewry Shipping Consultants (1998) and IAPH (1999) 
3.2.3 East-West container trades 
As world trade is dominated by North American, European and Asian 
markets, so it is that the majority of world container traffic flows to and from 
these three regions. The principal East-West container trades are therefore: 
u Transpacific routes between North America and Asia 
Li Europe-Asia routes 
u Transatlantic routes between Europe and North America. 
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Table 3.4 gives a breakdown of containers carried by sea on the three major 
East-West global trade routesi. 
Table 3.4 Breakdown of container traffic on East-West trades, 1998 
Million TEU 




North America-Asia WB 












Sub Total 6.0 7.9 +32% 
Europe-North America WB 





Sub Total 5.3 6.3 +19% 
Total 20.4 25.1 +23% 
Source: Derived from Standard & Poor's DRI 
The Transpacific is the largest trade with 9.1 million TEU transported in 
1998. Second largest trade is Europe-Asia with 6.0 TEU followed by the 
Transatlantic with 5.3 million TEU. This resulted in a total of 20.4 million 
TEU shipped between the three main global trading regions. Estimates for 
2002 suggest these volumes will rise by 23% to over 25 million TEU, with 
the biggest increase (+32%) in Europe-Asia trade. 
The above figures clearly show the imbalance in container trade leaving 
operators with endless management of empty box movements. The 1998 
Asian crisis exacerbated this imbalance with increased outbound cargo from 
Asia and simultaneously reduced inbound cargo to Asia. In 1998, for every 
10 loaded containers entering Europe from Asia, there were around 6 loaded 
ones on the return leg, i. e. 40% of empty containers requiring repositioning. 
On the Transpacific trade, the imbalance was estimated at 1.6 million TEU, 
after attaining near balance two years previously (IAPH, 1999). 
1 It should be noted that port throughput appears greater than containers actually shipped as ports 
record the number of lifts and relay or transshipment containers incur additional lifts in port, 
resulting in some double counting. 
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In addition to the three principal East-West trades, which together 
accounted for 44% of world container traffic (at 1997 levels), other large 
container flows exist on trades linking the three main trading blocs with 
South American and African markets (so-called North-South trades) and on 
Intra-Regional trades (e. g. intra-Europe, intra-Asia). North-south container 
trade between the Southern Hemisphere and the three main global trading 
blocs in 1994 totalled 9.6 million TEU in 1997,21% of the world total 
(Cargo Systems, 1999). Other significant container flows were recorded in 
Intra-Regional trade (i. e. trade between European countries, trade within Asia 
etc. ) which in 1997 totalled 15.2 million TEU, or 34% of the world total. 
3.3 Industry structure 
3.3.1 Carrier consolidation 
The container shipping industry has become increasingly concentrated during 
recent years as lines have merged with or acquired other lines, and this trend is 
forecast to continue (Fossey, 1998). In November 1998 the largest 20 lines 
controlled 3.1 million TEU of shipboard capacity which is equivalent to just over 
50.0 per cent of capacity in service world-wide (see Table 3.5). 
According to the IAPH (1999), by early 1999 the 25 leading carriers controlled 
almost 60% of worldwide shipboard container capacity, equivalent to 3.6 million 
TEU out of a total world capacity of 6.0 million TEU. Some recent notable 
changes in liner ownership include: 
L3 P&O's merger with Nedlloyd in 1997; 
u Hanjin's acquisition of DSR Senator Lines in 1998; 
u Neptune Orient's purchase of APL in 1998; 
u CP Ships acquisitions of Canada Maritime, Cast, Contship, Ivaran, and 
merger with TMM; 
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u Maersk's acquisition of Safmarine in 1999 and, subject to due diligence, Sea- 
Land. 
Table 3.5 Leading 20 container service operators (September 1998) on the 
basis of number of vessels and total shh)board capacitv (TEU) 
Rank Operator Country Ships Total 
TEU 
I Maersk Line Denmark 161 346,123 
2 Evergreen Taiwan 128 280,237 
3 P&O Nedlloyd UK/Dutch 111 250,858 
4 Med SC Switz. 134 220,745 
5 Hanjin Korea 67 213,081 
6 Sea-Land USA 91 211,358 
7 COSCO China 128 202,094 
8 APL Singapore 76 201,075 
9 NYK/TSK Japan 74 163,930 
10 Mitsui OSK Japan 65 133,681 
11 flýundai Korea 36 116,644 
12 zim Israel 62 111,293 
13 CP Ships Canada 55 105,322 
14 CMA-CGM France 61 91,600 
15 Hapag Lloyd Germany 27 90,879 
16 OOCL H. Kong 33 90,063 
17 K Line Japan 44 89,717 
18 Yangming Taiwan 32 79,840 
19 UASC UAE 52 59,331 
20 Saf. /CMB Denmark 45 55,584 
Source: Containerisation. International, November 1998. 
At the same time as the industry becomes more concentrated, a number of 
factors are combining to pressurise lines into introducing bigger vessels. The 
most significant of these factors appear to be: 
u As world trade continues to expand ... ... ... this means that additional capacity 
is needed, 
u The search for lower unit costs, resulting from a seemingly unstoppable 
decline infreight rates, motivates lines to build ever larger vessels; 
L3 Impending replacement of outdated tonnage is expected to result in afurther 
spate ofordersfor big new ships in the nextfew years. 
(Baird, 1999: 168-169) 
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The capacity of the largest container vessels has almost tripled since 1980 from 
3,000 TEU to 8,000 TEU (Maersk's 'S' Class vessels have a stated capacity of 
6,600 TEU but are believed capable of carrying 8,000 TEU, according to Cargo 
Systems). In the Post-Panamax sector (i. e. vessels too large to transit the Panama 
Canal, usually carrying in excess of 4,000 TEU), there were 234 vessels in 
operation at the end of 1997 (Hoffman, 1998). Around 50 of these ships have a 
capacity of more than 5,000 TEU. A fin-ther 60 Post-Panamax vessels are 
expected to be delivered by the turn of the millennium. 
Today all the top 20 carriers operate ships of 3,500 TEU and above. Vessels in 
the 4,500-4,999 TEU capacity range only came into service in force since 1995, 
and the first ships to break the 5,000 TEU and then 6,000 TEU barriers entered 
service in 1996. As can be seen from Table 3.6, most of the major lines now 
have vessels of 5,000 TEU or above on order at the end of 1999, with some 64 of 
these ships scheduled for delivery by 2001. 
Table 3.6 Post-Panamax ShiDS on order. tOD 20 lines (SeWember 1999)' 
Carrier No & size of ships Total TEU capacity Delivery dates 
Maersk 5x6,600 33,000 1999/2000 
Maersk 5x6,200 31,000 2000 
P&O Nedlloyd 4x6,788 27,152 2000/1 
P&O Nedlloyd 5x5,460 27,300 1999/2000 
Evergreen 9x5,652 50,868 1999/2001 
Cosco 7x5,250 36,750 2001 
Hanjin 7x5,800 40,600 2000/1 
Hapag Lloyd 7x4,800 33,600 2000 
OOCL 6x5,500 33,000 2000 
Yangining 5x5,500 27,500 2000/1 
Mitsui OSK 3x5,500 16,500 2001 
APL 2x5,500 11,000 2001 
Source: Containerisation International, November 1999: 43 
According to ship classification society Germanischer Lloyd (Payer, 1999), by 
2010 ships of up to 15,000 TEU could be in operation on the main East-West 
routes. These 150,000 DWT twin-enginned vessels would have a length of 
400/450 m, a width of 69/70 m enabling 24 rows of containers across, and a draft 
of 16/18 m. Such 'jumbo' container ships will place additional demands on ports 
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and this expectation is leading to development of new container terminals at 
'offshore' locations (e. g. Bahamas, Canaries, Aden, Sardinia ctc. ) at which 
infrastructure specially designed for the mega ships can more easily be 
established than in traditional liner ports (Cullinane, Khanna & Song, 1999; 
Baird, 1999). 
3.3.2 Motives for consolidation 
Aside from merger and acquisition activity, the top 20 or so container shipping 
lines have formed themselves into several global operating alliances within 
which the ships owned by each line are pooled together to provide for an 
extensive range of joint services on the main global East-West arterial routes and 
on some North-South routes (see Table 3.7). In 1998 there were eight such 
alliances in place. Collectively, these alliances accounted for almost 60 per cent 
of world container ship capacity, equivalent to just under 3.0 million TEU. 
Table 3.7 Main container shipping alliances, 1998 
Grouping Total Ship % of 
Slots (TEU) world total 
GrandAlliance: Hapag- 635,680 13.4% 
Lloyd; NYK; P&O Nedloyd; 
MISC, OOCL 
Maersk/Sea-Land 467,541 9.8% 
K Line; Cosco; Yangming 423,462 8.9% 
New WorldAlliance: APL; 382,125 8.0% 
HMM; Mitsui OSK 
UnitedAlliance: Hanjin; 330,300 6.9% 
DSR; Cho Yang; UASC 
Evergreen/Unigiory/L. 256,254 5.4% 
Triestino 
Canada Maritime Group 153,934 3.2% 
CMA; NSCSA; Norasia 157,072 3.3% 
Sub Total 2,806,368 58.9% 
Source: Cargo Systems (1999), The Futurefor the Container Shipping Industry 
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In terms of the main East-West arterial trades, the significance of the major 
liner groupings is indisputable; an estimated 80 per cent of the Transpacific and 
nearly 70 per cent of both the Asia-Europe and Transatlantic container trades are 
under the control of the new alliances (Ma, 1996). Furthermore, unlike previous 
consortia arrangements which tended to be specific to a single trade, most of the 
new partnerships operate on a global basis covering all three major East-West 
trades and in certain cases North-South trades as well. 
A number of factors motivate carriers in their quest for global coverage through 
alliances, including (Lim, 1996; Ma, 1996; Baird, 1997): 
As industry has globalised, so major manufacturers are increasingly insisting 
on single supplier arrangements (for components and services) on a global 
basis. This means that if a line wants Unilever's, Ford's or Proctor & 
Gamble's Transatlantic business, it may also have to offer the company 
Transpacific and Europe-Far East services as well, and this means global 
scope is essential; 
u This development has been fostered by the introduction of global contracts 
between lines and shippers, with shippers using their global volumes to 
leverage price discounts, and lines using these large volumes as their base 
cargo. Global contracts are becoming more common, helped by the demise of 
the liner conference system and industry deregulation; 
u As ships get bigger (now over 6,000 TEU capacity) a single line will find it 
increasingly difficult to fill all these slots on its own. A partnership allows 
for space sharing, still enabling each line to benefit from industry economies 
of scale; 
u Each of the main East-West routes suffer from trade imbalances. Maintaining 
services on all three routes allows a global carrier to reposition empty 
containers to areas of demand more easily and cheaply than a single trade 
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carrier is able to do. Alliances also pennit the sharing of containers and 
terminals among partners on a world-wide basis. 
The formation of alliances was believed to be the answer to poor profitability 
in liner container shipping, following consistent decreases in freight rates over 
recent years (Cargo Systems, 1999). Other objectives of alliances are: 
u To strengthen cargo consolidation via the deployment of larger 
containerships, thereby maximising slot usage. The only way to fill most 
post-Panamax vessels and offer weekly sailings has been to engage in ship 
sharing, 
u To spread the financial risk of capital investment in both ship construction 
and terminal and intermodal operations; 
u To achieve better vessel and container deployment at reduced costs; 
a To achieve economies of scale in land-side operations through a more 
efifident use and to establish a stronger bargaining position; 
u To improve geographical coverage by mutually complementing routes 
served, while also rationalising call patterns. 
(Cargo Systems, 1999; 120) 
At the same time as global alliances among major shipping lines are 
restructuring the industry, the barriers to entry have become that much greater. 
The likelihood of a new entrant penetrating the market has now become 
increasingly remote as the capital investment needed to participate in the 
industry has escalated: each of the leading lines today employ more than 100 
ships with a combined loading capacity in excess of a quarter of a million TEU. 
This, added to investments in container terminals and other equipment, plus 
costs associated with establishing a global network of sales offices, easily 
amounts to an outlay exceeding $2.0 billion. 
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3.4 Nature of competition 
It is inevitable that a number of external environmental pressures will impact on 
and determine the nature of competition in the global container shipping 
industry. In addition to the competitive dynamics associated with each 
individual trade, such factors include liner conferences, government regulation 
of liner shipping, plus pressures emanating from customers, many of whom are 
much larger in terms of turnover than the lines themselves. 
3.4.1 Liner conferences 
Liner conferences are agreements among liner companies serving on a given 
trade route (Sletmo & Holste, 1994). More specifically, a liner conference is: 
"A group of two or more vessel-operating carriers, which provides 
international liner services for the carriage of cargo on a particular route or 
routes within specified geographical limits and that .... operate under uniform or 
commonfteight rates. " 
(Lewis, 1996; 31) 
The conference system began in 1875, when British liner companies in the 
UK-Calcutta trade formed the Calcutta Conference (Nayar, 1996). Conferences, 
otherwise described as cartels and at one time referred to as "rings", were 
established during the period of British imperialism and represented an attempt, 
initially by British shipowners, to maintain market shares in an increasingly 
liberalised shipping era (Cafruny, 1987). 
Within a conference, liner shipping companies seek to create long-term 
relationships between themselves and their customers through various methods 
such as the use of loyalty contracts, dual rate systems, and more recently through 
the use of service contracts which commit a shipper to ship a certain amount of 
cargo on conference vessels over a given time period. However, in reality there 
is not one, but several types of liner conference, including (Sletmo & Williams, 
1981): 
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u The large all-embracing, classic closed conference (i. e. new members must 
first be acceptable to existing members) such as the Far Eastern Freight 
Conference (FEFC) which sets rates on the Europe-Far east route; 
u The conferences covering protected trades with government cargo-sharing 
practices, operating in areas such as West Africa and South America; 
u The smaller more tightly-knit version of the classic conference; and 
u The 'open' conference or agreement which prevail in US container trades 
which are free for lines to join on existing terms and are primarily pricing 
agreements. 
Being - quasi-monopolies, the chief aim of conferences are to eliminate 
damaging price competition among the members and to bar entry of new 
competitors. However, as containerisation of liner trades expanded, it became 
clear that the market power held by traditional conference members was being 
undermined by new entrants. While conference lines were determined to 
continue with their differential tariff principle of charging 'what the traffic could 
bear' (i. e. applying a higher tariff rate on higher value goods even though the 
cargo inside a container occupied the same amount of space on the ship as other 
types of cargo in containers) this created the conditions conducive to the rise of 
non-conference carriers. Non-conference lines such as Evergreen entered the 
Asia/US East Coast and Asia/Europe trades in the 1970's offering a more 
simple (certainly as far as customers were concerned) Treight-all-Kinds' (FAK) 
rate to shippers. This permitted Evergreen and other independent lines to 
'cream' the higher rated cargoes from the established conference carriers (Lim, 
1996). 
As the percentage of capacity offered by non-conference lines has increased in 
recent years, so the influence of conferences in many trades has diminished 
(Heaver, 1994; Nayar, 1996). Conferences have also suffered from concerted 
shipper opposition and perceived abuses drew the attention of national and 
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supra-national governments'. Conferences still exist but to some extent they 
have been replaced on the main east-west trade routes by new style Rate 
Agreements and Capacity Management (or 'stabilisation') Agreements. 
3.4.2 Regulation of liner shipping 
According to Nayar (1996), a number of crucial influences exist which help to 
moderate the monopolistic tendency of the conference system. Such influences, 
or rather what Nayar terms countervailing powers, consist primarily of the state, 
and to a lesser extent shippers, mainly through Shippers' Councils (see section 
3.6.3). Regulatory pressures surrounding the activities of container lines 
principally emanate from the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) of the 
United States Government and from the Competition Directorate (DGIV) within 
the European Commission (EC). Although most governments seek to control 
the presence of market power through anti-trust legislation, the majority of 
OECD countries provide conferences and consortia in the liner shipping 
industry with immunity from anti-trust legislation. 
3.4.2.1 Liner shipping regulation in the USA 
In the USA, the 1984 US Shipping Act fundamentally altered the conduct of 
liner services contracting in US trades. This Act gave conferences the ability to 
set intermodal rates and also allowed shippers and carriers to negotiate service 
contracts (i. e. an agreement between a shipper and a line for the transport of a 
set number of containers at an agreed rate over a fixed period), although the 
latter must still be individually filed with the FMC. The introduction and 
subsequently increased use of service contracts resulted in further 
marginalisation of traditional conference tariffs but still meant that negotiated 
rates between shipper and carrier (at least in the USA) were transparent for all to 
see. Furthermore, the Act eliminated loyalty contracts and gave lines' the right 
of Independent Action (IA) whereby a conference member was permitted to 
negotiate a lower freight rate (still filed with the FMC) in order to prevent the 
loss of important traffic to a non-conference line. 
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It has been suggested that the 1984 US Shipping Act actually extended carrier 
anti-trust immunity and gave carriers relatively greater advantages than shippers 
(Horowitz, 1996). What did not change, however, was the need for rates to be 
filed with the FMC with shippers being unable to negotiate with carriers in 
confidence. Shipper dissatisfaction with the 1984 Act, largely reflected in 
lobbying undertaken by the National Industrial Transportation League (NITL), 
an organisation representing US shippers, resulted in Congress enacting the 
Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) in 1998, the latter becoming effective in 
May 1999. This Act amended the 1984 US Shipping Act. The most important 
changes under OSRA are as follows: 
The terms and conditions of service contracts will no longer be made fully 
available to any interestedpartiesfor review and equal access; 
u Conferences and rate agreements will have to allow moreflexibility to their 
members in the areas or pricing and contracting ('independent action ); 
u Tariff formats will become more flexible ..... with FMC 
filing no longer 
mandatory. 
(Cargo Systems, 1999; 21-22) 
The most significant change resulting from OSRA is expected to be allowing 
confidential service contracts between a shipper and a carrier (Weil, 1999). The 
Act recognised the need for regulations to be altered in order to adapt to changes 
taking place in the container shipping business, for example, the development of 
global intermodal carriers and alliances, plus the fact that there is no longer any 
significant US-flag fleet. Regulation is now designed to promote export growth 
whilst ensuring competition would not be unfair to consumers and competitors. 
However, OSRA does not deregulate the industry completely, and the forces 
of supply and demand are unlikely to bring about dramatic rate reductions 
(Shashikumar, 1999). What it does do, however, is allow market forces to play a 
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greater role in making commercial decisions, with the main changes resulting 
from OSRA expected to be as follows: 
u Carriers will have to become more flexible and customer-orientated to 
maintain their market share; 
u OSRA will shift the focus from conferences to the individual operators who 
will need to go beyond bare-bones services and provide a variety of value 
added services; 
u The conference system ... ... is on its way out in the US trades ... ... (to be 
replaced by) liberal carrier agreements that do not interfere with 
commercial decisions of individual operators. 
(Shashikumar, 1999; 26-27) 
Most of the liner activity referred to in the regulations is concerned with ocean 
freight rates. In addition to setting freight rates as a group through enjoying anti- 
trust immunity, the liner shipping industry also implements, from time to time, a 
number of surcharges (e. g. bunker surcharge, currency adjustment surcharge 
etc. ). These surcharges are added to the basic freight rate when there is an 
adverse change in a cost factor. Shippers' Councils are exerting significant 
pressure on regulatory bodies as well as on the lines for the elimination of these 
surcharges and for a simplification of conference tariffs (Menachof, 1993). 
3.4.2.2 Liner shipping regulation in Europe 
In Europe, the EC adopted a law in 1986 that gave (or rather confirmed) anti- 
trust immunity to conferences in European trades. However, while EC 
Regulation 870/95 encourages IA's and service contracts, it does not accept 
extensive inland cooperation between lines or broad-based capacity 
management agreements. Recognising the increasingly significant role played 
by liner consortia (within and outside a conference), Regulation 870/95 exempts 
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four types of liner shipping consortia from the prohibition on anti-competitive 
practices under Article 85 of the EC Treaty, these being: 
c3 Consortia operating within a conference with less than 30 per cent of the 
direct trade; 
Consortia operating outside conferences with less than 35 per cent of the 
direct trade; 
u Conference consortia with between 30-50 per cent of the direct trade; and 
u Non-conference consortia with between 30-50 per cent of the direct trade. 
This ruling effectively means that the vast majority of existing consortia 
serving Europe (particularly on East-West routes) qualify for exemption. 
However, some restructuring of consortia on smaller North-South trades such as 
Europe-South Africa has taken place so that the new conditions for immunity 
can be met. Conference service contracts are not covered by the shipping block 
exemption regulation in the EU. Further, the European Commission (EQ 
prohibits conference contracts that cover the movement of cargo between ports 
and inland points in Europe; this is the opposite of the stance taken in the US. 
Consequently, carriers in the US-Europe trade may participate in conference 
service contracts covering the US-Europe ocean movements, but they then have 
to sign individual service contracts covering European inland transport for the 
same shipper. 
In September 1998 the EC imposed fines totalling $298 million on carrier 
members of the Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA) for what was 
described as 'anti-competitive practices'. Fines were imposed because TACA 
members had entered into a series of agreements that were outside of the scope 
of Regulation 4056/86 which permits carriers to fix prices on the ocean leg. The 
EC stated that TACA members enjoyed a market share in excess of 60% and 
had been in a dominant position and had abused this position by: 
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u Imposing restrictions on the availability ofservice contracts, and, 
u Inducing and assisting potential competitors to join the market as TACA 
members, thereby eliminating price competition. 
(Cargo Systems, 1999; 48-49) 
Fines were calculated on the basis of the degree of each carrier's violations, 
market share in the trade, and total revenues. P&O Nedlloyd was subject to the 
heaviest fine, about $38 million. Maersk and Sea-Land were each fined $25 
million. The EC reserved the right to impose further fines at a later date for 
practices relating to inland transport services offered within EU territory. 
Currently a new carrier grouping is being planned for the North Atlantic trade 
which meets the requirements of the EC. 
3.4.2.3 Liner shipping regulation in Asia 
Much of Asia, unlike Europe or the USA, appears unencumbered by such 
regulations, although the presence of strong, well-organised, and often statutory 
Shippers' Councils can exert significant pressure on lines to limit anti- 
competitive behaviour. Emphasising the difference in Asia, Brooks (1996) 
concluded: 
...... as the largest andfastest growing trading area and one which has a 
completely different view of market power, Asia (has become) the practice 
ground on which these consortia can explore the limits cooperation can reach. " 
(Brooks, 1996; 22) 
Yet such a statement is accurate only up to a point. Inevitably, liner operators 
trading within Asia will not be directly affected by US or EC regulations. But 
this is not the case for global carriers and liner consortia serving trades between 
Asia-US or between Asia-Europe. Thus, regulatory decisions in the US and in 
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Europe do, in fact, condition all three major global east-west trades, irrespective 
of any perceived lack of such regulation in Asia. 
Furthermore, partly due to recent legislative activity in the US and Europe, a 
number of Asian countries now appear to be reviewing their competition laws or 
maritime antitrust arrangements. In China, the Shanghai Shipping Exchange has 
imposed regulations with a filing requirement for tariffs and given the agency 
administering the regulatory scheme the right to intervene in certain cases where 
the rates are deemed to be too high or low (Weil, 1999). Thailand is pressing 
ahead with maritime legislation that could have a considerable effect on 
container lines calling at Thai ports, and Japan is currently amending its existing 
conference immunity regime (Cargo Systems, 1999). To achieve common 
provisions to reduce discrimination among nations, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) could in future include maritime services. This appears to 
be one option to bring about increased standardisation. 
3.5 Industry competitive dynamics 
Containerisation has created a totally different liner shipping industry and a new 
competitive environment (Sager, 1991; Brooks, 1996; Eyre, 1996). In this 
environment many traditional lines have disappeared (a process which has not 
yet ended), conferences are increasingly 'powerless', and freight rates are not 
decided by the lines but by shippers who play one carrier against another in what 
has become a buyers market. Moreover, given the pace and scope of these 
industry changes, the quite different competitive situation liner shipping is 
facing today does not mean that change is ended and it is inevitable that there 
will be more change in the future (Molenaar, 1991). 
3.5.1 Commercial entities selling cargo space 
It was mentioned above that the recently formed global alliances now control an 
estimated 80 per cent of Transpacific and 70 per cent of Asia/Europe container 
traffic (Ma, 1996). If one also considers the dominant independent lines - 
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Evergreen, COSCO, and ZIM - this does indeed seem to indicate that the main 
global East-West container trades are dominated by relatively few large 
operators. 
However, there are those who suggest that operational consolidation, as such, 
does not necessarily result in commercial consolidation (Kadar & De Proost, 
1997a). While the top 20 lines have increased their share of the major trade 
routes from roughly 70% in 1990 to 85% in 1995, such advances have been 
made in the form of collaborative arrangements. There may well be several 
alliances which control a large proportion of global container traffic, but when 
one separates the supply offered on each trade by individual commercial entity, 
the picture remains one of capacity fragmentation. 
Table 3.8 shows that, on the Transatlantic, Europe-Far East, and Transpacific 
trades, while these routes appear to be dominated by the top 20 carriers (i. e. 
mostly operating in 7-8 alliances), in reality shippers have a choice of, 48 
carriers, 41 carriers, and 32 carriers respectively on each trade. The explanation 
for this lies in the fact that the latter figures include a number of NVOCC's (non 
vessel operating common carriers) who charter space from the lines but who do 
not themselves provide ships or containers. 
Table 3.8 Container shipping capacity supplied by commercial 
entity and by route 
Trade route I Number of commercial entities 
Transatlantic 48 
Europe-Far East 41 
Europe-Gulf/Indian Sub-Continent 21 
Transpacific 32 
Europe-SE Africa 13 
Europe-Australasia 9 
Europe-S America 43 
N America-S America 55 
N America-Australasia 10 
Source: Kadar & De Proost (1997a) Supply and Demand in Liner Shipping, 
Containerisation International, June, pp. 61-65. 
From the customer viewpoint, therefore, a plethora of commercial entities, 
with ever less distinguishable products, compete on every major trade. This high 
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level of fragmentation, suggest Kadar & De Proost, coupled with the classic 
liner shipping top line or volume driven sales philosophy (i. e. 'just fill the 
ships'), has resulted in rates being driven down ever further. 
3.5.2 Attempts to differentiate liner services 
To counteract this, carriers have generally copied each others' strategies in 
seeking to improve their financial position. During the last decade the liner 
industry has attempted to return to profitability primarily through cutting costs. 
Usually this has meant a logical progression of: 
uA focus on joint services; 
u Restructuring and overhead cost reduction; 
u Global alliances; and now 
u Mergers and acquisitions. 
However, in many cases the benefits of these cost cutting initiatives have 
simply been passed on to customers in the form of lower freight rates, resulting 
in no real gain in terms of profitability. This cycle appears to have been 
exacerbated by a number of factors, according to Kadar & De Proost (1997a), 
including: 
u Most industry innovations are easily and quickly copied; 
u Shipper-carrier relationships are adversarial, resulting in low customer 
loyalty and leading to more pressure for lower rates; 
u Decline in conference control has diminished any price discipline among 
carriers (although it is arguable if such price discipline existed in the first 
place); and 
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u Introduction of larger ships has resulted in a concerted effort to fill slots. 
These factors have resulted in a need for the industry to adopt more targeted 
and sophisticated marketing, better customer segmentation, develop more 
tailored services, and implement simpler pricing structures (Kadar & De Proost, 
1997b). These more focused strategies are also necessary due to the fundamental 
way in which the industry has changed. In essence, 'traditional' shipping lines 
no longer exist - they have been replaced by international intermodal 
transportation companies (Sager, 1991; Heaver, 1994; Brooks, 1996; Eyre, 
1996). 
Industry changes over the past decade or so appear to closely correspond with 
forecasts made in 1991 by a Korean shipping line executive, Cheon Kyu (1991). 
Cheon Kyu suggested that industry pressures would eventually result in four 
very different groups of lines: 
" Lines offering a high level intermodal service with global networks; 
" Lines offering a lower service level with a regional network; 
c3 Lines offering a high level intennodal service with a regional network; and 
(3 Lines offering a low service level with a global network. 
According to this theory, lines under the last two categories would find it 
difficult to set a workable global strategy. A high level intermodal service (e. g. 
fast transit times, extensive land transport interests, value-added activities etc. ) 
would be expected to be demanded by large global shippers and these customers 
are unlikely to be interested in a line which only offers regional (or 'niche') 
services. Equally, these same global customers may be less interested in a global 
network which offers only a low service level. Cheon Kyu argued that the only 
approach likely to be successful is the first one (i. e. high level intermodal 
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I 
service and global network) which he terms a 'forward strategy', and in which 
key factors will be carrier innovation in terms of technology, cargo tracking, and 
cutting transit times. 
Looking at the situation as it is today, it is possible to see a quite similar 
scenario developing, for example: 
o 'High quality' lines such as Sea-Land and Maersk now provide a high level 
intermodal service with a global transport network; 
a Lines such as CAST and Atlantic Container Line (ACL) offer a high level 
regional service (e. g. only on the Transatlantic trade); 
u Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) offer a low-level service on a 
number of regional routes (although this line is now increasing its route 
network in an effort to become a global operator), and; 
u Evergreen Line provide a low level global round-the-world service (e. g. 
slower transit times, limited intermodal capability or value-added activities). 
3.5.3 Ocean carrier profitability 
Even though profitable operators exist, the trend is for an increasing number of 
carriers to experience financial losses from container shipping activities. Major 
lines reporting a deficit in 1998 included Sea-Land, P&O Nedlloyd, OOIL, 
NOUAPL, and Zim. Table 3.9 presents financial data relating to seventeen 
major container lines for 1998. Information is not available for Chinese state- 
owned carrier Cosco, or for Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) which is 
privately owned. Nevertheless, figures have been gathered for 15 of the top-20 
lines, plus one just outside the top-20 (MISQ, and one niche carrier (ACL, 
which operates only on the Atlantic trade). 
Net profit margins (NPM) for all lines in the top-20 fails to reach above 6.0%, 
with eleven lines falling below 2.0%. With $billions invested in assets, return on 
investment (ROI) likewise falls well below what would be expected in other 
industries. Conglomerates such as P&O insist on ROI of 15% from each of its 
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operating divisions; clearly the P&O container shipping division's 3.47% ROI is 
far from achieving this target. 
Table 3.9 Financial performance and key performance indicators of 
selected major liner shipping companies, 1998 
$ Millions 
Company Revenues Net Profit Assets NPM ROI 
Maersk 5,272 188 5,851 3.60% 1.80% 
Evergreen 1,639 34 2,792 2.05% 3.60% 
P&O Nedlloyd 3,411 -2 2,337 -0.10% 3.47% 
Hanjin 3,444 18 3,696 0.50% 3.10% 
Sea-Land 3,916 -70 2,452 -1.80% 5.40% 
NOUAPL 6,485 -438 5,935 -6.75% -2.04% 
NYK 9,825 113 13,620 1.10% 3.20% 
Mitsui OSK 7,344 64 10,661 0.90% 4.60% 
Hyundai 4,049 43 5,007 1.10% 7.80% 
Zim 1,470 4.9 - -0.33% - 
CP Ships 1,775 101 1,187 5.70% 9.10% 
CM. A-CGM 1,305 43 893 3.30% 6.80% 
OOIL 1,833 0.2 1,801 0.01% 1.20% 
K Line 4,768 14 4,742 0.30% 1.10% 
Yangining 1,180 18 1,159 1.50% -5.40% 
ACL 297 30 222 10.00% 22.30% 
misc 866 165 2,083 19.10% 7.90% 
Source: Containerisation International, October 1999, pp. 38-39. 
Notes: Figures for certain carriers (e. g. Maersk, NYK, and Mitsui) also include other shipping 
activities such as tanker, car carriers etc. ) 
Table 3.10 Liner shipping profitability by ocean freight 
service, 1997 
% of operating profit 
Port/tertninal operations 29% 
Container leasing 26% 
Forwarders/intermediaries 19% 
Inland transportation 18% 
Vessel overations 8% 
Source: Cargo Systems (1999), based on Kadar (1999) 
Breaking down the industry by operating sector, Table 3.10 illustrates the poor 
level of profits that are achieved through vessel operations. Compared with 
other operations linked to the liner shipping industry, it is clear that vessel 
operations return lower profits. Activities such as terminal operations, container 
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leasing, freight forwarding and inland transportation, each offer potentially 
much greater returns. This largely explains the desire of some lines to integrate 
into these related activities. 
An important contributor to the low profitability in respect of vessel operations 
has been the decline in freight rates and consequently a decline in revenue per 
slot. A recent study (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1999) found that average 
revenue per TEU fell by 13.8 per cent between 1996-1998, from $1,590 to 
$1,370 (Table 3.11). Total carrier earnings for the period fell by 1.2 per cent 
from $77.9 billion in 1996 to $77 billion in 1998. Clearly, while carriers are 
lifting more containers (as world trade continues to grow), freight rates and 
revenues are actually falling. 
Table 3.11 Nominal global carrier income, 1996-1998 
Year Loaded Container Average Revenue per Estimated Gross 
Moves TEU Carrier Income ($ 
(million TEU) ($ million)* billion) 
1996 49.0 1,590 77.9 
1997 53.5 1,451 77.6 
1998 56.2 1,370 77.0 
* As reported by P&O Nedlloyd 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1999 
A number of factors suggest low freight rates will continue to plague the 
industry for the foreseeable future: 
u Regulatory bodies in Europe and the US have assailed many of the anti- 
trust exemptions previously enjoyed by carriers, with the result that carrier 
rate cohesion is weak and growing weaker; 
u Globalisation of the world economy depends upon highly efficient andprice 
competitive container shipping. Attempts to 'turn the clock back' rate wise 
will be met by verypowerful opposition; 
u There is little prospect of a long term, global under-supply of shipping 
space, especially as shipbuilding prices remain very competitive; 
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u Container shipping is a largelyfixed cost operation which has an inherent 
structural tendency to promote marginal pricing - and deregulation will 
amplify this characteristic, and; 
u Global pressure exists on all service providers for higher quality at lower 
price - and liner shipping will not be immune to this. 
(European Logistics Management, October 1999; 14) 
The container shipping industry's problems therefore appear to be structural 
and long term. It is not surprising that several major investors in container 
shipping (e. g. Safmarine, Sea-Land etc. ) have been driven from the industry in 
1999 partly as a result of the long-term record of inadequate returns. As 
customers persist in demanding and obtaining lower freight rates, few 
possibilities appear to exist for carriers to try and secure improved returns. 
However, potentially successful strategies may involve: 
u Greater concentration of ownership of container shipping lines; 
u Long term, confidential, global contracts between shipping lines and their 
customers; 
u Carriers to develop a completely different kind of relationship with shippers 
that positions them as an indispensable link in their customers' global 
supply chain. 
With carriers struggling to differentiate themselves and the services they 
provide, a key issue has been whether container shipping is becoming a 
commodity business, in which the only way carriers differentiate themselves is 
through price. Alliances alone make it difficult for carriers to maintain 
differentiated services or engage in serious branding, and this means that lines 
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will need to do much more if they are to achieve desired levels of profitability. 
Meeting more comprehensively the changing supply chain needs of shippers 
could offer improved prospects, and this issue is discussed in the following 
section. 
3.6 Shippers 
3.6.1 Shipper requirements 
Container lines serve a very wide customer base therefore customer demands 
must represent a key consideration in the development of strategy. In a survey of 
European and North American shippers, Brooks (1995) sought to establish 
whether or not customer needs varied by customer type and geographic location. 
Brooks study involved a total sample of 300 shippers made up of large shippers, 
small shippers (defined as firms shipping 6-15 TEU annually), consignees, and 
freight forwarders. A range of carrier attributes was established and shippers 
were asked to rank each one in order of importance. These criteria, which are 
not necessarily in order of importance, are shown in Table 3.12. Key findings 
from Brook's study included: 
u Shippers overall requirements are dynamic - they change over time; 
u Shippers regarded freight rates as a top priority; and 
u On-time pickup and delivery of goods was also rated hýighly important, 
however, transit time did not prove to be a highly significant factor. 
These finding suggested that carrier differences were perceived not to exist. 
However, it could be argued that transit time may have been perceived to be less 
important only so long as the goods arrived on time. Ultimately, of course, 
ensuring that goods do arrive on time is actually dependent to a large degree 
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upon transit time, which rather suggests, contrary to Brooks conclusion, that 
transit time is a significant factor. 
Table 3.12 Carrier attributes required by shippers 
Cost ofservice (rate) 
The core service 
Transit time door-door 
Availability of equipment 
Weekly fixed day departure 
Measurable attributes ofthe core service 
On-time pickup and delivery 
Consistent timely pickup and delivery 
Quality of equipment 
Timely quote 
Timely arrival notices 
Accuracy of bill of lading production 
Accuracy of invoicing 
Service delivery 
Problem solving capability of carrier personnel 
Telephone satisfaction 
Professionalism of the sales personnel 
Professionalism of the driver 
Source: Brooks (1995) Understanding the ocean container market -a seven 
country study. Journal of Maritime Policy & Management, Vol. 22, No. 1, 
pp. 39-49. 
While Brooks established important aspects relating to shipper requirements, 
her survey did not include shippers in Asia or on North-South routes. The 
industry trade journal Containerisation International has undertaken two 
worldwide surveys of shippers priorities, first in 1992, and more recently in 
1995. In the 1992 survey (Damas, 1992), questionnaires were sent to more than 
3,000 shippers in some 30 different countries primarily throughout Asia, Europe 
and North America, and covering the main East/West and North/South trade 
lanes. Although there was a relatively low response rate to the survey of 7 per 
cent, the shippers who did respond controlled an estimated 400,000 TEU per 
annum. Shippers were defined as small (i. e. shipping less than 200 TEU per 
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annum), medium (200-800 TEU per annum), or large (over 800 TEU per 
annum). Key findings from this survey included: 
u More than 80 per cent of shippers were satisfied with service reliability; 
u Two-thirds of all shippers (but 76 per cent of large shippers) were 
dissatisfied with tariffs, more especially with conference tariffs, with many 
preferring an all-in fixed rate rather than the complex selection of Terminal 
Handling Charges (THC's), Currency Adjustment factors (CAF's), Bunker 
Adjustment factors (BAF's) etc. which were also subject to frequent revision 
by the lines; 
u Non-conference lines were apparently able to guarantee all-in fixed (FAK - 
freight all kinds) box rates; 
u Price was constantly one of the principal deciding factors for three quarters 
of all shippers, with short transit times, service reliability, and frequency 
also pre-eminent; 
u 53 per cent of larger shippers expected a partnership arrangement with 
carriers and these shippers were also much more demanding and generally 
more dissatisfied with the level of service provided by carriers; and 
u Large shippers moving in excess of 1,000 TEU per annum were far more 
likely to need individual value-added services (e. g. warehousing, packaging, 
freight forwarding etc. ). 36 per cent of shippers in this category required 
value-added services compared with 19 per cent overall. 
The 1992 Containerisation International survey found that larger shippers 
have different requirements from smaller shippers, particularly with regard to 
the need for lines to build partnerships with shippers, and to provide value- 
added services. The issue of an all-in FAK rate must also be considered as 
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important for lines, and transit time, unlike in Brook's findings, was considered 
by shippers to be important. An area where both studies were in agreement 
concerned the issue of service price, which was regarded as a key, if not the key 
decision variable. 
The second and more recent Containerisation International global shipper 
survey was carried out in 1995 (Eller, 1995). In this survey 900 questionnaires 
were sent to shippers in Europe, North America, and Asia, from which 152 
replies were received (a 17 per cent response rate). The key findings from this 
survey included: 
u When selecting ocean carriers, shippers were looking for overall cost, 
service, and reliability packages, rather than being concerned with individual 
considerations such as freight rates or service reliability; 
Ci Only 12 per cent of respondents viewed negotiating the lowest possible rate 
as the most important consideration whereas 80 per cent indicated that rates 
form part of overall service packages; 
U 30 per cent of shippers considered sailing schedule reliability to be of 
supreme importance, with 64 per cent regarding this as part of overall 
service packages; 
0 75 per cent of shippers considered the widest possible port coverage and 
overland intermodal capability also to be part of an overall service package; 
0 75 per cent of shippers deemed conference membership by carriers to be 
irrelevant, and the same proportion also viewed a carriers' flag as being 
irrelevant; and 
u Nearly 40 per cent of shippers considered a carrier's IT capability to be of 
supreme importance. 
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Evidence from the 1995 survey suggests that, far from being just one or two 
service priority aspects, shippers actually require an overall service package 
from carriers. This overall service package must combine attractive rates, sailing 
schedule reliability, wide port coverage, intermodal and IT capability, and 
increasingly, multi-trade or global capability (especially for large shippers 
seeking to reduce the number of suppliers they use). The study concluded that 
pleasing a shipper on all of these counts would give a carrier a greater chance of 
success. 
The reality of poor carrier profits in an industry lacking differentiation, appears 
at odds with a requirement from many shippers for what could be defined as 
'customised service packages', in which price is part of the overall package 
rather than the overriding factor. Clearly, the challenge for carriers is to design 
such customised service packages which on the one hand fully meets the needs 
of the customer, yet on the other hand can deliver satisfactory profits. 
3.6.2 Global contracts 
Larger global shippers are increasingly seeking to source from fewer suppliers 
overall, with preferred suppliers working for them on a global basis (Cooper, 
1993). This trend is just as relevant for providers of transport services as it is for 
suppliers of product components. As a consequence of this, and also as a result 
of carriers having developed extensive worldwide transport networks, global 
shippers are now demanding global contracts with container lines. 
A global contract in liner container shipping can be defined as one overall 
contract containing all the services, volume commitments, and contractual 
clauses that govern a multi-trade relationship between a carrier and a shipper. 
There are a number of supposed benefits for carriers and shippers associated 
with such global contracts, most notably (Damas, 1996): 
u Fewer lines to deal with which in turn minimises the amount of time a 
shipper needs to spend on administration and negotiation thus reducing 
transaction costs; 
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u Stability of cargo volumes and freight rates. For the line, large cargo 
volumes are secured over a longer time period and level of income is known 
for the same period. For the shipper transport costs are fixed for a lengthy 
period; 
u An enhanced interest in the other party because of higher volume 
commitments. This allows for improved service levels and creates the 
possibility to engage in joint cost-saving programmes; 
u Ease of communication, mutual understanding, transparency and a higher 
level of trust helps to create a new shipper/carrier relationship; 
c3 Stronger negotiation leverage for shippers. Aggregating the volume from all 
its subsidiaries worldwide gives a large shipper significant leverage with 
carriers when negotiating a global contract, resulting in lower rates, 
particularly on trades where an otherwise large shipper may only move 
minimal volumes; 
c3 Effectiveness of a 'worldwide tenders' system which allows shippers to 
compare the best overall service packages from the world's leading carriers, 
and; 
u Easier monitoring of carriers, especially of their quality performance. 
To some extent global or multi-trade contracts could simply be regarded as a 
formula invented by shippers to secure lower rates. However, for conference 
carriers, global contracts as defined above did not exist as under the 1984 US 
Shipping Act it was illegal to have a global service contract covering the scope 
of several conferences; within a conference, a carrier could only have a contract 
covering the scope of the conference. This meant that a non-conference carrier 
such as Evergreen Line could provide a global contract, while a conference 
carrier such as Sea-Land could not. For the latter, a global contract was 
effectively a series of parallel contracts or rates in different trades or conferences 
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for one shipper. Deregulation brought about after introduction of OSRA in 1999 
has meant that this restriction no longer exists, which means that all lines, 
whether conference member or not, can offer global contracts. 
While the present regulatory system has therefore improved the potential for 
global contracts, there are still a number of practicalities which actually hinder 
their implementation, including: 
u Many shippers still prefer to work with a small select group of carriers and 
would rarely contemplate allocating their entire freight to a single carrier in 
any one trade; 
u Spreading cargoes among carriers gives shippers rate stability and 
guarantees of space and equipment availability, something an exclusive 
global carrier might be unable to ensure; 
u Many so-called global carriers only provide a limited coverage of the many 
North/South trades which means that shippers still have to shop around and 
find niche carriers to fill the gaps in their global transport needs. However, 
as global carrier alliances continue to extend their reach into new markets, 
these geographical gaps are likely to lessen; and 
u If a line had to accommodate the entire business volume of major shippers 
on certain trade lanes, it may have problems with vessel capacity and 
equipment. 
Administratively, finalising a global contract requires individual carriers to 
come to the negotiating table as a "global negotiating team" with full authority 
or as a group of trade managers, each one having to cooperate with corporate 
colleagues (Eller, 1994). A number of carriers have now established global 
negotiating teams, partly at the insistence of global shippers. However, this still 
means that annual negotiations on global contracts are a major process, 
requiring the building of a matrix showing (a shipper's) traffic flows for every 
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region or factory and aligning these flows with individual carriers on each 
respective trade lane. A shipper also needs to bring together its managers from 
around the world, annually, to review company data and prepare global 
contracts. 
Setting up global contracts and working out all the necessary information on a 
worldwide basis clearly involves a significant investment in time and 
management for both shippers and carriers. For both shippers and carriers, it 
will be important to ensure that the costs involved in such an exercise do not 
exceed the benefits. 
3.6.3 Shippers' Councils 
While individually many large shippers can use their total annual traffic volume 
to leverage pressure on carriers for rate reductions and improved service levels, 
many small and medium sized shippers have also been able to exert a degree of 
influence over carriers through membership of Shippers' Councils. Shippers' 
Councils are national organisations, usually created and run by transport users or 
shippers. Their role and scope may vary considerably from one country to 
another, but they all share a concern for the efficiency and adequacy of 
transportation markets (Sletmo & Holste, 1994). Shippers' Councils are 
believed to have two important purposes (UNCTAD, 1975): 
u The prime purpose .... is to unite shippers and to give them the necessary 
bargaining strength to obtain adequate and efficient services at minimum 
cost; and 
To provide shipowners, government agencies and port authorities with a 
means of communicating with shippers, and of obtaining an authoritative 
shipper viewpoint. 
Functions commonly carried out by Shippers' Councils include consultation 
with conferences, input into international policy, and preparation of relevant 
publications. In the USA, however, Shippers' Associations fall into a slightly 
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different category as their objective is strictly commercial, i. e. the negotiation of 
contracts on behalf of their members to obtain volume discount rates. 
Some governments, notably in certain Asian countries, actually empower 
Shippers' Councils to regulate the shipping business. In Thailand, for example, 
the Thai National Shippers' Council (TNSQ was established by Act of 
Parliament as recently as 1994 (Turner, 1996). This Act made it compulsory for 
all Thai businesses with annual exports exceeding $2 million to become 
members of the TNSC, whose current membership stands at around 2,000. The 
TNSC was created amid concern that carriers tended to impose rate increases 
and other surcharges at short notice and to the detriment of exporters with fixed 
price contracts. The Act permits the TNSC to consult with ocean carriers on 
such issues. The Act also makes it mandatory that all carriers serving Thailand 
must register their tariff rates and conference or alliance agreements. There are 
penalties for failing to comply with these requirements, the ultimate penalty 
being exclusion from engagement in Thailand's ocean trade. 
Although the original focus of Shippers' Councils concerned the relationship 
between buyers (shippers) and sellers (liner conferences), many Shippers' 
Councils today appear to attach increasing importance to providing input into 
the political process and acting as lobby groups. This is particularly the case 
with large regional shippers' councils which have been formed, such as the 
European Shippers' Council (ESQ, the Federation of ASEAN Shippers' 
Councils (FASQ, the Japan Shippers' Council (JSC), and in the USA the 
National Industrial Transportation League (NITL). In 1994, the ESC, JSC, and 
NITL met in Brussels to sign a joint declaration establishing four common 
principles: 
u That industry and commerce in the three main trading regions have common 
interests as users of ocean liner services, even though they are competitors; 
That shipping services are competitive, by being subject to the normal forces 
of supply and demand; 
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o That shippers require flexible and clearly understandable pricing 
mechanisms. This means rates based on genuine commercial principles, but 
which also meet all categories of transport user; and 
u That shippers want to cooperate with shipowners/operators to help 
modernise services and business procedures. 
These large regional Shippers' Councils are predominantly anti-conference 
and successfully pressed for deregulation in the USA to allow individual 
shippers to negotiate confidential contracts with carriers without conference 
approval. In ftiture, the councils' argue that agreements between shippers and 
carriers should have sufficient flexibility to be conducted on a port-port, point- 
point, or global basis. The council's now meet on an annual basis to exchange 
information and to cooperate on matters of common interest. 
3.7 Summary 
In offering a macro perspective of the container shipping industry, this chapter 
has considered world container trade, the structure of the container shipping 
industry, the nature of competition within the container shipping industry, and 
the requirements of shippers. The essential objective of chapter 3 has been to 
outline and identify important aspects of the industry, and to establish what may 
be regarded as the key supply and demand factors and influences which will 
impact in one way or another on the strategies of competitors in the global liner 
container shipping business. 
Liner container shipping has clearly played a critical role in helping to 
facilitate the expansion of world trade and it is estimated that over 60% of all 
world trade by value is now containerised. The three dominant world economic 
regions of Asia, Europe, and North America collectively account for 90% of all 
container flows (East-West and Intra Regional). 
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Some 20 carriers control over half of all container ship slot capacity currently 
in service. Most of these top 20 lines participate within one of several separate 
global alliances, each offering an extensive (in some cases global) service 
network. Larger shippers in particular are increasingly demanding global 
services from their transport providers, hence the need for liner operators to 
develop global networks is primarily in response to customer demand. 
However, operating consolidation has not necessarily resulted in commercial 
consolidation, the result being that most trades remain fragmented with each 
alliance member still functioning as a separate commercial entity. This means 
that shippers have a wide choice of carrier, and it also means that competitors 
within alliances compete for the same business, to fill the same slots, on the 
same ships, perhaps even using the same containers. A key challenge for lines' 
is therefore to overcome the lack of differentiation between them. Carriers are 
now increasingly seeking to offer a 'superior intermodal service' on a global 
basis in an effort to gain competitive advantage. A superior service is considered 
to include elements such as fast transits, multiple service options, frequent 
service, extensive intermodal capability on the landside, and value-added 
activities, supported by advanced information systems. 
Coinciding with this change in carrier approach, shippers are increasingly 
demanding an overall service package from lines which includes aspects such as 
acceptable cost, service quality and coverage, and reliability. This is especially 
so with larger shippers sending goods between subsidiaries on a worldwide 
basis. 
There are clearly advantages and disadvantages associated with global 
shipper/carrier contracts, but the fact remains that carriers must go where global 
shippers want them to go, as failure to do so may mean loss of business. Many 
small and medium-sized shippers represented by Shippers' Councils are also 
able to exert strong bargaining power over lines. Shippers' Councils have been 
actively campaigning against conference 'cartels', advocating the removal of 
surcharges, and the introduction of confidential contracts between a line and its 
customers. 
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Protection for lines within the traditional liner conference system has been 
severely weakened through the countervailing powers of government regulation, 
Shippers' Councils, global shipper bargaining power, and by the introduction of 
new services by 'independents'. To a large extent conferences have now been 
usurped by new-style carrier alliances, either global or trade-specific. 
Deregulation in the USA through enactment of OSRA has eased the way for 
global contracts and also allows for confidential contracts. However, differences 
still exist between regulatory regimes. While the EC, like the US, allows 
conference members to jointly set prices, the EC does not permit joint pricing 
on inland transport, unlike the US. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that 
certain Asian countries may introduce new regulations for liner shipping. In an 
effort to provide for fair competition, and protect consumers, a possible global 
solution may be for a single body such as the WTO to work towards 
harmonising regulations for the container shipping industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES 
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4.1 Introduction 
The container shipping industry is one of the critical enablers of globalisation: 
containerisation permits globalisation of industry to happen (Cafruny, 1987). 
The container itself is a global homogenised product -a standard ISO container 
is nowadays just as likely to be seen in an African or South American city, as on 
the streets of New York, Hamburg or Tokyo. Standardised systems (e. g. ports, 
highways, railways etc. ) are in place globally to allow this. 
It is the strategies of global shippers that are driving container lines towards 
providing sophisticated global container transportation systems. A consequence 
of this is that wherever there is economic growth, there is evidence of increasing 
container traffic. 
This chapter provides a review of the literature relating to the reasons behind 
industry globalisation, and the implications for management and business 
strategy. More specifically, it seeks to address several important issues 
including: 
u What leads firms to become global? 
u What pressures do global companies face? 
u What are the organisational implications of a global strategy? 
u How does a firm reconcile the dilemma of global operational integration, 
with the need to maintain a sufficient degree of customer responsiveness at 
the local level? 
ci How is it possible to identify and analyse, for a given industry, the pressures 
for global operational integration and for local responsiveness to diverse 
market'needs? 
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4.2 Competing internationally 
Firms internationalise for a number of reasons but the fundamental reason is to 
enhance the firm's overall competitive position (Dicken, 1998). The decision to 
internationalise is a major strategic decision and the very fact of operating 
across national boundaries provides added complexity. 
4.2.1 Generic strategies 
Michael Porter (1985,1986) has developed some of the most influential ideas 
on a firm's competitive strategy. According to Porter, business firms seek to 
achieve a competitive advantage in their particular industry through the pursuit 







Figure 4.1 Porter's classification of 'generic' competitive strategies 
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c3 Cost leadership: being the lowest cost producer of a good or service; 
u Differentiation: being different from competitors in some way or other; 
c3 Focus: applying either of these two strategies on a broad or a narrow front. 
The latter is generally known as a niche strategy and may apply to a specific 
geographic market, a particular segment of a production process or a 
particular type of customer. 
4.2.2 The Value Chain 
A key question relates to the type of international strategy best suited to a 
particular industry. To diagnose and understand the sources of competitive 
advantage, it is necessary to adopt a disaggregated view of the firm's activities, 
which Porter calls the value chain (Porter, 1986: 19). Every firm is a collection 
of discrete activities which Porter refers to as value activities, although others 
use the term production chain (Dicken, 1998). Porter grouped the activities 
















Figure 4.2 The Value Chain (Porter, 1986: 21) 
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A key difference between Porter's value chain and the production chain is that 
the latter takes into account external environmental factors such as financial and 
regulatory systems. Porter sought to compensate for this through development of 
his competitive forces framework. In this study it is recognised that using one 
single framework may be unlikely to offer sufficient explanation on its own for 
a particular phenomena and that, consequently, two or more theoretical 
frameworks could be applied depending on the extent and purpose of analysis 
deemed necessary. 
However, several aspects render Porter's value chain problematic for analysis 
of the global container shipping industry: 
u The terminology and emphasis is biased towards manufacturing rather than 
service industries; 
It is uncertain under what category to analyse particular industry issues (e. g. 
trade agreements between container lines, service networks); 
c3 Whilst the framework is useful for analysing some elements of strategy, it 
ignores specific strategic choices available to, and pressures faced by 
industry competitors, particularly with regard to key issues such as global 
operational integration and the need for local responsiveness to meet diverse 
local market needs. 
4.2.3 Globalisation pressures 
A number of significant changes during the past three decades have led to the 
globalisation of economic activity, bringing with it pressures on firms to alter 
the way they compete. The lowering of trade barriers (particularly through 
successive rounds of GATT agreements) and the revolution in international 
transport (notably the impact of containerisation, international jet air travel, and 
worldwide telecommunication linkages), meant many companies were able to 
treat the world in a much more integrated manner (Bartlett, Doz & Hedlund, 
1990; Cooper, 1993). These factors were reinforced by a new wave of 
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competitors, particularly from Asia, who capitalised on falling tariffs and 
efficient global distribution to leverage their country-specific comparative 
advantages. 
By the end of the 1980s the economy of the developed world had become 
dominated by three trading blocs - Western Europe, North America and the 
Pacific Rim. Between them these regions accounted for over 75% of the world's 
output and trade and their companies accounted for over 80% of all international 
production (UNCTC, 1991). This virtually mirrors world container traffic flows 
as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Other factors accelerating the globalisation process included a rapid growth of 
financial markets, the explosion of international mergers and acquisitions, and a 
trend for large companies to be less dependent on the health of any one nation's 
economy (Emmerij, 1992). A more open trade environment has made global 
sourcing possible, leading to the emergence of global customers demanding 
consistent price, quality and service at all their locations worldwide (Porter, 
1986). 
There has also been an acceleration in the emergence of new technologies (e. g. 
pharmaceuticals, electronics) which increasingly demand global sales volumes 
in order to fund and recoup the necessary research and development costs. The 
ability to coordinate an organisation's activities in different countries has also 
been facilitated by growing similarities among the developed countries in 
marketing systems, business practices and infrastructure. These pressures have 
inevitably led to changes in the strategies and structures of international 
companies. 
4.2.4 Capital in global industries 
MNC's must exploit the benefits of their international scope to match their 
competitors' costs of capital and effective rates of taxation. The structure of 
external financing has become more global, shifting from primarily home 
currency borrowing at the parent level and local currency borrowing on the part 
of foreign subsidiaries, to a more complex pattern which recognises the 
interaction between minimising taxes, exploiting financial incentives and 
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distortions in financial markets, and offsetting exchange rate exposures 
(Lessard, 1986). 
Factors influencing a MNC's cost of capital include: national capital market 
structure, national tax policy, national systems of corporate governance as well 
as project-linked financing opportunities (Baldwin, 1986). At the national level, 
competitive forces of supply and demand determine the cost of capital within 
the marketplace. However, a dramatic development over the past few decades 
has been the integration of world financial markets into one global 
'supermarket'. Global corporations are particularly well positioned to gain 
access to this market (e. g. P&O has raised capital in Hong Kong, New York 
and Tokyo). 
Global container lines have also benefited from host government financial 
incentives. By constructing ships in Denmark, Maersk Line enjoys tax 
advantages in the form of attractive depreciation allowances. Lines chartering 
vessels from German owners indirectly benefit from the KG tax system. Lines 
have also taken advantage of public bodies financing new port infrastructure and 
then entering into a joint venture, with lines contributing less finance than 
would otherwise be the case (e. g. Evergreen at Taranto, Maersk/Sea-Land in 
New York and Aden). 
Although global corporations have the capability to scan locations in order to 
determine the most productive match of resources and activities, they 
themselves are being scanned by increasingly sophisticated international 
providers of capital. There is also a tendency for capital in all markets to be 
driven towards a common global standard. This implies a need for global 
corporations to identify earlier potential advantages to be gained from specific 
configuration of its various value activities. In global container shipping, as in 
any other global industry, the corporation needs to have full knowledge of its 
opportunities, and thus seek to lower the cost and increase the efficiency of the 
capital it deploys. 
I 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 103 
Chanter 4- Strateeic Manaizement in Global Industries 
4.3 International strategies 
4.3.1 Multidomestic strategy 
During the early decades of the twentieth century European MNC's such as 
Unilever, Philips and Nestle played leading roles in the development of foreign 
direct investment and the setting up of overseas subsidiary companies. Distance, 
protectionist policies and communication difficulties inevitably meant that these 
overseas subsidiaries were allowed a high degree of strategic and operating 
autonomy; as a result they pursued country-centred or "multidomestic" 
strategies (Porter, 1986). 
A multidomestic strategy is mainly relevant in industries where a firm's 
overseas subsidiary can compete effectively by performing most of the functions 
in the value added chain within a single foreign country (or small group of 
countries). Competition in each country is essentially independent of 
competition in other countries - competition occurs on a country-by-country 
basis and competing internationally is discretionary. Such a company will only 
expand internationally if its management believes that it has some advantage 
that allows it to overcome the extra costs of entering and competing in foreign 
markets. 
Once it has set up in a foreign country the firm builds its competitive 
advantage by responding to the local needs and wants of customers in that 
country, i. e. by adapting its products and/or services to suit local tastes and to fit 
market structures such as local channels of distribution, communications media 
and local laws, regulations and standards (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). These 
pressures for local responsiveness may also be enhanced by high tariff barriers 
aimed at discouraging imports and encouraging sourcing from indigenous 
industries. 
Typically, the firm's subsidiary will adapt its products/services and activities 
in a manner that is relatively independent of its parent organisation or of other 
subsidiaries within that organisation. There is no competitive advantage to be 
gained from coordinating activities across subsidiaries. In the early years, these 
organisations tended to be run as "decentralised federations" (Bartlett & 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 104 
Chapter 4- Strateeic Mannement in Global Industries 
Ghoshal, 1989). The role of the group head office in the home country would be 
limited to the appointment of senior managers to subsidiaries. Such interactions 
were the inevitable response to an era when international transport and 
communications were costly and unreliable and national markets were highly 
differentiated. 
In spite of the obvious benefits of responsiveness to local market requirements, 
a multidomestic strategy has some equally obvious disadvantages: 
u Economies of scale are limited by the size of the local market so production 
costs may remain high; 
13 Concentrating attention on the local market may blind managers to 
developing trends in the wider world; and 
u It may also discourage cooperation with and learning from affiliated 
companies elsewhere in the same group. 
These factors can lead to unnecessary costs and delays in the introduction of 
new products and/or technology and the consequent loss of market opportunities 
to more quick-footed competitors. In recent years these competitors have 
generally been ones operating on a global basis, i. e. Japanese automobile 
manufacturers, and American electronics companies. Nevertheless, 
multidomestic strategies can still be identified in some industries, such as 
processed foods and retailing, where national tastes predominate and traditional 
business practices or government regulations or constraints persist (Doz & 
Prahalad, 1984). 
Each of Porter's three generic competitive strategies applies to all firms 
regardless of the geographical extent of their operations. At the international or 
global scale, however, such competitive strategies take on an additional 
dimension in that: 
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"Industries may vary along a spectrum from multidomestic to global in their 
competitive scope. 
(Porter, 1986: 17) 
Figure 4.3 surnmarises the basic features of industries at each end of this 
spectrum. Until the 1960s most MNC's pursued a multidomestic (or nationally 
responsive) strategy in their international operations, whereby autonomous 
national subsidiaries served individual national markets (Dicken, 1992). The 
essence of a multidomestic or nationally responsive competitive strategy is an 
international network of commonly owned, but quasi-independent, operations, 
each responsive to the characteristics of individual national markets. 
While such multidomestic strategies are still very common among MNC's, a 
growing number of mainly larger corporations have developed globally 
integrated competitive strategies. Technological changes in transport and 
communications, in the production process, and in the organisation of 
production, together with international convergence in market characteristics, 
have increased the benefits to be gained from operating at very large scales. 
However, dividing industry strategies into these two polar opposite types 
would be an over simplification of reality. It suggests two mutually exclusive 
strategic orientations: global integration on the one hand and national 
responsiveness on the other. In reality, each contains elements of the other. 
Firms operating in so-called multidomestic industries (e. g. container lines 
serving intra-Asia trades) must take account of global forces (e. g. global carriers 
(wayporting' (i. e. shipping cargo between Asian markets) when their ships 
transit Asia en-route to Europe or North America, or demands from shippers for 
global service contracts). Conversely, firms operating in global industries must 
be responsive to national and local differences (e. g. different port working 
practices, local agency laws, container weight and size limits, container types, 
seasonal impacts on trade flows etc. ). This means that intensification of global 
competition in a world which still retains a high degree of local differentiation 
creates, for all MNC's, an internal tension between globalisation forces on the 
one hand and localisation forces on the other. 
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" An industry in which a firm's 
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country is significantly 
affected by its position in 
other countries and vice versa 
" The industry is not merely a 
collection of domestic 
industries but a series of 
linked industries but a series 
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activities as an overall system 
but must still maintain some 
country perspective 
Figure 4.3 Competitive and strategic characteristics of multidomestic and 
global industries (Source: based on material in Porter, 1986, Chapter 1) 
4.3.2 Global strategy 
The essence of a global strategy is the ability to regard the world (or the most 
significant regions of it) as a single market. This implies an increasing 
homogenisation of consumer tastes across the world and the ability to produce 
and sell a standardised product in response to such tastes. It also implies the 
ability to compete effectively on a worldwide basis. 
It is argued (e. g. Hout, Porter & Rudden, 1982; Porter, 1986) that the 
international firm pursuing a global strategy will search for competitive 
advantage by locating its activities in the best (and in the optimum number of) 
locations worldwide, and it will seek to manage those activities as 
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interdependent members of a single system, not as a portfolio of independent 
businesses. In this sense 'strategy' may mean either organic growth, 
acquisitions, alliances, or a mixture of these. Success in these areas should 
deliver the essential benefits of a global strategy, which include low cost and 
high efficiency. 
Low cost can be delivered through economies of scale in production, logistics 
and/or marketing. In container shipping there is evidence of this in terms of 
increased ship size, and in larger vessel and container fleet orders. It can also be 
delivered through economies of scope such as the sharing of physical assets (e. g. 
terminals), brand names and/or external relations across different businesses and 
markets (e. g. mergers between lines has reduced costs associated with local 
representation - one local office instead of two). However, greater efficiency 
may depend on the ability to transfer, share and develop knowledge, expertise 
and experience from one part of the organisation to others on a worldwide basis 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). The implication is that this has to be done by 
centralising the organisation's decision-making process to ensure effective 
control over the whole complex system. 
It has been argued (Kobrin, 1991) that the key pressure encouraging global 
integration has now become technological intensity - primarily measured in 
terms of R&D expenditure and the increasing cost of process technology. 
Kobrin sees one of the most obvious manifestations of this trend as the 
emergence of international strategic alliances between very large MNC's from 
advanced industrial countries; container shipping appears to offer a classic 
example. of this as lines collaborate in order to share costs associated with 
constant upscaling. Others (Harrigan, 1987; Contractor & Lorange, 1988) also 
list high, risky investment requirements and rapid technological change as 
important causes of the increase in international alliances and partnerships. 
As well as low cost entry and risk-sharing, alliances can provide fast access to 
new markets, by 'borrowing' the already-in-place infrastructure of a partner 
(Doz, Prahalad & Hedlund, 1990). For example, alliances between Asian and 
European lines enabled the former to access terminal facilities and intermodal 
connections previously put in place by their European partners. Global 
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competition can also highlight asymmetries in the skill endowments of firms. 
Essentially, collaboration may provide an opportunity for one partner to 
internalise the skills of the other, and thus improve its position both within and 
outwith the alliance (Contractor & Lorange, 1988). In the Maersk/Sea-Land 
alliance, Maersk benefited from Sea-Land's extensive terminal and intermodal 
capabilities, whilst Sea-Land sought advantages from Maersk's vast shipping 
fleet and more extensive global network of routes. 
However, firms that want the edge an alliance can provide must cope with a 
host of constraints, from nationalism to cultural differences to antitrust attitudes. 
Many firms have difficulty sustaining long-term relationships (Perlmutter & 
Heenan, 1986). Cultural differences, ' poor communication, and political 
infighting may lead to the demise of a strategic partnership. Corporate 
partnership is difficult to achieve, especially where it involves diverse 
backgrounds and cultures. An atmosphere of mutual distrust or domination by 
one partner may j eopardise the stability of an alliance and two corporate cultures 
will not always mesh well or smoothly (Ohmae, 1989). In container shipping, 
the alliances that seem to work best occur where lines have had some dealings 
with each other over a long period, perhaps within a liner conference. For 
example, P&O and Nedlloyd, Maersk and Sea-Land, and Neptune Orient Lines 
(NOL) and American President Lines (APL), had all been working closely 
together prior to their subsequent mergers. 
4.4 Factors leading to globalisation 
From case study research into several industries, Cvar (1986) identified two 
particularly significant factors leading to industry globalisation: 
c3 Homogeneous demand, and; 
c3 Susceptibility to scale economies. 
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4.4.1 Homogeneous demand 
Cvar (1986) found that most global industries were characterised by a 
significant level of demand for standardised products. Container shipping 
provides a good example of this as containers are standardised worldwide to 
ensure effective handling by ships, within terminals, and through use of 
intermodal connections. Cvar also notes that, as economic circumstances have 
converged (a container shipping example being the growing level of 
technological sophistication in most seaports around the world), so the demand 
for standardised products has expanded. 
4.4.2 Susceptibility to scale economies 
Cvar (1986) also found that the value or production chain in global industries 
tended to include activities that were highly susceptible to scale economies, 
thereby allowing a cost advantage from global configuration. The tremendous 
size economies in container shipping have been investigated by a number of 
writers, especially in recent years due in part to the dramatic increase in ship 
size, with the largest vessels now capable of carrying upwards of 8,000 TEU 
(e. g. Lim, 1994; Cullinane & Khanna, 1999; Gilman, 1999). Scale effects are 
also demonstrated in other ways, for example through the greater purchasing 
power of global lines and alliances with respect to new ships, container 
purchases, port facility charging, and intermodal suppliers. 
In regard to ship economies, Gilman (1999) notes the improvements in 
stowage efficiency for larger ships, partly due to reduced engine weight, and 
smaller crew and accommodation deck which have the effect of reducing ship 
lightweight (i. e. weight of unladen ship), allowing more cargo to be carried. 
However, Gilman suggests that economies of scale in ship size diminish due to 
the extra time taken to load and discharge larger vessels in port, and that 
consequently carriers should keep ship size to under 10,000 TEU. 
So, whereas potentially there are significant economies of scale to be earned 
from operating larger ships as opposed to small, the overall efficiency of a ship 
depends ultimately on the total time it takes to complete a voyage, including 
port time which is a function of the cargo handling rate (Cullinane & Khanna, 
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1999). As Jansson & Shneerson (1987) point out, the aggregate economic 
position vis-h-vis economics of scale in the containership sector represents a 
trade-off between the positive returns earned at sea, and the negative returns 
accruing while in port. 
4.5 Criticisms of the multidomestic versus global distinction 
4.5.1 Diversity of markets 
The essence of a global business strategy is frequently claimed to be improved 
efficiency (Hout, Porter & Rudden, 1982; Levitt, 1983). The world is 
increasingly viewed as a single market in which consumers with homogenised 
tastes will accept standardised products, and these global products will yield 
immense economies of scale in production, logistics and marketing. However, a 
number of writers (e. g. Kogut, 1985; Douglas & Wind, 1987) wam against the 
oversimplification implied in such views. They argue that there is actually 
evidence of an increasing diversity of behaviour within countries, that 
companies must adapt product lines to idiosyncratic country preferences, and 
that many countries are characterised by substantial regional differences, as well 
as different lifestyle and value segments. Indeed, it has been suggested that in 
some industries (e. g. food processing) national-focused companies have been 
more profitable than their global competitors (Baden-Fuller & StoPford, 1991). 
Kogut (1985) suggested that the distinction between standardised and 
differentiated products may be misleading. For example, marketing can be 
highly differentiated by country and market segment, but can still exploit 
upstream competitive advantages such as low cost production. A major task of 
the international marketing function is therefore to differentiate products that 
embody the shared or distinctive competence of earlier links in the value-added 
chain. Container lines serving the same markets may try to differentiate their 
'product' by offering faster 'express' services than their competitors or indeed 
faster than their own normal service linking the markets in question. For 
example, Evergreen Line offers customers a choice on some routes of an 
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express direct service (e. g. Singapore-USA), or the slower transit (and cheaper) 
Eastbound Round-The-World service which calls at several other ports in Asia 
before heading across the Pacific. Each type of service is therefore geared 
towards a different customer segment. 
4.5.2 Flexibility of functional delegation 
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1987; 1989), using the example of Unilever in the 1970s 
and 1980s, describe how that company had to respond to competitive pressures 
to increase standardisation, coordination and integration in its detergents 
business worldwide, but not in its processed foods business. But even though 
the head office decided to manage its detergents subsidiaries in a more globally 
coordinated manner, it still had to decide what to coordinate. The benefits of 
coordinating R&D, for example, were greater than those of. coordinating 
marketing and sales. And inside the marketing function there were more benefits 
from coordination in the fields of product policy than in promotional activities. 
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) concluded that in MNC's a degree of flexibility is 
required in the approach to functional delegation and organisational issues. 
Thus, it may well be the case that there will be difficulty in defending a 
competitive position by responding uniformly to a single dominant pressure 
such as that for global coordination and responsiveness. 
Innovation and new product development are seen as increasingly important to 
international competitiveness. According to Grant (1991), this poses a dilemma 
for top management, as the generation of product or process innovations may be 
best fertilised by a high degree of decentralisation which encourages creativity 
and participation throughout the organisation. Conversely, the effective 
introduction of innovations around a globally spread organisation is likely to 
require a high degree of coordination and integration (Porter, 1986). 
A further complication is caused by the intervention of national governments 
in international business. Governments both promote and protect against global 
competition. They seek to attract inward investment by large companies and in 
so doing help them to become more successful. At the same time they impose 
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sourcing requirements and raise protective trade barriers that may impede the 
pursuit of a true global strategy. 
Doz & Prahalad (1984) and Prahalad & Doz (1987) consider that although 
every business is subject to varying degrees of economic, competitive and 
technological pressure which push it towards becoming global or remaining 
locally responsive, most have to accommodate both pressures simultaneously. 
This results in managers having to make difficult trade-offs in the extent and 
forrn of integration and responsiveness. Prahalad & Doz point out that labelling 
businesses as "global" or "multidomestic" may actually conceal and undervalue 
these crucial managerial tasks. 
4.5.3 Economic regulation 
Economic regulation concerns the way in which the economic process is 
normalised; this concerns the norms for relations within which the process of 
production and the division of goods for satisfying demand takes place, as well 
as the governance and coordination mechanisms pertaining to these (Stevens, 
1999). The concept of economic regulation concerns the pattern of rules that 
determine who takes the decisions regarding production and the destination of 
goods and services and how these are coordinated. 
To what extent the state lays down or tries to influence the limiting conditions 
for economic activity depends on the current political ideology. Eucken (1950) 
(as quoted in Stevens, 1999: 18-19) emphasised that the economic process can 
be coordinated in principle by three different actors: 
0 The state 
u Groups 
c3 The market 
The control mechanism differs fundamentally in these three regulatory models. 
In management by the state, control over economic activity is in the hands of 
politicians. Decision making about the allocation of the means of production 
and the coordinating of supply and demand takes place through the budget 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 113 
Chapter 4- Strategic Management in Global Industries 
mechanism and political and administrative procedures. In the management by 
the market model, the coordinating principles are the price mechanism and the 
level of competition between suppliers. It is difficult to distinguish management 
by groups as a separate form of regulation; management by groups can be 
interpreted as 'consultation economics' but consultation cannot equate to 
decision-making and coordination. 
However, the attention devoted to economic regulation often fails to take 
account of specific characteristics such as the degree of development and rate of 
innovation, the relationship between various economic sectors, and the degree 
of openness and dependence on foreign markets, whereas these are just as 
important to a description of an economy as the degree of centralisation. These 
two models also ignore the countless tools which a government has at its 
disposal to influence the market without obstructing spontaneous market 
relations. 
Regulation in international liner container shipping has previously been 
discussed in Chapter 3, which also gave reference to the statutory role of some 
Shippers' Councils', the latter perhaps corresponding to Eucken's 'groups'. In 
Chapter 6, and based on empirical evidence, the different regulations imposed 
by a number of host governments that affect liner shipping operations are 
considered in more detail. 
4.6 Organisational implications 
4.6.1 The need for integration and responsiveness 
The nature of the strategic challenge facing firms in today's global environment 
implies therefore the need for organisational capability to facilitate strategy 
implementation. Arguably senior managers most critical task is to structure the 
relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries (Doz & Prahalad, 1984). 
For any large complex organisation the problem of ensuring that its constituent 
parts act in accordance with overall policy is a central and continuing concern. 
The specialisation of subsidiaries which allows the organisation to undertake 
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complicated tasks requires an equally developed system of integration to bind 
them into an operational whole (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Global films must 
therefore maintain a system of integration that minimises overlap and conflict 
among subsidiaries, while allowing the necessary flexibility to adapt to their 
particular environments. 
4.6.2 Management capabilities, 
Even successful, well-established organisations face problems in managing 
operations, and after much experimentation, an ideal international structure 
remains elusive (Bartlett, 1983). However, as a firm's product/market strategy 
changes it is important that the organisation's structure is also changed to 
support implementation of the new strategy. Critical capabilities that 
management has to develop to compete successfully internationally are: 
u Efficiency in executing agreed-upon strategies through a process of control 
ofsubsidiary actions; 
o Ability to change the nature of the headquarter-subsidiary, and subsidiary- 
to-subsidiary, relationships in order to allow required changes in strategic 
direction to take place; and 
a Flexibility to bring subsidiaries together to compete in a coordinated 
fashion, to exploit government-controlled and non-conventional markets 
(e. g. China), and selectively to take advantage of interdependencies across 
businesses (rather than to sufferfrom them). 
Doz, Prahalad & Hamel, 1990: 119) 
Taken together, these three capabilities might be regarded as the keys to the 
strategic management process in a multinational business. They allow corporate 
management, or the business unit management for a single business to vary 
selectively the nature and the extent of autonomous responsiveness to diverse 
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market conditions, and the degree of coordination and integration across 
borders. 
Essentially, global firms have to ensure their international subsidiaries 
understand that they are part of a worldwide company, not a local one. But the 
difficulty here may relate to how top management can maintain a balance 
between national responsiveness and international integration priorities without 
stifling initiative and entrepreneurship by imposing central decisions or striving 
for a "perfect" balance on each decision. In other words: 
"The issue is to allow sufficient asymmetry in the outcome of individual 
decisions to avoid paralysis, and at the same time to maintain a sufficiently 
stable overall balance so that, a priori, both responsiveness and integration 
priorities are effectively represented in the process ofreaching each decision. " 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1984: 47) 
4.7 Integration-Responsiveness Framework (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) 
4.7.1 Selecting the analytical framework 
This thesis investigates the global container shipping industry from a strategic 
management disciplinary perspective. Strategic management scholars advocate 
the use of analytical frameworks specifically designed to facilitate analysis of 
important aspects of strategy (e. g. Porter, 1986; Johnson & Scholes, 1993). 
Although many frameworks exist, some of which have been considered in this 
chapter (e. g. generic strategies, value or production chain, SWOT), each tends to 
have a particular purpose. Ultimately, what is important is that the framework 
chosen should be suited to the task in question. 
Review of the strategic management literature suggests only one analytical 
framework exists which is specifically designed to facilitate analysis of the 
pressures faced by global industries in respect of conflicting needs for global 
integration and local responsiveness - the Integration-Responsiveness 
Framework (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Prahalad & Doz used the framework to 
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help analyse integration-responsiveness pressures faced by global 
pharmaceutical and electronics businesses (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
The merits of the framework and its relevance to the global container shipping 
industry were initially tested during preliminary interviews in the study 
programme with the collaborating organisation, Sea-Land. The framework was 
found to provide a sufficiently comprehensive coverage of key industry 
influences vis-A-vis global integration and local responsiveness. This, plus the 
lack of any other published framework(s) designed to help analyse industry 
pressures for global integration and local responsiveness, resulted in the 
Prahalad & Doz Integration-Responsiveness Framework being selected for use 
in this study. 
4.7.2 Methodological building blocks 
Prahalad & Doz (1987) established what they termed a set of three "building 
blocks" of the methodology for analysing global industry pressures and mapping 
relevant industry characteristics, starting with the managerial demands that are 
imposed on senior management. These building blocks consist of the need for 
strategic coordination and for integration of activities across global markets, 
and the need for local responsiveness. 
4.7.3 Global strategic coordination. 
Prahalad & Doz define strategic coordination as the management of resource 
commitments across national boundaries in pursuit of a strategy. The head office 
at the centre of an international business has to deal with its affiliates or 
branches located around the world and coordination refers to the efforts made by 
the centre to ensure cooperation and collaboration between them. This may 
involve business-wide strategic planning and intervention at the policy-making 
level to avoid duplication and/or competition between members of the same 
group. As Prahalad & Doz maintain, coordination decisions transcend a single 
subsidiary. The centre may assign strategic roles to its subsidiaries in order to 
develop a coherent response to a global competitor, however, global 
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coordination implies a high level of central direction of planning and policy- 
making throughout the business. 
4.7.4 Global integration of activities. 
Integration refers to the centralised management of geographically dispersed 
activities on an ongoing basis. This covers the more detailed day-to-day 
scheduling and controlling of operations to ensure the smooth running of the 
business. It is characterised by efforts to minimise duplication and waste and to 
maximise the efficiency of operations. Prahalad & Doz give as an example 
managing shipments of parts and subassemblies across a network of 
manufacturing facilities in various countries. This would involve integration of 
production, scheduling, transport and overall logistics across borders. Global 
integration implies a high level of central control of day-to-day operations 
throughout the business. 
4.7.5 Local responsiveness. 
Local responsiveness refers to resource commitment decisions taken 
autonomously by a subsidiary in response to primarily local competitive or 
customer demands. In some businesses, there may be no competitive advantage 
to be gained by coordinating actions across subsidiaries; in fact, in certain 
instances that may prove to be detrimental. There may be no meaningful 
economies of scale or there may be a real need for local adaptation and 
differentiation of the product/service. In businesses where the pressures for local 
responsiveness are great, individual affiliates or branches around the world will 
have a great deal of independence in decision-making and their policies will not 
be influenced to any significant extent by the needs of other members of their 
group. 
4.7.6 Criteria for analysing global integration and local responsiveness 
These three building blocks refer to the nature of relationships between head 
office and affiliates, as well as among affiliates in a multinational setting. The 
purpose of the framework is to permit assessment of the relative importance of 
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the two sets of conflicting pressures - for integration and for responsiveness 
(Prahalad & Doz assumed that the extent of strategic coordination is related to 
the need for integration) - on a business and to determine which of the two 
provides strategic leverage at a given point in time. 
A range of criteria are suggested by Prahalad & Doz to help evaluate such 
pressures (see Table 4.1). These criteria formed the basis of the interview 
questionnaire used in this study (see APPENDIX B), with specific reference to 
Sea-Land and Evergreen and the container shipping industry, the results of 
which are presented in Chapter 6. 
In order to assess pressures for global strategic coordination on a given 
business, it is necessary to consider the importance of multinational customers, 
competitors, and the intensity of investment. 
To assess pressures for global operational integration, the focus is on 
technological intensity, the need for cost reduction, universal needs of 
customers, and access to energy and raw materials. 
Table 4.1 Criteria for analysing global integration and local 
responsiveness 
Pressures for Global Strategic Coordination 
Importance of multinational customers 
Importance of multinational competitors 
Investment intensity 
Pressures for Global Operational Integration 
Technology intensity 
Pressure for cost reduction 
Universal needs 
Access to raw materials and energy 
Pressures for Local Responsiveness 
Differences in customer needs 
Differences in distribution 
Need for substitutes and product adaptation 
Market structure 
Host government demands 
Source: Prahalad, C. K. & Doz, Y. L. (1987) The Multinational Mission 
- Balancing Local Demands and Global Vision. New York: Free Press. 
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Evaluating pressures for local responsiveness in a global industry requires 
analysis across countries and regions of different customer needs, different 
distribution channels, substitute products and product adaptation, different 
market structures, and the various demands made by host governments. 
Essentially, through in-depth analysis of all of these factors, Prahalad & Doz 
maintain that it is possible to fully analyse conflicting pressures for integration 
and responsiveness on a global business. Hence this framework is employed to 
aid analysis of integration and responsiveness in the global container shipping 
industry (see Chapter 6). 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter outlined factors leading to globalisation of business activity, with 
reference to liner container shipping as appropriate. The dual influences of 
homogeneous demand and susceptibility to scale economies largely provides 
sufficient explanation for globalisation of the liner container shipping industry. 
However, there are warnings that scale economies may not continue for ever, 
with diseconomies in port adversely impacting on larger ships. 
The chapter reviewed analytical frameworks that may be used to investigate 
strategic management issues confronting global corporations. A number of 
frameworks can be used to aid investigation of strategic management issues. 
Many of these frameworks can be employed to facilitate analysis of any 
industry, whether global, multidomestic, or domestic. 
Global strategies were contrasted with multidomestic strategies, the latter 
formerly employed by MNC's and still having significant relevance today for 
many corporations. In a global industry, a key question relates to how MNC's 
balance the need for global integration of activities, yet still remain locally 
responsive to the diverse demands of many different national and regional 
markets. This inevitably requires firms to carefully consider the organisational 
implications of pursuing a global strategy. 
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From a regulatory perspective, container shipping appears to be a highly 
unusual industry. As highlighted in Chapter 3, 'groups' of shippers in the guise 
of Shippers' Councils', do in some countries regulate liner services. On the 
supply side, liner conferences regulate both price and capacity, and are legally 
permitted to do so. 
In reviewing the strategic management literature, an analytical framework 
specifically designed to aid analysis of the conflicting pressures for global 
integration and local responsiveness was identified. The Integration- 
Responsiveness Framework is used in this study to evaluate and compare 
organisational. pressures facing global container lines, pressures which imply a 
need for global integration, and pressures which suggest local responsiveness is 
necessary (see Chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONTRASTING STRATEGIES 
IN CONTAINER SHIPPING 
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5.1 Introduction 
Although basically providing a homogeneous service to shippers, global 
container lines may adopt rather different strategies in order to meet shippers 
needs. This appears to be particularly the case in relation to asset configuration 
(e. g. ships, containers, terminals, landside transport etc. ), in terms of the extent 
and form of vertical integration, the use or extent of partnerships with other 
lines, and membership or non-membership of liner conferences. 
The objective of this chapter is to place in context, and to compare, two of the 
leading carriers on the basis of these key variables. The carriers analysed in 
depth here are Sea-Land Service Inc. and Evergreen Marine Corporation. These 
companies are believed to represent examples of the main modes of operation 
adopted in the container shipping industry as proposed in chapter 2. 
Data presented in this chapter is mainly derived from secondary published 
sources. The Containerisation International journal and yearbook have been 
particularly useful sources. An effort has also been made during subsequent 
interviews with both Sea-Land and Evergreen (see APPENDIX A) to verify 
much of the information presented. 
Chapter 5 contains six main sections, beginning with a brief outline of the 
origins and development of both Sea-Land and Evergreen. The focus then 
concentrates on the 'hardware' each company employs to maintain a global 
service, with analysis and comparison of container ship fleets, route networks, 
containers, and terminals. A comparison of organisation structures' reveals 
significant differences in approach, as does the subsequent investigation of the 
lines' respective conference affiliations. Finally, the analysis concludes with a 
review of Sea-Land's and Evergreen's respective market shares on the main 
East-West trades, followed by analysis of key financial indictors in respect of 
each company. 
The intention of this chapter is to set the scene for chapter 6 which, through 
application of a theoretical framework (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) to help 
categorise data collected, seeks to further analyse some of the key differences 
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(and similarities) between Sea-Land and Evergreen in relation to their global 
strategic management. 
5.2 Corporate origins 
5.2.1 Sea-Land Service Inc. 
Sea-Land Service Inc. (Sea-Land) is a wholly owned subsidiary of CSX 
Corporation. Based in Richmond, Virginia, CSX is a 'family' of international 
transportation companies providing a wide variety of rail, container shipping, 
intermodal, barging, trucking, contract logistics and related services worldwide. 
Combined, the CSX group of companies has an annual turnover of $9 billion 
and employs approximately 43,000 people (199 8). 
The origins of Sea-Land can be traced back to 1956 when Malcolm McLean, a 
trucker, purchased Pan Atlantic Steamship Corporation. McLean believed that 
traditional methods of freight transport and shipping could be improved by 
using standardised steel containers. He subsequently converted Pan Atlantic's 
conventional cargo-passenger ships into container ships and began offering 
regular container shipping services between New York and Houston, 
Jacksonville, Miami, and San Juan (Van Den Burg, 1969; Dupin, 1986). 
In 1960, McLean changed the name of his steamship company to Sea-Land 
Service Inc. "to better describe the services offered" (Rinaldi, 1972). During that 
year, the intercoastal service was extended via the Panama Canal to the West 
Coast, calling at the Californian ports of Long Beach and Oakland. The 
container service was extended further in 1964 to include calls at the Pacific 
west coast port of Seattle and onwards to Alaska. 
In April 1966, Sea-Land introduced the first container service outside of US 
coastal waters when it began a weekly service across the North Atlantic to 
Europe. Later in 1966, a further service was introduced across the Pacific Ocean 
linking California with Okinawa and then on to Japan and South-East Asia. 
In 1969, McLean sold Sea-Land to the tobacco conglomerate R. J. Reynolds 
Industries. Sea-Land became a publicly-held company in 1984 and, after several 
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unsuccessful takeover attempts, eventually became a subsidiary of CSX 
Corporation in 1986. McLean himself later acquired Sea-Land's great 
competitor, United States Lines (USL), which subsequently went bankrupt in 
1987. 
5.2.2 Evergreen Marine Corporation 
Evergreen Marine Corporation is part of the Taiwan-based Evergreen Group. 
Although the Group's beginnings were in shipping, Evergreen- has since 
expanded and now encompasses more than twenty companies involved in heavy 
industries, property investment, computer software, air transport, and hotels. 
Evergreen's subsidiary companies are divided into four main business 
categories: 
o Marine shipping, container and transport industries; 
c3 Airline and hotel industries; 
u Heavy industrial and construction industries; and 
a Computer information industry. 
Evergreen was established by the present chairman Chang Yung-fa, a former 
ships' captain, in 1968 (Lim, 1996). Based in Taiwan, the company started with 
just one second-hand ship which plied between Asia and the US. Chang was 
born in Formosa (now Taiwan) during the Japanese occupation of the island. 
During the occupationhe learned to speak Japanese and this is believed to be a 
key factor in his subsequent relationships with Japanese bankers and shipyards 
(Magnier, 1990). By 1972, Chang had built up his fleet to twelve ships, financed 
with the help of the Japanese trading house Marubeni. Evergreen services were 
expanded during this period to include calls in the Mid-East and the Caribbean. 
Realising that containerisation represented the way forward for shipping, in 
1975 Chang built four advanced container ships and launched a new service 
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between Asia and the US east coast. Additional new vessels soon followed and, 
by 1979, further new services were initiated between Asia-US west coast and 
between Asia-Europe. 
In 1984, Chang began his most ambitious service yet - two 80-day Round-The- 
World (RTW) services, one circling the globe in an eastbound direction, the 
other westbound. Twenty-four large ships were built specifically for the RTW 
service. Including containers, the RTW service represented a total investment of 
approximately $1 billion (Kim, 1987). 
After developing the business into one of the world's largest container 
shipping operations, Chang's Evergreen Group then began the process of 
diversification into other fields. Although still very much a family-controlled 
business, in 1987 the group made Taiwan's largest ever public offering of shares 
(the offering was vastly over-subscribed) when Chang put up a5 per cent stake 
for public subscription. Chang has also transferred over 25 per cent of his shares 
in the group to employees. 
5.3 Ships and trade routes 
5.3.1 Sea-Land ships and main East-West routes 
In 1997, Sea-Land's total fleet consisted of 94 ships with an aggregate slot 
capacity of 198,765 TEU (see Table 5.1). Some 47 of these ships are employed 
on linehaull routes. Linehaul ships are Sea-Land's larger vessels, accounting for 
a total shipboard capacity of 145,269 TEU, equivalent to 73 per cent of the 
line's total capacity. Average size of Sea-Land's linehaul vessels is 3,090 TEU, 
with the smallest being 1,131 TEU and the largest 4,354 TEU. The remaining 
47 ships offering a combined total aggregate capacity of 53,496 TEU (27 per 
cent) are employed on feeder service operations. The average size of feeder 
vessel employed is 1,138 TEU, which is around one third the capacity of the 
average-sized linehaul ship. 
1' Linehaul' or 'mainline' are terms used for deep-sea or inter-continental liner services. 
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Some 30 per cent of Sea-Land's total fleet capacity is made up of chartered 
vessels. In 1997, this amounted to 46 ships offering a combined slot capacity of 
59,408 TEU. Most of the ships on charter are feeder vessels, although there are 
also 13 linchaul vessels with a combined slot capacity of approximately 30,000 
TEU on charter. About half of all chartered slot capacity therefore relates to 
linehaul ships. 
Table 5.1 Sea-Land fleet and deployment on main East-West routes, 
1997 






3x3,918 Eur/Med/ME/Ind Sub/ R Sea/ Med/Eur 












2x2,324 WCNA/HawN Pac/FE/WCNA 
2x2,304 
1x2,437 
Sub total 47 ships/145,269 TEU 
Feeders 47 ships/53,496 TEU 
Total fleet 94 ships/198,765 TEU 
Of which chartered 46 ships/59,408 TEU (30%) 
Source: Containerisation International Yearbook 1997. 
Notes: Eur - Europe; ECNA - East Coast North America; USGC - US Gulf Coast; Med - 
Mediterranean; FE - Far East; ME - Mid-East; Ind Sub - Indian Sub-Continent; R Sea - 
Red Sea; WCNA - West Coast North America; Haw - Hawaii; N Pac - North Pacific. 
Sea-Land has not been noted for building new ships in recent years. Nine 
newbuildings of 4,062 TEU were added to the fleet between 1995-1997, 
however, this was rather a rare event for Sea-Land; these were the first 
newbuildings ordered by the American carrier for almost a decade. 
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Consequently, over two-thirds of the linehaul vessels in the fleet are over 10 
years old. The recent fleet strategy has focussed on upgrading older vessels with 
more efficient engines, and reducing loading capacity of some ships in order to 
maintain a faster service speed (to compete with new faster ships being 
introduced by competitors). 
In 1995, Sea-Land entered into a global alliance agreement with the Danish 
carrier Maersk Line, subsequently implemented in May 1996. The agreement, 
which runs for 5 yearsýuntil 2001, with options to extend for a further 5 years, 
allows both carriers to share ships (and other assets) and offer a wide range of 
joint services covering both linehaul and feeder routes. 
A key difference between the partners is that, unlike Sea-Land, Maersk has an 
ongoing programme of vessel newbuildings; Maersk is committed to spending 
at least $1.2 billion on new tonnage between 1995 and 1999. This includes a 
series of 15 x 6,000-6,600 TEU and 7x4,300 TEU ships for linehaul duties, 
and 10 x 1,092 TEU ships for feeder services. 
Maersk's total fleet capacity will subsequently increase from 223,330 TEU in 
1997 to more than 340,000 TEU (161 ships) by 1999 (Boyes, 1997). Sea-Land 
agreed to charter 6x6,200 TEU newbuildings from Greek owner Costarnare 
from 1999. However, even with this change in the size of Sea-Land's fleet 
(there are currently no other orders for newbuildings pending), by 1999 Maersk 
is expected to have a fleet of ships offering a total carrying capacity more than 
one third greater than Sea-Land. While Maersk will take the number 1 position 
in liner shipping in terms of capacity in 1998, Sea-Land's movement is in the 
opposite direction, to number 6. 
Table 5.1 shows the routes Sea-Land's linehaul ships are employed on. Routes 
to and from the West Coast North America (WCNA) dominate; Sea-Land has 
around 25 of its largest vessels employed on these routes, offering a combined 
aggregate slot capacity of nearly 70,000 TEU, virtually half the company's 
entire linehaul fleet. Other significant routes where own tonnage is employed 
include Transatlantic services, and services linking the Mid-East and the Indian 
Sub-Continent. Sea-Land has committed very limited tonnage to the Europe/Far 
East trade although the US carrier has access to global partner Maersk's 
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extensive service network on this route; Maersk is also placing most of its new 
and fast 15 x 6,000+ TEU ships on the latter trade. 
Table 5.2 shows the services Sea-Land is able to offer shippers on the major 
East-West trades. By combining with Maersk, Sea-Land now offers: 4 sailings 
per week between Asia/Europe; 7 per week between Asia/US; and 4 per week 
across the Atlantic between Europe/US. Other important and growing East-West 
trades now served by weekly fixed day sailing 'frequencies include links from 
Europe and ECNA to Mid-East and Indian Sub-Continent destinations. 
Table 5.2 Sea-Land' s main East-West services, 1997 
Route Frequency Partners 
Asia/Europe 4 per week Maersk 
Asia/US 7 per week Maersk 
Europe/US 4 per week Maersk, VSA 
Europe/Mid-East/ISC I per week Maersk 
Asia/Mid-East I per week Maersk 
Note: VSA - Vessel Sharing Agreement between P&O-Nedlloyd, OOCL and Sea-LanT- 
provide three of the four Europe/US weekly services. 
5.3.2 Evergreen ships and main East-West routes 
Evergreen Marine Corporation controls a fleet of 112 ships (including 
newbuildings expected to be in service by 1999), with a total slot capacity of 
265,308 TEU (see Table 5.3). Some 62 of these vessels, with an aggregate slot 
capacity of 213,968 TEU (80 per cent of total capacity), comprise larger linehaul 
ships. The remaining 50 ships are feeder vessels. Average size of deep-sea 
linehaul vessel employed is 3,451 TEU while the average size of feeder is 1,027 
TEU. The total fleet includes 39 ships operated by Evergreen's affiliate 
company Uniglory, the latter specialising in feeder services mostly throughout 
Asia. 
Only around 8 per cent of the total fleet by slot capacity (21,493 TEU) is 
chartered. This amounts to about 20 ships, all feeder vessels operated by 
Uniglory. Thus, Evergreen owns all of its linehaul ships and does not employ 
any chartered tonnage on deep-sea services. This also reflects the fact that 
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Evergreen, similar to Sea-Land's global partner Maersk, is virtually always 
building new ships. 
Table 5.3 Evergreen fleet and deployment on main east-west routes, 
1997 
Ships/TEU size Route deployment 
3x1,810 
10 x 4,229 
10 x 4,173 
7x3,428 
5x2,728 





Eur/Med/FE/Ind Sub/ Eur 
RTW Westbound - 
FE/Ind Sub/Eur/ECNA/Carib[WCNA/FE 
RTW Eastbound - 
FE/WCNA/C Am/ECNA/Eur/Ind Sub/FE 
WCNA/FE/Ind Sub/R Sea/Med/R 
Sea/FE/WCNA 
WCNA/FE/WCNA 
Sub total 62 ships/213,968 TEU 
Feeders 11 ships/12,804 TEU (Newbuildings 
1997-99) 
Feeders (Unigiory) 39 ships/38,536 TEU 
Total fleet 112 ships/265,308 TEU 
Of which chartered 20 ships/21,493 TEU (8%) 
Source: Containerisation International Yearbook 1997. 
Notes: RTW - Round-The-World; Eur - Europe; Med - Mediterranean; Ind Sub - Indian 
Sub-Continent; FE - Far East; ECNA - East Coast North America; Carib - Caribbean; 
WCNA - West Coast North America; C Am - Central America; R Sea - Red Sea. 
The newbuilding programme for ships entering service between 1996 and 
1999 comprised 5x5,364 TEU and 10 x 4,173 TEU linehaul vessels, plus 10 x. 
1,164 TEU feeders. In 1999, additional orders were placed for 9x5,652 TEU 
and 9x1,618 TEU ships. By the end of 1999, the company expected to have a 
total of 132 ships in service offering capacity of over 300,000 TEU, with more 
due for delivery in 2000 and 2001. Reflecting the company's strategy of 
constantly building new ships, in excess of two-thirds of Evergreen's fleet are 
under 10 years old. 
A key part of Evergreen's worldwide network is its Round-The-World (RTW) 
services which require large and separate fleets of ships travelling both 
eastbound and westbound. Each RTW service takes in all three major global 
East-West trades (i. e. the Transpacific, Transatlantic and Europe/Far East) 
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during one circumnavigation (Lim, 1996). To support its RTW services, 
Evergreen also has a number of end-to-qnd (i. e. one trade lane) and pendulum 
(i. e. two trade lane) services connecting the main East-West routes allowing the 
carrier to offer additional and frequent services to more ports. 
Table 5.4 sets out the main East-West services offered by Evergreen. Four 
sailings a week are offered between Asia/Europe, one of which is the RTW 
service with the remainder consisting of joint venture services with Italian state- 
owned line Lloyd Triestino 2 (albeit with Evergreen providing most of the ships). 
Six sailings per week are offered on the Transpacific trade and, like Sea-Land, 
this is the trade on which most of Evergreen's capacity is targeted, reflecting the 
fact that it is the world's largest single trade lane. Evergreen offers four weekly 
sailings across the Atlantic, one of these through a reciprocal slot sharing 
agreement with the US carrier Lykes Lines. An increasingly important weekly 
service is maintained between Asia/Mid-East, and Evergreen also maintains a 
weekly southern hemisphere pendulum service linking Asia with South Africa 
and then on to South America. 
Table 5.4 Everereen's main East-West services 
Route Frequency Partners 
Asia/Europe 4 per week Lloyd Triestino 
Asia/US 6 per week Lloyd Triestino 
Europe/US 4 per week Lykes 
Asia/Mid-East I per week 
Asia/S Africa/EC S I per week 
America 
Notes: Lloyd Triestino are partners on two of Evergreen's four weekly Asia/Europe 
services and on two of the six Asia/US services; Evergreen has a reciprocal slot sharing 
agreement on Lykes Lines single weekly sailing between Europe and the US Gulf Coast. 
5.3.3 Sea-Land feeder services 
Both Sea-Land and Evergreen operate an extensive network of feeder services to 
support their global linehaul services. In Europe, Sea-Land's network of feeder 
services operate between the company's main hub ports of Rotterdam and 
Algeciras, from there connecting with smaller regional ports throughout the 
North Sea, Scandinavia, Baltic, Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Black Sea regions. 
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Sea-Land's partner Maersk has expanded this system by adding relay services 
between the Mediterranean hub port of Algeciras and South and West Africa, 
services which Sea-Land are expected to take space on at some point in the 
future. 
In Asia, Sea-Land and Maersk together provide 44 separate feeder services 
(Boyes, 1996). These services permit each line to be a major player in intra- 
Asian trades as well as linking ports in Russia, China, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam into their linehaul network. Maersk has 
also begun new relay services to Australia and New Zealand, from Singapore. 
From the latter port connections are made with the main East-West services to 
Europe and North America. Sea-Land are allocated space on the latter services. 
The sharing of vessel space between Sea-Land and Maersk is otherwise 
virtually system-wide, albeit with the exception of so-called 'domestic trades', 
those between the US mainland and Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Alaska. The US 
Jones Act prohibits non-US carriers from serving these trades. However, 
elsewhere in the Americas, Sea-Land and Maersk maintain an pXtensive 
network with weekly or twice-weekly joint services offered to a multitude of 
destinations throughout Central America, the Caribbean, and both coasts of 
South America. Connecting hubs for these services are mainly in the US at Long 
Beach on the west coast, Jacksonville and New York on the east coast. New 
terminals under construction by independent terminal operators in Panama are 
also expected to figure large in terms of future intra-Americas transhipment 
traffic for both carriers. 
5.3.4 Evergreen feeder services 
In 1984, Evergreen helped to establish intra-Asia container feeder line Uniglory 
Marine Corporation, also based in Taiwan. Uniglory developed a number of 
feeder services throughout Asia, initially designed to connect with and support 
Evergeen's RTW services. Evergreen owns 34% of Uniglory, and Evergreen 
feeder cargo now accounts for only around 15-18% of Uniglory's total business, 
2 Evergreen has since acquired Lloyd Triestino. 
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reflecting the strides the affiliate company has made in developing its own intra- 
Asia traffic on the back of Evergreen movements. 
From Singapore, Uniglory feeder ships provide connections to the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Chinese ports are fed over Hong 
Kong and Pusan (Korea). A further service has been introduced between Taiwan 
and China; however, this service was only allowed to carry transhipment cargo 
in accordance with government rulings. Uniglory also serves Indian Sub- 
Continent markets from the port of Colombo. 
Now building ships for its own use, Uniglory has previously benefited from 
the 'domino' system whereby Evergreen's constant flow of newbuildings tipped 
the smallest ships from its fleet into the Uniglory pool. This enabled Uniglory to 
grow in order to meet Asian demand as well as expand its services further 
afield. 
Evergreen's feeder activities in the Americas are not so extensive as in Asia. 
Two feeder ships operate from the company's regional hubs at Panama and 
Kingston, Jamaica. These feeders serve a number of countries and islands 
throughout the region including Venezuela, Colombia, and Puerto Rico. A 
further feeder service has been introduced between Uruguay and Brazil, to link 
in with the Southern Hemisphere pendulum service between Asia and South 
America. 
Evergreen make considerable use of third party common-user feeder services 
throughout Europe. Hamburg is Evergreen's designated transhipment centre for 
Scandinavian and Baltic countries. From there feeders serve Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland, with customers in Russia served via Helsinki. 
Thamesport, near London, is the company's hub for the UK and Ireland. Feeder 
ships sail to/from Thamesport connecting with ports in Scotland, Cornwall, and 
a number of Irish ports. Spanish and Portuguese markets are served by feeder 
from Rotterdam. 
Evergreen tries to avoid high feeder costs, where possible, by extending the 
number of direct ports of call for linehaul vessels. For instance, on one of its 
new weekly Europe/Far East service strings, direct calls are now made at Lisbon 
and Gothenburg, both ports formerly served by feeder. A similar process has 
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occurred in Asia, with more direct calls now being made at Chinese and 
Japanese ports. 
5.3.5 Sea-Land inland transport services 
Throughout the US, Sea-Land's inland connections are to a large degree 
provided by sister companies within parent CSX Corporation. CSX Intermodal 
offers trucking services from a network of 33 intermodal terminals in the US; 
CSX transportation provide rail services in 20 states; and American Commercial 
Lines operate over 3,000 barges along the main navigable inland waterways. In 
addition to using sister companies for intermodal connections, Sea-Land employ 
independent third-party trucking and rail operators where necessary. 
In Europe, Sea-Land contract out trucking in each market to local road haulage 
companies, and inland shipping movements to barge operators. The US 
company has, however, developed a number of rail services in what is fast 
becoming a more liberalised European rail transport industry. Sea-Land started a 
new rail service between Rotterdam and Moscow in 1993. Three more rail 
services were started in 1994, between Rotterdam and Gernersheim (in Southern 
Germany), from Rotterdam to Milan, and between the Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk and a range of inland points in the CIS. Since 1992 Sea-Land has 
also managed the Trans-Siberian rail service between Brest and Vostochnyy in 
partnership with the Russian Ministry of Railways. 
Throughout Asia, landside transport is dominated by road haulage for which 
Sea-Land usually sub-contract to local operators. However, in instances where it 
is considered advantageous to set up its own facilities this has been done, as in 
China, where Sea-Land formed Guangdong Orient Trucking Ltd together with a 
local partner in 1993. Guangdong Orient purchased 40 new tractors to begin 
with, and established offices in Guangzhou and in Shenzhen. In an effort to 
expand its global intermodal capability, Sea-Land is currently investigating 
possibilities to become involved in provision of rail container services in both 
China and India. 
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5.3.6 Evergreen inland transport services 
With the exception of Taiwan, Evergreen Line sub-con'tract its road haulage 
needs to independent truckers virtually everywhere else. Normally in each 
country the line has an agreement with one major trucker to attend to all its road 
transport needs. In Taiwan, subsidiary company Evergreen Transport 
Corporation own and operate a significant fleet comprising 180 trucks and 530 
trailers. Rail services are only extensively used in North America where 
Evergreen employ the services of stack train operators linking its hub terminals 
at Vancouver, Seattle, Los Angeles, and New York with a number of inland 
destinations such as Chicago, Dallas, Toronto, and Montreal. 
5.4 Containers and terminals 
5.4.1 Sea-Land container fleet 
In addition to the need to have an extensive fleet of ships, the global container 
carrier also needs to have at its disposal a very large fleet of containers, of 
various sizes and types. Sea-Land's total global equipment fleet in 1995 
consisted of 207,454 TEU (see Table 5.5). Of this, just over 120,000 TEU 
(almost 60 per cent) consisted of 40' dry cargo containers. With nearly 3 1,000 
TEU in 40' refrigerated containers, Sea-Land controls one of the world's largest 
reefer container fleets. The company also has a significant number of 'specials' 
e. g. open-tops, platforms, etc. ), amounting to 11,854 TEU. 
Just under half of Sea-Land's container fleet (46 per cent, or 95,322 TEU) is 
owned by the carrier. Owned containers are supplemented by a further 112,132 
TEU of leased units. Dry-cargo 40' and 20' containers account for the majority 
of leased containers (101,069 TEU or 90 per cent). Sea-Land's owned fleet 
therefore appears to be dominated by container types which are generally not 
available on the leased market, to a large extent, such as high cube containers, 
longer 45' containers, and refrigerated units. Over the last decade Sea-Land has 
progressively moved away from operating a predominantly owned fleet, to a 
predominantly leased container fleet today. 
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Table 5.5 Sea-Land's container fleet (at Sep tember 1,1995) 
Containers Owned Leased Total 
(TEU) 
20' dry vans 2,166 25,883 28,049 
40' dry vans (HQ 18,277 4,033 44,620 
40' dry vans 4,248 33,560 75,616 
45' dry vans 6,710 590 16,425 
40' refrig. (HQ 9,212 731 19,886 
40' refrigerated 4,347 1,155 11,004 
Specialised units 5,890 5,964 11,854 
Total (TEU) 95,322 112,132 207,454 
% 46% 54% 100% 
Source: Containerisation International Yearbook 1995. 
HC denotes high-cube (9'6" high) containers 
Sea-Land also owns approximately 60,000 chassis and 300 double-stack rail 
cars. The chassis are virtually entirely used in North American terminals, many 
of which still store containers on chassis rather than stacking on the ground as is 
more common elsewhere. However, Sea-Land expect to phase most of these 
chassis out in future as US terminals revert to the more common ground 
stacking arrangement. 
5.4.2 Evergreen container fleet 
Evergreen's container equipment pool in 1995 totalled 401,670 TEU (see Table 
5.6), equivalent to almost double that of Sea-Land. The fleet also includes 
containers used by Uniglory which are managed in the one pool by Evergreen. 
Evergreen own a total of 260,000 TEU, or 65 per cent of the fleet; Uniglory 
account for a further 24,780 TEU (6 per cent), whilst the balance of 116,230 
TEU (equivalent to 29%) consist of leased units. 
Approximately one quarter of the entire fleet is made up of 20' containers, 
highlighting Evergreen's strong position on the Europe/Asia trades where this 
size of unit is in demand, more especially eastbound. Nevertheless, 40' 
containers, including high-cubes, account for the largest portion of the fleet (66 
per cent). The remainder of the fleet consists of reefers and specialised units. 
While Evergreen has a much larger container fleet than Sea-Land, Evergreen's 
fleet of refrigerated containers totalling 16,540 TEU is only about half of Sea- 
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Land's. Unlike Sea-Land, Evergreen does not have any of the longer 45' 
containers in its fleet, a unit almost entirely used in US markets. 
Table 5.6 Everareen's container fleet (at I September 1995 
Containers Evergreen Uniglory Leased Total 
(TEU) 
20' dry vans 72,500 10,700 27,000 110,200 
40' dry vans (HQ 22,500 1,050 - 47,100 
40' dry vans 64,600 5,300 44,000 227,800 
40' refrig (HQ 5,600 640 600 13,680 
20' refrig - - 30 2,860 
Specials 2,760 100 - 30 
Total (TEU) 260,660 24,780 116,230 401,670 
% 65% 6% 29% 100% 
Source: Evergreen Equipment Team, Taipei 
HC denotes high-cube (9'6" high) containers 
The main reason Evergreen has a relatively low ratio of leased containers 
relative to Sea-Land (or for that matter other major carriers, as typically leased 
containers account for 50% of all containers across the liner industry) is that the 
Taiwan carrier owns its own container manufacturing facilities. Factories 
located in Taiwan and Malaysia, add approximately 25,000 TEU to the 
company's fleet each year, and account for 96 per cent of Evergreen's annual 
container purchases amounting to approximately $100 million (Damas, 1994). 
Based on this rate of growth, the Evergreen container fleet in 1999 was 
estimated to be in the order of 500,000 TEU. 
5.4.3 Sea-Land terminals 
Sea-Land operate 25 terminals worldwide. Of these, 15 terminals are in North 
America, 5 in Asia, with 2 in Europe. Fourteen terminals are for the exclusive 
use of Sea-Land. Sea-Land has preferential berthing rights at a further 14 ports. 
Preferential berthing rights means a port provides a guarantee of a berth when a 
ship arrives on schedule, in return for a commitment from the line that a given 
volume of traffic will be handled at agreed handling rates. 
Together with Maersk and local partners, Sea-Land is developing a new hub 
port at Mina Raysut in the south of Oman. Other new hub ports are being 
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considered in Panama and in Brazil (Crichton, 1995). The alliance with Maersk 
is intended to rationalise some of the terminal operations of both carriers. This is 
not always easy as in many ports each carrier still has a number of years to run 
on their separate lease agreements. However, the lines managed to overcome 
this problem in Algeciras and in Hong Kong where their terminals were adjacent 
to each other and this meant that all they needed to do was to remove the fence 
which separated them. The ultimate objective of the alliance is to have a single 
terminal in each port where there is sufficient land to accommodate both 
carriers' increasing volumes (Boyes, 1996). 
5.4.4 Evergreen terminals 
Instead of investing heavily in its own marine terminals, Evergreen seeks to 
enter into priority preferential berthing agreements with existing container 
terminal operating companies at key hub ports such as Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Hamburg, Rotterdam, Thamesport, Los Angeles, and Charleston. In offering a 
high volume of traffic to a port, Evergreen is able to negotiate competitive 
handling rates without the need to invest in terminals and equipment. 
Evergreen nevertheless maintains a small number of dedicated hub terminals 
at which it leases facilities from the relevant port authorities', most notably at 
the new Thai port of Laem Chabang, at Los Angeles, and in Kaohsiung. The 
company has also developed a new hub terminal in Panama, at the Caribbean 
entrance to the canal (Crichton, 1995). Terminal ownership and operation is 
nevertheless the exception rather than the rule for Evergreen. 
Aside from different strategies adopted by Sea-Land and Evergreen in regard 
to terminal ownership and operation, major hub ports used by both tend to be 
quite similar in each of the principal trading regions. For example, both lines' 
ships call at the largest container ports such as Rotterdam, New York, Long 
Beach/Los Angeles, Tokyo/Yokohama, Kaohsuing, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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5.5 Organisation structures 
5.5.1 Sea-Land divisions 
Since president and CEO John Clancey was appointed in 1991, Sea-Land has 
undergone a major restructuring. With almost 9,000 employees worldwide in 
1995, much of the restructuring has involved an element of downsizing, with the 
loss of around 1,000 employees over the 1991-96 period (Boyes, 1996). The 
restructuring has also involved the centralisation of key management functions 
within the new corporate headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina. This led to 
all three key Sea-Land operating divisions - Pacific, Atlantic, and Americas - 
being relocated in Charlotte from the former HQ in New Jersey. 
The Pacific division, with responsibility for Asia-North America trades, was 
formerly based in Seattle, while the Americas division, with overall 
responsibility for US offshore domestic trades, was based in Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida. The Atlantic division was based in Rotterdam, to which responsibility 
had been transferred from New Jersey as recently as 1993. Rotterdam and other 
former trade division headquarters have since been downgraded to 'regional 
sales coordinating office' status. 
Under the existing arrangement, Sea-Land have placed increased emphasis on 
global marketing (Fossey, 1994). The company has formed a Global Services 
Division, also headquartered in Charlotte, to support all three operating 
divisions. This consolidation and centralisation of management functions has 
been influenced by a fundamental change in customer requirements. 
There are around a hundred or so large shippers with regular worldwide 
business and these relatively few global shippers account for around 20-25 per 
cent of all East-West container traffic (Drewry, 1992). As these global shippers 
are cutting back on the number of carriers they do business with, Sea-Land's 
relocation to a single site where all decision makers are together is intended to 
make the company more responsive to the needs of these customers, and to 
improve operating efficiency at the same time as keeping costs down (Fossey, 
1994). The new structure (see Figure 5.1) is intended to enable the organisation 
to think and act as one integrated, interactive company. A further benefit is 
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perceived to be the ability to quickly form cross-functional teams to improve 
processes and solve problems. 
I CEO I 










--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- Division 
Atlantic 
Division 
Figure 5.1 Sea-Land organisation structure 
Also relocated to Charlotte are key administrative functions including IT, 
personnel, finance, equipment, and shipmanagement. Reasons given by Sea- 
Land for selecting Charlotte as location for its corporate headquarters (a rather 
unusual choice for an ocean carrier given that it is nowhere near a port) include: 
u It is a cheaper place (than New Jersey) in which to conduct business; 
u There is a good work ethic; and 
a The state offers a good quality of life (perceived to be better than New 
Jersey, the previous corporate HQ location), which makes it easier to attract 
and retain personnel. 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 140 
Chapter 5- Contrasting Strategies in Container Shipping 
Approximately 500 people are based at the new corporate HQ. Key personnel 
have been transferred to Charlotte from Sea-Land offices around the world, 
including Europe and Asia as well as from throughout North America. 
5.5.2 Evergreen divisions 
Evergreen's shipping business - Evergreen Marine Corporation - operates under 
the supervisory management of Evergreen International Corp. (Taiwan). 
Answerable in the first instance to Evergreen International is Evergreen Marine 
Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd, and Evergreen's two Panamanian registered 
companies, Evergreen International SA, and Green Compass SA (see Figure 
5.2). Approximately half of Evergreen's container ship fleet are registered in 
Panama and these vessels are also owned by the Panamanian subsidiaries. The 
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Figure 5.2 Evergreen organisation structure 
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The three regional headquarters located in Europe, North America, and Japan, 
are each responsible for export sales and overall financial performance within 
their own respective regions. Evergreen Marine Corporation (Taiwan) is 
responsible for South East Asia, and is also the headquarters for global ship 
operations, container equipment, personnel and training, finance and planning, 
and information technology functions. 
Evergreen therefore appears to adopt a more decentralised management 
structure, at least as far as trade divisions are concerned, compared. to Sea- 
Land's centralised matrix management structure. However, both companies 
maintain centralised control over vessels, equipment, and IT. 
5.5.3 Sea-Land sales offices 
Sea-Land has approximately 205 sales offices spread across the world. Each 
local sales office operates within one of the three trade divisions. Around 85 of 
these Sea-Land sales offices are branch offices, while at the remaining 120 
locations the company is represented by local independent agencies. Sea-Land's 
overseas branch office businesses are generally not registered locally. The 
company prefers, where allowed, for all branch offices to trade as "Sea-Land 
Service Inc". This in turn avoids the need to prepare separate trading accounts 
in respect of each branch office for filing in the host country. However, this 
strategy is not possible in all markets as local regulations (e. g. in India, and in 
some Mid-East locations) insist a foreign company register a subsidiary in the 
host country or appoint a local representative agency. 
Almost half of Sea-Land's own sales offices, 41 in total, are located in North 
America (including Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam). The company has 19 
'principal' offices in North America, that is, offices located at key linehaul ports 
(e. g. Long Beach, New Jersey, Seattle) and important inland terminals (e. g. 
Chicago, Dallas). The remaining 22 offices are smaller units providing local 
representation in secondary markets such as St. Louis, El Paso, and Anchorage. 
Sea-Land also maintains branch offices at virtually all its linehaul ports of call 
throughout Asia and Europe. Thus, key ports of call such as Felixstowe, 
Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Algeciras, Singapore, Hong Kong, Pusan, Kaohsuing, 
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and Tokyo each have a branch office. Important inland or feeder port locations 
(such as Grangemouth, Wallhamn, and Bangkok) also have branch offices. In 
most other markets (e. g. Latin America, the Mid-East, India, and in several 
Mediterranean countries), Sea-Land employs independent agents to secure and 
reserve cargo, issue documentation, and attend to the needs of direct call 
vessels. 
5.5.4 Evergreen sales offices 
Evergreen is traditionally an 'agency' carrier. That is, the company mostly uses 
agents at whichever port its ships call. However, this approach has changed 
during recent years and today Evergreen now owns or part owns most of its 
agencies at main ports of call. Quite often Evergreen has purchased shares in its 
independent agents, as has happened in the UK, Germany, the US and Hong 
Kong. 
Unlike Sea-Land, Evergreen has established its own locally-registered 
subsidiary companies in key locations including Japan (4 offices), Taiwan (4 
offices), Germany (5 offices), the UK (5 offices), and throughout North America 
(25 offices). 
Evergreen also employs independent agents in a number of markets. For 
example, the company has 24 agency representative offices in Asia, 35 in the 
Mid-East, 16 in Europe, II in the Indian Sub-Continent, plus 10 offices in the 
Caribbean and Central America. Where possible, the company will seek to 
acquire shares in its agents, some of which only act on behalf of the Taiwan line 
as it is company policy to have agents dedicated only to Evergreen services, thus 
avoiding any potential conflict of loyalty. I 
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5.6 Conference affiliation 
5.6.1 Transpacific 
3 
There are two rate-making agreements covering the Transpacific trade route 
These are: 
u The Asia North America Eastbound Rate Agreement (ANERA); and 
u The Transpacific Westbound Rate Agreement. 
Sea-Land is a signatory to both agreements, as is global partner Maersk. 
Evergreen, however, has refused to join either agreement and prefers to operate 
as an independent. In 1995, conference carriers accounted for an estimated 60 
per cent of all Transpacific container traffic (Fossey, 1995a). 
In addition to these rate agreements, there are two 'stabilisation agreements' 
relating to the Transpacific trade. The purpose of a stabilisation agreement is to 
avoid shipping lines introducing too much excess capacity onto a route as this 
generally precipitates a rates war. In the case of the Transpacific trade, the 
respective stabilisation agreements are: 
u The Westbound Transpacific Stabilisation Agreement (WTSA); and 
u The Transpacific Stabilisation Agreement (TSA). 
Within both agreements, lines discuss general operating conditions, capacity, 
and rates (although not rate setting). Both Sea-Land and Evergreen Line are 
members of these stabilisation agreements. 
3 Transpacific Rate Agreements disappeared in the second half of 1999 after OSRA 98' came into force 
and resulting in the introduction of several new independent liner services (Containerisation 
International, August 1999, p. 37). 
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5.6.2 Europe-Asia 
The liner conference covering the Europe-Asia trade is the Far Eastern Freight 
Conference (FEFC). The FEFC has three regional units and these are: 
u The Japan Europe Freight Conference (JEFC); 
u The Asia Westbound Rate Agreement (AWRA); and 
u The Eastbound Management Agreement (EMA). 
Each regional unit is responsible for setting ocean freight rates for its 
respective geographic areas. FEFC member lines controlled an estimated 50-55 
per cent of liner container traffic between Europe and Asia in 1995, independent 
lines the remainder (Fossey, 1995b). 
Sea-Land is a relatively recent entrant to the Europe-Asia trades, only joining 
the FEFC in 1996, just prior to commencement of its global alliance with 
Maersk. Evergreen, however, has always preferred to remain outside of the 
conference system and, as on the Transpacific trade, the Taiwanese line has 
refused to sign up to any of the rate agreements on the Europe-Asia trades. 
Separate from these rate agreements, there is also a stabilisation agreement 
covering the Europe-Far East trade, known as the Europe Asia Trades 
Agreement (EATA). Signatories to this agreement are able to exchange opinions 
on rates (but again not to set them) and capacity. Both Sea-Land and Evergreen 
Line are signatories to EATA, suggesting that for Evergreen, at least, there is a 
clear distinction between discussing industry capacity and discussing rates. 
5.6.3 Transatlantic 
The liner shipping conference covering the main Transatlantic trades is known 
as the Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA). This agreement differs 
from the other main east-west trades in that it combines both rates and shipping 
capacity. While Sea-Land is a member of TACA, Evergreen, due to the Taiwan 
carrier's dislike of rate agreements, has decided to have no involvement with it. 
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It has been estimated that TACA member lines control between 65-70 per cent 
of container traffic on the Transatlantic trade (Damas, 1994). 
5.7 Market shares and proritability 
5.7.1 Market shares 
Table 5.7 sets out the estimated market share of the main East-West linehaul 
trades held by Sea-Land and Evergreen. It needs to be stated that the volume of 
containers noted in Table 5.7 does not represent all container traffic carried by 
these lines as a number of other routes are omitted. For example, non East-West 
routes include North-South trades, intra-regional trades, and 'domestic' services 
(which are extensive in the US). 
While Sea-Land is estimated to have carried 780,000 TEU in 1995 on the main 
East-West routes, the line actually carried nearly double this amount in total (i. e. 
1.44 million TEU) on all its routes (Boyes, 1996). Similarly, Evergreen traffic 
figures do not include affiliate Uniglory's liftings in intra-Asia nor other trades. 
Nevertheless, Table 5.7 does serve to illustrate the relative importance of each 
line in the key East-West global trade lanes. 
On the Europe-Asia trade, Evergreen would appear to have a'much stronger 
position than Sea-Land. Evergreen had an estimated 5.5 per cent of the Europe- 
Asia market (in 1995), compared with just 1.5 per cent held by Sea-Land, a 
reflection of the latter's relatively recent entry into this trade during the late 
1980s. Evergreen also appear to have a stronger position on the Transpacific 
trade, with a market share of 9 per cent in 1995 compared to Sea-Land's 6 per 
cent. Each line appears to be similarly positioned as far as the Transatlantic 
trade is concerned, with Sea-Land on 12 per cent and Evergreen just ahead with 
13 per cent market share. Indeed, both lines' shares combined on the 
Transatlantic trade amount to a significant 25 per cent of the total market. 
Overall, Evergreen are estimated to have a combined market share of all East- 
West container trades in 1995 of 8.3 per cent (1.19 million TEU), whilst Sea- 
Land has 5.4 per cent (780,000 TEU). 
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Table 5.7 Market shares of main east-west linehaul trades 1995 
(000TVITRM 
Route Sea-Land Evergreen Other lines Total 
Eur-Asia 71 1.5% 270 5.5% 4,550 93% 4,891 100%- 
T/Atlantic 238 12% 258 13% 1,490 75% 1,986 100% 
T/Pacific 471 6% 662 9% 6,347 85% 7,480 100% 
Total 780 5.4% , 1,190 8.3% 1 12,387 86.3% 1 14,357 100% j 
Sources: Jourrial of Commerce/PIERS; Containerisation Intemational Yearbook, 1995; 
Containerisation Intemational, October, 1995. 
More recent data on trade lane market shares has not been obtained as it is 
costly to purchase from collection agencies. However, information subsequently 
obtained from each carrier appeared to suggest that the market shares stated 
above remained relatively constant during the 1995-97 period, albeit with some 
change due to traffic growth experienced on each trade lane. 
More recent data was obtained with regard to total liftings on all trades (e. g. 
East-West, North-South, and Intra-Regional combined) for the top 20 carriers at 
1997 levels (see Table 5.8). This data shows that the top carrier overall in terms 
of TEU lifted in 1997 was the Chinese national line Cosco, with 3.25 million 
TEU, equivalent to 7.3% of world container traffic. Evergreen and Sea-Land 
were more or less positioned in joint second place, each lifting just over 3.0 
million TEU, equal to 6.9% of world container traffic. 
Although Maersk Line is the largest carrier in the world in terms of ship 
capacity on offer, the Danish company is in fourth place in terms of TEU lifted, 
with a market share of 6.5%. Clearly, certain carriers appear to perform rather 
better than others in terms of the ratio of lifted TEU compared to TEU capacity. 
However, a more useful indicator may be TEU-kilometres as it is likely that 
some carriers figure more prominently in short-distance Intra-Regional trades 
than in linehaul trades (e. g. Sea-Land's significant US domestic traffic). 
Data provided in Table 5.8 shows also that the top 20 lines accounted for 70% 
of world TEU lifted in 1997, amounting to some 31.2 million TEU. More 
significantly, the top 5 carriers account for almost one third of TEU lifted 
(32.8%, or 14.6 million TEU). With further industry consolidation expected, the 
degree of carrier concentration in evidence already seems likely to continue. 
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Table 5.8 Top 20 carriers according to liftings (in TEU) for 1997 
000 TEU 
Carrier TEU liftings % share Carrier TEU liftings % share 
Cosco 3,250 7.3 Hyundai 1,332 3.0 
Evergreen 3,080 6.9 Hapag Lloyd 1,100 2.5 
Sea-Land 3,055 6.9 Yangming 1,062 2.4 
Maersk 2,900 6.5 APL 1,002 2.2 
P&O Ned1loyd 2,320 5.2 CMA-CGM 1,000 2.2 
Hanjin 1,680 3.8 Zim Israel 973 2.2 
NYK 1,660 3.7 K Line 850 1.9 
OOCL 1,500 3.4 CP Ships 670 1.5 
mSC 1,400 3.1 Safinarine 600 1.3 
Mitsui OSK 1,350 3.0 UASC 429 1.0 
Totals: 
Top-20 lines 31,213 70 
Other lines 13,147 30 
Total 43,360 100 
Sources: Containerisation International, November 1998, p. 55 and Cargo Systems report on 
The Future ofthe Container Shipping Industry (1999), p. 67. 
5.7.2 Profitability 
Table 5.9 outlines the financial performance of Sea-Land and Evergreen 
between 1991 and 1995, also noting the average industry performance among 
the top 14 liner operators for the years 1991-1993. Sea-Land revenues increased 
by 25% from $3.2 billion in 1991 to $4.0 billion in 1995. Net profit also 
increased over the period, from $27 million in 1991 to $42 million in 1995, 
although there was a significant fall during 1992-93. By 1995 Sea-Land 
appeared to be moving slightly ahead of the (very low) average industry profit 
level. In addition, while Sea-Land revenues and profits increased over the 
period, total assets employed remained virtually static (implying that the 
company was doing more with less resources). 
The situation with Evergreen appeared to be very different. Evergreen's total 
revenues actually fell from $1.2 billion in 1991 to $1.1 billion in 1995, a 
reduction of just under 10 per cent. The fall in revenue reflected increased 
pressure on freight rates as opposed to diminishing volumes (Kadar & De 
Proost, 1997a). However, net profit increased over the same period from $88 
million to $115 million in 1995, indicating that the Taiwan carrier was able to 
reduce unit costs sufficiently to offset price reductions. Assets employed by 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 148 
Chapter 5- Contrasting Strategies in Container Shipping 
Evergreen increased from $1.5 billion in 1991 to nearly $1.7 billion in 1995, a 
rise of 13 per cent and reflecting the regular introduction of new vessels and 
containers. 
Table 5.9 Key financial indicators in liner container shipping, 1991-1995 
(Million US$) 
Carrier Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Sea-Land Total revenues 3,238 3,148 3,246 3,492 4,008 
Net profit 27 17 12 26 42 
Total assets 2,088 2,020 2,043 2,050 2,074 
Evergreen Total revenues 1,230 1,187 1,189 1,175 1,105 
Net profit 88 107 106 110 115 
Total assets 1,505 1,580 1,594 1,650 1,680 
Industry Total revenues 2,174 2,304 2,381 - - 
Averagel Net profit 26 14 25 
Total assets 2,400 2,540 2,753 
Sources: Derived from Containerisation International - December 1994, p. 60, November 1996, 
p. 53, June 1997, p. 25, July 1997, p. 46. 
Notes: I Denotes average based on top 14 liner services. 
Net profit is after deduction of interest and tax. 
Inevitably there is a need to treat these net profit figures with a degree of 
caution. Any detailed financial analysis would need to consider a wide range of 
factors including vessel depreciation policy, borrowing rates, and the possibility 
for intra-group transfer pricing. Corporate cash flows would also need to be 
considered. 
Nevertheless, Evergreen appears to have consistently outperformed the rest of 
the industry, typically achieving up to five times the amount of profit earned by 
its major competitors, and doing so with 25 per cent less assets. Compared with 
Sea-Land, up to 1995 Evergreen still earned almost three times the profit earned 
by the US carrier, despite the latter having more assets employed than 
Evergreen. 
While Evergreen had more ships and equipment in use than Sea-Land, Sea- 
Land's investments in container terminals, intermodal transport, and other 
interests on the landside (e. g. consolidators) reflect its greater asset base. What 
may be regarded as curious, however, is the fact that Sea-Land's revenues 
increased significantly over the 1991-95 period, while its asset base remained 
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relatively static. A possible explanation for this may be that the company was 
moving away from owning a large proportion of its assets, especially ships and 
containers, much of which are now chartered or leased or alternatively shared 
with global partner Maersk. Sea-Lands' more extensive landside capability, 
coupled with its considerable liner activities on the protected US 'coastal' 
trades, and partly subsidised (albeit more expensive to operate) US-flag fleet, 
may also help to explain the US carriers higher level of income compared to 
Evergreen (separate figures for these activities are not available). However, it is 
evident that Evergreen, although earning considerably less total revenue than 
Sea-Land, appears consistently able to work its assets more profitably than 
either Sea-Land or any of the other major lines. 
More recent figures relating to the financial performances of Sea-Land and 
Evergreen are provided in Table 5.10. Comparing these figures with those in 
Table 5.9 shows that assets employed by Sea-Land have increased by 18% over 
the 1995-1998 period, whereas Evergreen's assets have risen by two thirds. This 
reflects the different strategies adopted by both lines in relation to new vessel 
and container orders. 
Sea-Land revenues actually fell during the 1995-1998 period to $3.9 billion, 
and the company recorded a net loss of $70 million in 1998 4. However, 
Evergreen's profits have also fallen, from $115 million to just $32 million and 
$34 million in 1998, reflecting continued downward pressure on rates. 
Table 5.10 Financial performance of Sea-Land and Evergreen, 1997-1998 
USSMillions 
Total Revenues Net Profit Total Assets 
1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 
Evergreen 1,6 
' 
39 1,337 34 32 2,792 2,280 
Sea-Land 3,916 3,991 -70 56 2,452 2,576 
Source: Containerisation International, October 1999, p. 38. 
4 In the case of Sea-Land, failure to earn the cost of capital for any consistent period ultimately 
led parent company CSX to dispose of its international liner shipping activities (retaining 
domestic shipping and certain terminal assets). The firm was finally sold to global partner 
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5.8 Summary 
Findings from this chapter reveal that although global shipping lines Sea-Land 
and Evergreen appear to provide virtually homogeneous service, they do so in 
very different ways. 
Both firms were started from relatively humble beginnings, by entrepreneurial 
individuals who came to be recognised as industry icons in their own right; 
Malcolm McLean of Sea-Land as the father of containerisation, and Dr. Chang 
Yung-fa of Evergreen demonstrating that an independent line could survive and 
prosper against the traditional established conference structure, and provide a 
truly global service. Both firms are also relatively young in shipping line terms, 
Sea-Land becoming internationally established in container shipping during the 
1960s, and Evergreen in the 1970s. 
The predominant orientation of each firm differs and this appears to have 
much to do with their respective origins, and more particularly their leaders. 
Sea-Land is still today intermodal oriented, with a high degree of emphasis on 
landside intermodal and terminal activities, reflecting the historic fact that the 
line was created by a trucker. Within Sea-Land there appears to be rather less 
emphasis on ships than on landside capabilities. Conversely, Evergreen is very 
clearly maritime oriented, with a very strong emphasis on ships and containers, 
but with minimal investments on the landside. This is also a reflection of that 
company's heritage, originally established and still headed by a former sea 
captain. 
The composition of Sea-Land's seagoing fleet of ships differs in a number of 
ways from Evergreen's. Sea-Land has a much smaller fleet overall (and further 
reducing relative to competitors), seldom builds new vessels, has a much older 
fleet profile, and often charters ships to meet demand. Sea-Land also makes 
extensive use of its global alliance with Maersk through which a significant 
number of slots are taken on Maersk's ships, most notably on the Europe-Asia 
trades where Sea-Land hardly employ any vessels at all. 
Maersk Line in December 1999 for approximately $800 million. (Source: Maersk Line Website 
- www. maersk. com). 
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Evergreen, on the other hand, is always building new ships, has a very large 
and continually expanding fleet, a more modem vessel profile, and seldom if 
ever charters linehaul ships. Furthermore, Evergreen's global route network is 
built around an intensive high-volume Round-the-World liner schedule which is 
supplemented by pendulum and end-to-end services, whilst Sea-Land employs 
traditional end-to-end services (mainly to/from North America), making use of 
Maersk's pendulum services where necessary. 
Different approaches are also in evidence with respect to containers and 
terminals. Sea-Land's total container fleet is only half the size of Evergreen's. 
Moreover, nearly half of Sea-Land's container fleet is leased, whereas 
Evergreen leases under one third of its container fleet, which is way below the 
industry average for equipment leased to liner operators (also 50 per cent). 
While Sea-Land has a much greater emphasis on (more expensive) reefer 
container equipment than Evergreen, Evergreen are clearly heavily integrated 
into their container supply chain in that the Taiwan company manufactures 
containers in its own factories. The gap between these firms' respective 
container fleets is expected to widen further as Evergreen continues to add units 
on an regular basis, while Sea-Land has few new containers on order. 
Both lines tend to call at the same global hub ports, with one or two 
exceptions. Sea-Land has adopted a policy of operating and investing in many of 
its own container terminals. This is also a legacy emanating from its creator, 
Malcolm McLean, who believed that control of terminals was a fundamentally 
important advantage for an intermodal transport operator. However, this belief 
may have been relevant in the days of almost constant dock labour union unrest 
(especially in the US and Europe), but since reform of dock labour practices in 
most countries, it may be that there is now less need for liner shipping 
companies to actually operate and control all or most of their own terminals. 
Evergreen adopt a very different posture, preferring to use its significant 
container volume in order to leverage competitive port and container handling 
charges from common-user terminals at most of its hub ports. This approach 
implies relatively little investment in ports for Evergreen, although where there 
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is some strategic advantage to be gained from investing in a particular port (e. g. 
Panama, Taranto), Evergreen will make the decision to invest. 
Sea-Land has recently implemented a new global matrix organisation structure 
by relocating all key operating and support divisions to its new global 
headquarters in Charlotte. This apparently allows the company to respond faster 
to the needs of global customers who increasingly demand a different level of 
service (e. g. a global contract), while still being able to deal with the needs of 
smaller shippers via local sales offices. Evergreen has preferred to leave its key 
operating division headquarters in the relevant region concerned, although 
responsibility for ships, equipment, IT, finance and overall strategic planning 
remains with the Taipei headquarters. Both lines tend to establish their own 
branch offices at key hub port locations, supported by independent agents in 
secondary markets. Sea-Land prefers not to register companies in each country 
of operation, whereas Evergreen takes the opposite approach, registering 
subsidiaries locally. Evergreen's policy is also to acquire shares in the 
independent agents it appoints. 
Evergreen exhibits a longstanding dislike of price-fixing liner conferences, and 
generally remains outside of trade rate agreements, preferring to operate as an 
'independent'. However, Evergreen has become a signatory to capacity 
stabilisation agreements, although only where such agreements are unrelated to 
rate setting. Historically, Sea-Land adopted a similar posture, although today the 
US carrier is a member of- all the major rates and capacity management 
agreements covering the major east-west trades. Part of the reason for this 
change is that Sea-Land, over the past decade, has entered into a number of 
partnership agreements with conference member lines. Now in a global alliance 
with Maersk, a longstanding liner conference member, Sea-Land has little 
option but to join the respective rate agreements. As a 'stand alone' carrier 
having minimal partnerships with other lines, Evergreen believe that conference 
rate agreements simply protect weaker lines, and point to the 'insincerity' 
prevalent among conference lines in that they seldom actually keep to the agreed 
rates. 
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Sea-Land is estimated to control approximately 5.3 per cent market share of all 
container traffic on the main global East-West trades (1995 levels), compared to 
Evergreen' larger share of 8.3 per cent. On key East-West routes, Sea-Land 
appear to be especially weak on the EuroPe-Asia trade lane (market share of 1.5 
per cent compared to Evergreen's 5.5 per cent), and also appear to be lagging 
behind on the Transpacific (6 per cent as opposed to Evergreen's 9 per cent), 
although both are virtually level on the Transatlantic (12 per cent and 13 per 
cent respectively). However, Sea-Land is very strong on the so-called 'domestic' 
routes in the US which are protected by the Jones Act (i. e. these trades are 
reserved for US companies, ships, and crews only). 
Whereas Evergreen appears to have captured a relatively balanced and 
significantly greater market share across the principal global East-West trade 
lanes than Sea-Land, Sea-Land's dominance in US domestic container trades 
levels things somewhat, at least in terms of overall traffic volumes. In terms of 
containers lifted annually, both carriers are in virtually joint second place in the 
world with around 3 million TEU. 
Profitability in liner shipping is more often than not something of a 
contradiction in terms, with many lines making losses in recent years. This has 
resulted in further industry consolidation after a number of bankruptcies and 
takeovers. Until the mid-1990's, Sea-Land consistently recorded a profit level 
which more or less matched the very low industry average of between 1-3 per 
cent. However, Sea-Land achieved this level of profit (and higher turnover) on a 
significantly reduced asset base relative to the industry average. This tended to 
reflect Sea-Land's strategy whereby the line invested less in ships and 
containers (relative to its competitors), instead using the assets of global partner 
Maersk Line to a greater extent. 
Evergreen was, until the mid-1990's, regarded as one of the most profitable 
carriers. From a lower asset base relative to the industry average, profits tended 
to be higher than average. In recent years, however, due to a combination of 
increased competition, lower freight rates, and sustained investment levels, ROI 
has fallen just below the industry average, and profits have also declined. 
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Chapter 5 has therefore highlighted a number of significant differences 
between Sea-Land and Evergreen. These differences reflect contrasting 
strategies in liner container shipping. Thus, it is evident from this analysis that 
although Sea-Land and Evergreen provide a relatively homogeneous global 
service (at least as far as many shippers are concerned), they do so through 
implementation of what are very different strategies. Chapter 6 extends this 
comparison through the application of a theoretical framework that permits both 
companies to be analysed in more detail, based on empirical evidence (i. e. 
following in-depth interviews with management of both firms). The analysis 
evaluates organisational pressures faced by what are essentially global 
businesses, pressures relating to the often conflicting need for global 
corporations to be both locally responsive as well as globally integrated. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND LOCAL 
RESPONSIVENESS IN CONTAINER SHIPPING 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 156 
Chapter 6- Global Integration and Local Responsiveness in Container Shinvine 
6.1 Introduction 
Based largely on secondary data, Chapter 3 provided a macro analysis of the 
global container shipping industry, while Chapter 5 illustrated via micro 
analysis the quite different strategies adopted by two leading carriers, Sea-Land 
and Evergreen, in providing global container transportation services. Chapter 6 
seeks to extend this micro analysis ftirther through in-depth appraisal of the 
pressures for global integration, and for local responsiveness, facing container 
shipping businesses. What are these pressures? How do global carriers respond 
to them? And why do carriers respond in different ways? These are the key 
questions Chapter 6 seeks to answer. 
Acknowledging that labelling an industry as either "global" or 
(4multidomestic" may hide broad variations in the underlying managerial tasks 
involved, Prahalad & Doz (1987) developed a methodology - the integration 
responsiveness firamework - for capturing, or for understanding, what they 
termed as the "existing rules of the game" in an industry. This methodology was 
discussed in Chapter 4. No other strategic management framework were found 
that enabled such analysis to be undertaken. 
The methodological framework proposed by Prahalad & Doz is employed here 
as a template (Yin, 1984) to help establish the pressures facing global container 
lines, pressures which make global coordination and integration critical, coupled 
with pressures which imply a degree of local responsiveness is still essential. 
This methodology is applied to the two companies whose contrasting strategies 
constituted the focus of the previous chapter - Sea-Land Service Inc. of the USA 
and Taiwan's Evergreen Marine Corporation. The primary focus concerns 
pressures facing the collaborating organisation, Sea-Land, however, sufficient 
additional information was obtained with regard to Evergreen to allow for a 
degree of comparison. 
The aim is not simply to compare pressures for global integration and local 
responsiveness facing Sea-Land and Evergreen; rather, it is also to identify and 
analyse the main pressures which must face all global carriers to a greater or 
lesser extent. Further, the objective is to ascertain carrier strategic responses to 
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such pressures, and this is accomplished through in-depth analysis using a 
structured methodological framework. 
Information has been gathered through a series of face-to-face interviews with 
carrier executives, with primary data being supported where applicable by 
relevant secondary data. A detailed list of interviews is provided in APPENDIX 
A. A total of 25 interviews were conducted between 1993 and 1996,21 with the 
collaborating organisation Sea-Land, and 4 with Evergreen. Eight of the first 12 
interviews with Sea-Land management (I: I to 1: 12), and 4 with Evergreen 
personnel (1: 13-1: 16) were specifically related to the questionnaire (see 
APPENDIX B) data gathering exercise employed in this chapter. The 9 further 
interviews held with Sea-Land executives in the USA during the summer of 
1996 (Interview numbers I: 174: 25), were more specifically related to chapter 7. 
However, the opportunity was also taken to ask these respondents a number of 
questions relating to the analysis in this chapter, hence the inclusion of 
comments from these latter interviews in Chapter 6 also. Comments made by 
respondents are referred to in the text of this and subsequent chapters by noting 
the relevant interview number (e. g. 1: 17 refers to interview number 17). 
Interviewees were asked a series of questions relating specifically to each of 
the pressures set out in the Prahalad & Doz methodological framework. 
Questions were adjusted to take account of unique factors associated with liner 
container shipping. A copy of questions used is provided in APPENDIX B. 
Additional secondary information has been included, where appropriate, within 
the analysis. The structure of this chapter essentially follows the framework 
headings (see section 4.7 for a full explanation of the framework). 
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6.2 Pressures for global strategic coordination 
6.2.1 Importance of multinational customers 
Prahalad & Doz maintain that the dependence of a business on multinational 
(NINQ customers imposes a need for global strategic coordination. When an 
N4NC customer is operating on a global basis, it may produce a standardised 
product at different locations around the world, or seek to obtain identical 
components and/or services (such as transport) in different parts of the world. 
To achieve cost savings and to improve its control over suppliers, the global 
MNC may move towards sourcing components/services from a single supplier 
capable of producing/delivering on a worldwide basis. In addition to central 
purchasing, the MNC may also monitor (from the centre) the supplier's quality 
and delivery performance at each of its production locations. 
To keep such a customer satisfied the supplier will have to standardisc prices, 
quality and delivery performance worldwide. Moreover, it may not be able to 
rely on its affiliates around the world to achieve an identical level of service 
without some central control and setting of priorities. This implies it will have 
to coordinate relations with the customer on a global basis. 
In the case of Sea-Land, the company has some 164,000 customers 
worldwide but only 5,000 (i. e. 3 per cent) of these account for 93 per cent of 
container flows (I: 11). %ffle smaller accounts tend to have better margins, the 
sheer volume of traffic emanating from larger shippers means the latter must be 
treated differently. The implication is that bigger volume customers receive high 
priority. 
Interviewees suggested that many of the larger customers also tend to be 
receivers as well as shippers of cargo, in that movements are often between 
subsidiaries (1: 6; 1: 11). Car manufacturers are a case in point, with GM and 
Ford, until relatively recently mainly concentrated in the US and Europe, but 
who now have production plants in many other countries. Companies such as 
Proctor & Gamble, Pepsi-Co, Nestle, and Philips also manufacture and source 
products worldwide. Nestle subsidiaries ship over 150,000 TEU worldwide each 
year and control most of this volume from their Geneva headquarters, while 
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Philips controls 90% of its worldwide flows from Eindhoven (I: 11). In effect, 
these large MNC's consolidate their worldwide logistics functions centrally in 
order to negotiate global contracts with major transportation and other suppliers. 
Greater volumes would also be expected to enhance shipper bargaining power, 
putting further pressure on freight rates. 
As early as 1994 Sea-Land had secured between 30-40 global accounts in the 
US; that is, contracts to transport customer's goods on a worldwide basis. 
Inroads have also been made in Europe to secure global contracts. Pressure is 
coming mainly from shippers themselves, with companies such as Nestle trying 
to bring down the number of container shipping suppliers that it deals with 
worldwide to 10 or less (from 40-50 before). Negotiating previously with so 
many carriers over rates proved to be a time-consuming burden for shippers. In 
addition, customers now want just one point of entry within each carrier 
resulting in carriers such as Sea-Land appointing an individual staff member to 
work with a specific customer on a global basis. Nevertheless, although most of 
their traffic is committed to the major lines, many large shippers still "throw 
scraps at niche carriers" working in single trade lanes to ensure there remains a 
fair degree of price competition (1: 18). 
In practice, Sea-Land suggest that not all markets/trades are the same as far 
as global shippers are concerned. For example, global shippers represent only 
about 10-15% of business in Mid East and Indian Sub Continent markets; in 
these markets smaller shippers are more prevalent (1: 18). Nevertheless, the view 
within the company is that things are changing fast as the larger MNC's make 
inroads into these developing markets also. 
Evergreen accept that the proportion of freight moved on behalf of MNCs is 
increasing and view this as a threat; MNC's are regarded as very hard 
negotiators on rate levels, using their large volumes to leverage agreement on 
rates. According to Evergreen, Black & Decker in the UK combined its traffic 
volume with its other plants in Spain and Italy to negotiate a new rate agreement 
with Evergreen for all its shipments to the US (1: 13). However, each trade is 
considered to be different. For example, while the US trades are dominated by 
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MNC's, Asia and Europe are rather more fragmented with, suggests Evergreen, 
larger numbers of smaller shippers. 
This is not to say that transport costs are the most critical consideration 
amongst manufacturers (Schoenberger, 1984), but it is clearly important. Yet, 
with certain types of goods (e. g. low value goods sensitive to transport costs), 
the transport cost element is considered the most critical aspect. Indeed, where 
commodity market prices have fallen significantly, this results in pressure for 
lower freight rates, and examples of this phenomenon include goods such as 
Colombian coffee, Australian wool shipments, and dried fruit and nuts from the 
USA (Boyes, 1993a; Fossey, 1992). 
Evergreen have a very mixed customer base that includes a large number of 
small customers. Global contracts are regarded as "a minefileld area " for 
Evergreen, partly because its regional headquarters (in Taiwan, Tokyo, 
Hamburg, and New York) each decide outbound cargo rates from their 
respective regions and it is difficult to get agreement between them (1: 14). Three 
or four separately accountable pricing divisions within a single liner shipping 
company, all seeking to maintain a high degree of local responsiveness, adds to 
the complexity in trying to deal with a shipper seeking a single global contract. 
Sea-Land has adopted a pro-active policy of entering emerging markets prior 
to new manufacturing plants being established in such locations (e. g. in 
Vietnam, India, Russia etc. ). This enables the company to develop a presence in 
the market and be ready to exploit new traffic flows as soon as they begin. 
"Companies like Proctor & Gamble want to be everywhere in the world and 
this means global carriers must also be present". according to Sea-Land (I: 11). 
Sea-Land regards Evergreen as more of a port-port carrier serving mainly 
forwarders and NVOCC's, rather than a door-door intermodal transportation 
service provider (1: 21). Evergreen admit this is true, up to point (1: 16). But 
carrying for third parties may not be such a bad thing given the reported annual 
worldwide container flows of major forwarders such as Kuehne & Nagel, which 
exceed 230,000 TEU, are even greater than companies like Nestle (Eller, 1992). 
However, it seems inevitable that the demands of global customers will 
dictate a need for global coordination. In Sea-Land's case this implies 
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significant pressure on the organisation towards global coordination, yet the 
presence of many local customers also suggests a need to retain a degree of local 
responsiveness. In the case of Evergreen, by contrast, there appears to be rather 
less influence from global customers, and consequently less need for global 
coordination, this being reflected in the regionalised organisation structure and 
pricing responsibilities of the company. Yet this could change as more shippers 
request global contracts. 
6.2.2 Presence of multinational competitors 
"The presence, of competitors who operate in multiple markets indicates the 
potential for global competition. Consequently, it is crucial to gather 
intelligence on competitors across national markets, to understand their 
strategic intent, and to be ready to respond to their actions wherever most 
appropriate. The presence of multinational competitors calls for global 
strategic coordination. " 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987: p. 19). 
The following two subsections consider how global carriers are able to 
monitor the activities of their competitors, and to assess the different types of 
competitor in the marketplace. 
6.2.2.1 Monitoring competitors 
Multinational competitors may threaten the profits of a business by entering new 
markets, setting up in new low-cost operating locations, and by launching new 
or improved products/services or cutting prices. To counter serious competitive 
threats, a business may need to respond either by replicating competitors' 
actions or by retaliating in another part of the world where it can impact the 
profits of adversaries. However, it may not be effective to rely on affiliates 
around the world to respond in the way they judge to be the most appropriate; 
such activity requires central planning and coordination. 
Sea-Land executives highlighted a number of ways in which the activities of 
competing lines can be monitored. For example, competitors' new ships are 
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monitored, including date of delivery, vessel size and speed, and trade deployed 
(1: 8). A company really needs to know the trade a competitor's newbuilding is to 
be deployed on, however, and in the case of global competitors such as 
Evergreen, it is more difficult to establish which trade lane new vessels are to be 
deployed as these firms have so many routes. Carriers may nevertheless indicate 
their intent if it is known that they want to phase out older ships in their fleet. 
New and faster ships are perceived to be a significant competitive threat because 
they will tend to shorten transit times and this will be attractive to certain 
shippers, at least in the short term until other lines have time to react. Sea-Land 
are relatively fortunate in this regard through the company's global alliance with 
Maersk Line because the latter currently operate some of the largest and fastest 
vessels in service (i. e. 6,000 TEU and 25 knots). 
Sea-Land also obtain information through discussions with other carriers 
(1: 23). This may be via discussions with global partner Maersk, with VSA 
partners, or through contact with other lines seeking a joint venture or slot- 
sharing arrangement. Conference meetings represent a further opportunity to 
obtain information and this avenue is not open to Evergreen to such an extent as 
the latter tends not to participate in price fixing conferences, with competitors. 
Conference meetings can also be used to send misinformation about a carriers 
intent. Whereas the old consortia arrangements were regarded as "alliances 
amongftiends" (e. g. establishment lines, conference members of long standing 
etc. ), most lines are now involved in "alliances among enemies", including Sea- 
Land (1: 23). Evergreen, by contrast, are generally referred to as a "stand-alone" 
carrier, although this is becoming less so as the latter enters into more joint 
services with its Italian partners on a limited number of routes. 
Trade publications can also offer a rich source of information with regard to 
the intent of competitors. Information may also be supplied by outside 
consultancies' specialising in liner shipping market research, such as Mercer 
Management Consulting, Drewry, and MDS Transmodal. In addition, Sea-Land 
closely monitor export/import trade publications in which trade contracts are 
announced as these contracts will eventually result in goods flows requiring 
transportation (1: 6). 
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6.2.2.2 Main types of competitors 
According to Sea-Land, "real competitors are those you constantly meet in the 
marketplace, and who fightfor yourfteight, like P&O and Maersk" (1: 8). Of all 
global competitors, Maersk Line is generally the most respected by Sea-Land 
executives in terms of service quality, efficiency, and overall management (1: 4). 
Evergreen is regarded as a "price aggressor" with a different philosophy and 
cost pattern, whereas Sea-Land views itself as a "low cost, high quality, reliable 
carrier" (1: 20). Quality and low cost are viewed by Sea-Land as essential 
prerequisites to compete against Asian carriers like Evergreen. This emphasis on 
taking costs out of the system is reflected in a Sea-Land saying - "it may be nice 
to have but do we need to have? " (1: 19); in this context, the comment related to 
ships. 
Evergreen is considered to be "only dangerous from a pricing perspective as 
they (i. e. Evergreen) cannot provide as comprehensive a service as Sea-Land' 
(1: 9). The perception of Evergreen is that they are only a real threat on a port- 
port basis, not for intermodal transport as, according to Sea-Land, "inland 
transport is their (i. e. Evergreen's) main weakness" (1: 9). Evergreen dispute 
this, pointing to the company's extensive use of double stack rail links in North 
America (1: 15). However, unlike Sea-Land, Evergreen admits to not being 
active in markets such as Eastern Europe, and to preferring containers not to be 
destined for consignees far inland from seaports in an effort to improve 
container utilisation. 
Like Sea-Land, Evergreen also suggests the same carriers tend to be present 
in the global marketplace, but asserts that regional competition is more severe 
wherever national lines are strong. For example, P&O are particularly strong in 
the UK, Hapag Lloyd in Germany, COSCO in China, TMM in Mexico, 
Italia/Lloyd Triestino in Italy, Japanese carriers in Japan, and US carriers in the 
USA. In essence, many shippers still prefer to use a shipping line of the same 
nationality ( as the shipper), suggest Evergreen. 
Numerous regional niche carriers specialising in the one trade lane such as 
ACL, CAST and Lykes on the North Atlantic, Safmarine to South Africa, and 
Andrew Weir to the Indian Sub Continent, also represent a threat to the global 
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carrier. There are few barriers to entry for such lines and in instances where a 
small carrier goes bankrupt, very often the same people start up again under a 
different name (1: 19). For instance, in 1993, American Contract Freight Lines, a 
new line employing chartered tonnage, ceased to operate after only two sailings 
across the North Atlantic (Tirschwell, 1993). However, the introduction of such 
new services may be hampered where a number of major shippers are 
committed by existing service contracts to other carriers (Crichton, 1992a). 
Thus, global and/or service contracts effectively mean there would be switching 
costs if these agreements were broken, thus limiting the advance of any new 
entrant. 
Within each region there are also numerous small intra-regional carriers. For 
global carriers such as Sea-Land and Evergreen, who now carry intra-regional 
traffic on their mainline vessels, particularly in Asia, these regional carriers 
(who may formerly have provided global carriers with a feeder service) are now 
also a competitor. 
Thus, the presence of global competitors requires an understanding, through 
constant monitoring, of their strategic intent, and this necessitates global 
coordination to facilitate an adequate and appropriate strategic response. Sea- 
Land can monitor competing lines closely through alliances and conference 
membership, whereas Evergreen, being more of a stand-alone carrier, may have 
to rely on other intelligence gathering techniques. Each line differs in terms of 
intermodal capability, with Sea-Land apparently able and willing to penetrate 
markets far inland from ocean terminals, Evergreen less so. The evidence does 
suggest that, to a large extent, both Sea-Land and Evergreen's competitors are 
virtually the same companies. However, while the main threat for each firm 
comes from other global carriers, local competitors and lines with a strong 
national customer base also remain a significant threat in each respective trade, 
suggesting a need for global coordination, yet also, a need for a locally 
responsive posture. 
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6.2.3 Investment intensity 
"If an aspect of the business is investment-intensive (e. g. R&D, manufacturing), 
the need to leverage that investment increases the need for global 
coordination. " 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987: p. 19). 
The larger the initial capital investment involved in a project, the greater will 
be the need to maximise the utilisation of the assets in order to achieve a 
satisfactory return, and an acceptable payback. In instances of high investment, a 
rapid achievement of economies of scale and scope are likely to be important 
objectives. This may require high sales volumes at an early date combined with 
minimum downtime and maximum efficiency in operating the equipment. As 
Prahalad & Doz maintain, worldwide product strategies have to be developed 
and implemented quickly to make the initial investments profitable. These 
strategies may require coordination of marketing and operating units from the 
centre. The centre may also adopt the strategy of forming alliances to share the 
costs and risks of the investment. Again, this will also require central 
coordination to ensure the smooth running of the alliance and the effective 
cooperation of the partners. 
Global container lines must make significant investments in hardware such as 
ships, containers, and terminals. There is also a need to establish a worldwide 
network of offices, in addition to telecommunications and IT links, plus options 
on the landside such as warehousing and distribution, road haulage and rail 
wagons. The following sections consider each of these investments in more 
detail. 
6.2.3.1 Ships 
Container ships are getting bigger, more expensive, and now also have much 
greater reefer capacity which further adds to costs (1: 18). Lines can acquire 
second-hand tonnage instead of newbuilds, and Sea-Land expect to see 
increased availability of cheap second-hand ships in future as more lines exit the 
industry. The US carrier benefited significantly when it acquired twelve 4,400 
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TEU 'econships' formerly owned by United States Lines when the latter went 
bankrupt in 1987; these vessels were purchased, almost new, for about one third 
of the newbuilding cost. 
Sea-Land are now more interested in sharing ships (and other equipment) 
with other carriers and in using other carriers ships than in building a vast fleet. 
Vessel sharing arrangements "offset a large portion offixed costsfor ships" and 
"partnerships limit the cost and spread the risk", according to Sea-Land (1: 6). 
This is significant as some 50% of the costs of a container line are fixed, and a 
large proportion of these fixed costs (15%-20%) relate to the ship (I: 10). The 
long delay in Sea-Land orders for new ships was believed to also result from 
uncertainty surrounding changes to the US government's Operational 
Differential Subsidy (ODS) Scheme for US flag ships (Roberts, 1992). 
Evergreen are "very tight on vessel costs and use Asian crews", according to 
Sea-Land, the implication being that this is one major reason behind the Taiwan 
carrier's consistently higher than industry average profit record (1: 4). However, 
this only partly explains any advantage Evergreen may have in connection with 
vessel expense. The company also benefits from an attractive tax regime in 
Taiwan for significant capital investments in assets such as new ships. 
Moreover, Evergreen's ships are financed by Japanese trading houses and are 
built in Japanese yards which are subsidised by the state. Evergreen is always 
building ships in large numbers and receives volume discounts from yards in 
return. The fleet is very modem and on-board operations highly computerised; 
for example, ships' computer systems allow for one man to feed in loading 
information and finalise the stowage plan very quickly. According to Evergreen, 
"Asian carriers are more high-tech than establishment lines" and "carriers like 
Sea-Land rarely launch a new ship" (1: 14). A series of five 4900 TEU ships 
delivered to Evergreen from Mitsubishi in 1996-97 costing a total of nearly 
$500 million, represents a 'typical' newbuilding sequence and cost for the line. 
Evergreen suggests its purchasing power is greater than most lines, with the 
exception of Maersk. This, it is argued, enables the carrier to secure more 
attractive deals with shipbuilders (1: 16), notwithstanding the fact that the market 
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envirorunent for newbuildings does fluctuate and lines can be caught out 
(Wastler, 1993). 
6.2.3.2 Containers 
Evergreen owns plants in Asia which manufacture and sell containers. A direct 
consequence of this is that there are constant flows of new containers into the 
fleet and Evergreen is "never short of containers" (1: 13). Consequently, 
Evergreen make relatively limited use of leased containers compared to other 
lines like Sea-Land, with the leased portion of the fleet seldom exceeding 30% 
compared to an industry average of 50% for most lines. Ordinary dry freight 40' 
containers cost around $3,50044,000 each (typically the most common size of 
unit is 40'), which means a fleet of 100,000 x 40' dry cargo containers has a 
replacement value of some $400 million. 
Sea-Land has one of the largest reefer container fleets of all carriers and 
around half of its entire container fleet is owned by the line, the remainder on 
lease. Reefer containers are particularly expensive, costing up to $30,000 each. 
In 1992, when the Korean carrier Hanjin decided to enter the reefer market, it 
spent $3 5 million on just 1,000 containers. 
The price of new containers has fallen in recent years, but this illustrates the 
large investments necessary by carriers in containers alone. Sea-Land's policy 
now is to promote the use of what is termed a 'grey box', that is, a "neutral 
container, without logos, that can be easily shared among carriers", in an effort 
to minimise equipment costs (1: 2). Sea-Land believe that "customers do not pay 
extra just for the name on a box" and the company is now using its partners 
containers whenever possible. 
6.2.3.3 Terminals 
Terminals are considered a key strength within Sea-Land. Sea-Land controls, 
mainly through- long-term lease deals with respective port authorities', more 
than 20 terminals worldwide. According to one inside source, "control of 
terminals means control ofdestin)ý'(I: 3). Malcolm McLean, the founder of Sea- 
Land, believed strongly in controlling terminals and this legacy lives on within 
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the company. Terminals are nevertheless very expensive. In 1991, Sea-Land 
sold a one third share of its Hong Kong terminal services company for $96.7 
million, a transaction representing a substantial return on investment which still 
allowed Sea-Land to retain control over terminal operations. The transaction 
was intended to improve the balance sheet and free up cash flow. 
In contrast, and with relatively few exceptions, Evergreen is really a 
common-user terminal customer (i. e. the company mainly uses terminals owned 
and operated by other organisations) at most of its ports of call. Evergreen has 
some investment in what it regards as strategic ports, notably in Taiwan, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Panama, and these lease arrangements with landlord 
port authorities in respect of terminal land, leaves Evergreen to invest in 
superstructure such as cranes, in addition to undertaking responsibility for 
terminal operations. In general, however, Evergreen ships call at common-user 
terminals in most ports, leaving the necessary infrastructure and equipment 
investments to port authorities and local stevedores. 
Evergreen always negotiates a priority deal in its ports and has sufficient 
volume in circulation to leverage a very attractive price (1: 15). Unlike Sea-Land, 
where own-terminal operation is considered a form of control, Evergreen takes 
the view that there are many alternative ports each vigorously competing for its 
business. This enables Evergreen to play off one port against another, or two 
terminals in the same port, in order to secure the best deal and without any need 
for the line to make significant capital investments in infrastructure. Panama 
was considered an exception due to the lack of suitable facilities there, and the 
strategic location of the port as a potential Latin American hub. 
In some respects Sea-Land is now withdrawing from investment in certain 
assets. This fits in with the fact that Sea-Land is now "Wall Street driven and 
what Wall Street hates about shipping is things like the effect offuel price hikes, 
collision at sea, earthquakes - assets are often casualty-prone" (1: 20). 
Furthermore, the customer "does not care whose assets are used', stated one 
Sea-Land employee (1: 20), and "its a macho thing to own ships", suggested 
another (1: 19). The reality, according to Sea-Land, is that assets are expensive 
things and it may be better to let others (e. g. Maersk? ) do the investing in assets 
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if possible. This philosophy also appears to mirror the worldwide trend towards 
contracting out exhibited in many other industries. 
Sea-Land sees itself becoming more of a specialist in terminal management, 
inland transport, and providing value added services. While the company still 
operates ships and provides containers, it is not considered unfeasible that Sea- 
Land will in future become more like a NVOCC (non vessel operating common 
carrier), taking care of cargo inside a country, with Maersk or some other line 
responsible for the trunk hauls. "We could leave moving boxes to others .... when 
you have a good thirdparty it doesn't matter who is in the middle providing the 
trunk haur', suggested one Sea-Land manager (1: 23). 
6.2.3.4 Local representation and IT 
Sea-Land formerly employed independent agents in most countries but the 
practice is now to have its own staff in each location if possible. New offices 
have been opened in India and in China. In certain "difficult" markets local 
agents are used, such as in Greece, Italy, and in the Mid East where "trading 
families" are required by law to represent foreign lines (1: 8). However, Sea-Land 
now prefer to use their own staff wherever feasible and as the company expands 
further - "we have doubled in size in the past six years" (1: 21) - overseas 
representation will continue to be a large cost. Evergreen, in contrast, mostly 
uses agents in which the Taiwan line purchases shares, although the company 
maintains its own offices in the main markets (e. g. US, UK, Taiwan). 
In relation to IT, Sea-Land's 'DYM$' system (Dynamic Yield Management 
System) enables the line to calculate the net profit for each potential container 
move anywhere in the world, inclusive of factoring in repositioning costs. 
DYM$ represents a significant investment ($2 million) in a type of technology 
which was previously used mainly by airlines. Sea-Land believes the next stage 
of IT development must be for shippers to make bookings via the internet and 
this has already started (1: 8). Sea-Land also want to use IT to control shipments, 
to feed back information such as the position of cargo (track and trace), and are 
currently working on supply chain management and information systems 
management. 
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Another IT system called Encompass was introduced by a number of major 
container lines in 1992 at an initial cost of $10 million, although investment has 
since risen to nearer $100 million. Encompass allows global trading partners - 
shippers, consignees, forwarders and carriers - to communicate electronically, 
regardless of the type of their internal computer system or where they are 
located. The system also permits intermodal partners to expedite the movement 
of their goods, check the status of cargo in-transit, select transportation routes 
and modes and manage inventory levels better (Siedeman, 1992). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the emphasis on investments for both Sea-Land 
and Evergreen differs with respect to certain assets, the overall intensity of 
investment (i. e. approximately $2 billion for sufficient ships, containers, 
terminals etc. necessary to provide a global service) indicates that a high level of 
global coordination and integration is necessary. However, a number of 
significant differences exist in relation to resource configuration exhibited by 
both carriers. Sea-Land has preferred to acquire second-hand ships, builds few 
new vessels, and makes extensive use of its global partner Maersk's more 
advanced fleet. Conversely, Evergreen are always building new technologically 
advanced ships in low cost yards, and benefits from an advantageous home 
country tax regime in respect of capital investments. Sea-Land mainly lease 
containers, while Evergreen owns most of its fleet which are manufactured in its 
own low cost plants in Asia. Sea-Land lease and operate most of its major 
terminals, whereas Evergreen tend to use third party terminals unless a 
port/terminal is considered to be a particularly' significant strategic location 
worthy of leasing and operating. Ultimately Sea-Land's primary focus appears 
to be towards terminals, landside intermodal activities, IT and added value 
functions, whilst Evergreen's main orientation lies towards operating a fleet of 
ships and containers. Other differences exist in relation to overseas 
representation, Sea-Land preferring to have its own offices, Evergreen largely 
using local agents (many of which it also part owns) to represent its business 
activities. 
Table 6.1 surnmarises the key differences identified between Sea-Land and 
Evergreen under the heading of coordination. Sea-Land has a clear focus on 
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larger global customers, whereas Evergreen's focus is on all customers. Both 
lines face relatively similar competitors, who are primarily global, but also 
regional. In terms of investment intensity, Sea-Land focus on equipment 
sharing, terminal and landside activities, and use of IT to enhance yield 
management and value added activities, whereas Evergreen concentrate on 
equipment owning, maritime operations, and the application of IT to enhance 
ship and container operations. 
Table 6.1 Global coordination differences between Sea-Land and 
Evergreen 
Sea-Land Evergreen 
Focus on global MNC Customers Focus on all customers 
customers 
Global and regional MNC Competitors Global and regional 
Focus on: Investment intensity Focus on: 
equipment sharing equipment owning 
terminalslintermodal maritime operations 
IT-yield management 1T-ships and container 
and 'value added' flows 
6.3 Pressures for global integration of activities 
6.3.1 Technology intensity 
Technology intensity and the extent of proprietary technology often encourage 
firms to centralise 'production' in only a few selected locations. Having fewer 
sites allows easier control over -quality, cost, and new product innovation. 
Centralising 'product' development and operations in a few locations results in 
global integration, particularly when markets are widely dispersed. 
According to Prahalad & Doz, businesses using complex technological 
processes which are expensive to set up, are constantly being upgraded and 
require high levels of skill to operate and maintain, may try to limit the number 
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of sites worldwide on which they employ that technology. This is also the case 
with R&D establishments in businesses where proprietary technology is 
important and where scientific breakthroughs are key to competitive advantage. 
If the technology is developing rapidly, product life cycles are short, and 
frequent new product launches occur, concentration on a few sites may 
encourage the most effective employment of the technology. By contrast, 
businesses where low technology is required and where products are stable and 
have long life cycles, will not feel the same pressure to concentrate and 
maximise the productivity of their R&D or operating facilities. 
Global container carriers centralise their operations at relatively few hub 
ports, and most global carriers call at virtually the same hubs (e. g. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Los Angeles, Rotterdam etc. ). These hub ports (of which there are 
around 30 worldwide each handling in excess of I million TEU per annum) 
represent the principal 'operational centres' in the field for each line (1: 7). The 
typical global carrier makes regular calls with various service strings at between 
20-30 hub ports worldwide, in addition to a myriad of feeder ports served by 
owned/chartered or third party feeder ships. Centralised operations in relatively 
few locations (i. e. hub ports) results in a need for global integration, particularly 
with regard to vessel scheduling and equipment flows. 
Lines tend not to enjoy proprietary technology advantage for very long as 
advancements in container handling (e. g. automation) or ships tend to be easily 
and quickly replicated by other ports and carriers. A key influence in the choice 
of hub port, according to Sea-Land (1: 3) and others (e. g. Baird, 1997a), appears 
to be ship draft, with bigger vessels now demanding deeper water. 
Competing lines can relatively easily acquire advanced vessels, as Nedlloyd 
has with its five 3,500 TEU hatchless Ultra Container Carriers (UCC's) 
specially designed for faster port turnaround. Yet, according to the Port of 
Felixstowe (1: 12), hatchless vessels have no real gain in terms of speed of 
turnaround as the extended cell guides (i. e. steel cells extending well above deck 
height) means the crane spreader must be lifted higher than usual. Others 
disagree (e. g. Bendall & Stent, 1996), pointing to the avoidance of lashing and 
opening/closing hatch covers. In any event, in terms of terminals, ships, or 
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containers, the extent of proprietary technology in container shipping assets 
appears to be minimal. While ship and terminal technology may continue to be 
improved, or perhaps more aptly described by Sea-Land as "occasional 
tweaking" (1: 8), the technology of containerisation is itself relatively mature. 
An area Sea-Land sees itself building a lead is in information and how this is 
used through IT systems. Sea-Land's DYM$ system, for instance, which is 
controlled from the company's HQ in Charlotte, North Carolina, represents a 
single global operation centre which is dependent upon a very high degree of 
global integration in order to be effective (1: 22). As yet Evergreen Line do not 
have an equivalent system in place, preferring instead to devolve pricing 
responsibility to each regional HQ around the world. Moreover, "Evergreen 
agents are not all EDI connected globalll' and this was considered something 
of a weakness by the carriers own UK staff (1: 15). Sea-Land's Global Division 
is using information systems to provide global customers with a central unit to 
deal with "thus facilitating responsiveness through a single integrated network" 
(1: 18). Responsiveness, in this instance, appears to reflect a global rather than a 
local perspective. 
Thus, Sea-Land and Evergreen, to a very large degree, make use of similar 
ports and terminals and related cargo handling technologies. Current ship and 
intermodal equipment technologies are available to all lines, although it is 
evident from the earlier analysis that Evergreen has a constant flow of 
newbuildings into its fleet with smaller units cascading into the fleet of feeder 
affiliate Uniglory. While this may therefore appear at first sight to represent an 
Evergreen advantage, it is also evident that Sea-Land makes substantial use of 
partner Maersk's constant flow of advanced newbuild ships, although the 
sustainability of this latter arrangement might be questioned. 
Although there is some evidence that ship technology is relatively stable, it 
nevertheless appears to be the case that ships are being replaced on major routes 
with greater rapidity than previously (e. g. the largest vessels are typically placed 
on the Transpacific or Europe-Asia trades first, then shifted onto other mainline 
routes as new and larger vessels are introduced). Both lines also make extensive 
use of third party intermodal truck and rail service suppliers. Sea-Land has built 
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up what appears to be a lead in yield management IT systems tailored to 
intermodal container transportation, however, it is questionable if any 'lead' as 
such is sustainable as other lines catch up and introduce the same or even more 
advanced IT systems. 
6.3.2 Pressure for cost reduction 
Prahalad & Doz assert that global integration is often a response to pressure for 
cost reduction. The search for cost reduction is likely to be greatest in those 
businesses where competition from large multinationals is most intense. Cost 
reduction strategies can take either or both of the following two forms: 
u An emphasis on economies of scale through operating in larger and larger 
facilities so that cost per unit of output is minimised and leaming curve 
advantages are maximised; 
uA search for economies of scope and the avoidance of duplication between 
affiliates across borders. This may be achieved through greater control of 
activities and the integration of business functions on a regional or global 
scale. It may involve the complete elimination of some departments or 
offices in some countries. 
The search for cost reduction is another reason behind the formation of 
international alliances and collaborative agreements. Single sourcing and just- 
in-time supply procedures can also promote greater integration of activities 
between affiliates as liaison with suppliers becomes increasingly handled in one 
location rather than several. 
Pressure for cost reduction in container transport is continuous; constantly 
reducing freight rates coupled with increased competition and minimal 
opportunity for service differentiation, has made cost reduction a necessity 
rather than an option. This is mainly a consequence of a high fixed cost element 
for the industry, traditionally resulting in a relentless drive for volume (Turner, 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 175 
Chanter 6- Global Intearation and Local Resnonsiveness in Container Shimin 
1994), often at any price as long as it was giving at least some contribution to 
fixed costs. 
Sea-Land was formerly more heavily fixed cost-based compared to other 
lines but the situation is now different. Developing partnerships on a global 
basis has allowed Sea-Land to cut expenses. "Partnerships are the most 
significant factor in taking costs out and improving service levels in order to 
increase overall sales revenue", according to Sea-Land (1: 21). Partnerships have 
allowed Sea-Land to share ships, terminals, containers and, in the process, still 
enjoy the benefits of large economies of scale which a stand alone carrier would 
have difficulty achieving. 
Critical in this is container sharing as the "real task (of a global carrier) is 
solving equipment imbalances" (1: 11). Equipment imbalances tend to be fairly 
consistent and this is where the DYM$ system helps Sea-Land to optimise its 
empty repositioning in a cost-effective manner. 
Sea-Land has placed a significant number of its ships under foreign flag 
registries, such as that of the Marshall Islands, which is among the cheapest of 
maritime flags (Vail, 1993). Flagging out is estimated to have saved the 
company around $3 million a ship each year, mainly through reduced crew costs 
(Beargie, 1993). Sea-Land's five 4,000 TEU newbuildings delivered from 
Japanese yard IHHI in 1995/96 are all foreign flagged. Sea-Land chose the 
Marshall Islands registry to satisfy national security requirements; an agreement 
between the US and the Marshall Islands provides that control of vessels 
registered in the Marshall's can be assumed by the US government in a national 
security emergency. Another factor that Sea-Land claim to have influenced its 
decision to flag out has been the decline in US worldwide military cargoes 
which, in terms of carriage costs, fell from $506 million in 1990 to $253 million 
in 1995 (US flag carriers are given preference for this traffic). Military 
shipments accounted for a significant 10% of Sea-Land's $3.1 billion income in 
1992 (1: 20). 
Sea-Land has also sought to further reduce costs through restricting its 
already limited dependence on independent liner agents. The largest carriers, 
with the exception of Evergreen, prefer to have their own staff at each location 
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to provide close contact between in-house specialists and customers, clarify 
corporate identity, integrate EDP systems, control inland logistics, and avoid the 
added cost, complexities and confusion surrounding agency commissions 
(Crichton, 1992b). Evergreen take an opposite approach, preferring to appoint 
agents (albeit many of which are part-owned) in most host country markets. 
A hub port is more or less the equivalent of a large plant serving multiple 
markets, acting as an interface between sea and land transport in which the 
inputs and outputs consist of containers, full and empty. Sea-Land and global 
partner Maersk have a joint annual throughput of around I million TEU at each 
of their main hub ports (e. g. Long Beach, Rotterdam, Algeciras, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Koahsiung). This measure of throughput provides Sea-Land with 
enormous economies of scale and bargaining power with ports, with port 
suppliers, with feeder lines, and with intermodal operators on the landside. Sea- 
Land also benefits from using its own large capacity vessels and Maersk's new 
fleet of twelve 6,000 TEU ships which are believed to provide the lowest unit 
slot costs in the industry. 
Evergreen have a crew of only 14 on its ships, compared to crews of 20 on 
Sea-Land vessels and 23 on P&O (1: 16). This, coupled with the fact that its 
Asian seafarers are paid less than US seafarers, is believed to give the company 
a competitive advantage, although any advantage will be reducing given Sea- 
Land's ongoing policy to flag out. Evergreen is highly active in a technical sense 
as far as ships are concerned, and has developed new twistlocks to help speed up 
port turnaround, and a new computerised ballast system to allow for faster 
stability and trim when loading (1: 15). In ports, Evergreen guarantees a certain 
level of throughput in return for low rates and imposes penalties on port 
operators when they cannot meet agreed productivity or turnaround targets. 
Evergreen considers itself "a lean companjP with minimal office staff in 
regional headquarters and in its mostly part-owned agency network (1: 14). Local 
offices such as Manchester and Glasgow in the UK each have only 516 staff. The 
company point out that other liner company offices have traditionally been 
incredibly overmanned, pointing to OOCL which paid off 22 staff from its 
Manchester office, and Hapag Lloyd which paid off 2,000 staff across Europe. 
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Moreover, while Sea-Land, P&O and other establishment carriers retain 
managers for each trade (e. g. Australasia, North America etc. ), Evergreen have 
in each country only two trade managers, one for exports and one for imports 
and they cover all routes worldwide. 
Evergreen's low crew numbers is mainly a consequence of new ship-board 
management systems whereby a Ship Operating Officer (SOO), is trained to 
simultaneously keep a continuous lookout, to navigate the ship, and to keep an 
intelligent watch over all engine room systems. The SOO approach is hardly 
unique to Evergreen, however, as lines such as Hapag Lloyd now operate such a 
system with crews of 14/15 on its series of 4,400 TEU ships (Phillips, 1992). 
Significant efforts are made by Evergreen to optimise the utilisation of its 
container fleet in an effort to reduce costs. The carrier claims a container/slot 
ratio (i. e. the amount of containers in circulation relative to vessel carrying 
capacity) of generally between 1.9 and 2.5, which is believed to be one of the 
industry's lowest. An Equipment Department based in the Taipei HQ controls 
what is one of the largest carrier-owned fleets in the world. A worldwide system 
of monthly reports are sent to Taipei identifying forecast equipment needs by 
port and by region and this helps the department plan for future global empty 
repositioning (Damas, 1994). Evergreen also benefits from purchasing new 
containers from its own low cost container manufacturing facilities in Taiwan 
and Indonesia. 
Thus, Sea-Land claim to be less fixed cost-based than previously due in the 
main to its extensive global partnership with Maersk whereby ships, containers 
and terminals are now shared. Evergreen, however, are beginning to use 
partnerships more. Both carriers are flagging out to reduce costs but it would 
appear that Evergreen's crew costs will have been lower than Sea-Land's for 
some time due to its lower manning and wage levels relative to the US carrier. 
While Sea-Land and other long -established lines have been forced to rationalise 
and downsize their organisations in recent years, Evergreen claims to have 
already been a 'lean' company for some time, implying to some extent that other 
lines have largely been catching up. Sea-Land uses its IT yield management 
system to reduce costs, and to maximise the net financial benefits of each 
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container move, while Evergreen's IT focus is on moving empty containers 
around the system as fast as possible to areas of demand. With apparent benefits 
to be gained, it might be expected that more lines will in future introduce yield 
management systems in place of the rather more traditional and less 
sophisticated liner shipping drive for volume. 
6.3.3 Universal needs 
"If a product or service meets a universal need and requires little adaptation 
across national markets, global integration is obviouslyfacilitated " 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987: p. 21). 
Prahalad & Doz refer to electronic products such as capacitors and resistors as 
good examples of universal products that do not vary from country to country. 
Likewise, similar customer needs may enable a service to be standardised 
around the world with minimum local adaptation. Similar needs and a 
standardised service may encourage competing businesses to collaborate and 
share facilities in order to share costs and risks. They may see this as a profitable 
option. When local adaptation, special prices or differentiated marketing 
approaches for different customers are required, integration and or collaboration 
may be expected to be more unusual. 
6.3.3.1 Service schedules 
On the principal East-West routes, both Sea-Land and Evergreen maintain a 
minimum frequency of weekly fixed day sailing schedules. On particularly high- 
volume corridors, however, such as US West Coast to South East Asia, each 
line maintains three or even four fixed day weekly services. As more lines 
introduce further service strings on key trade lanes, the norm is becoming three 
or even four sailings per week on routes such as the Transpacific and Europe- 
Far East. Typically North-South trades are served less frequently, being weekly 
or even every two-weeks in some cases. 
Transit times are regarded as one of the main selling point on most routes. 
Evergreen and Maersk are currently bringing into service a large number of fast 
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25-knot ships and these vessels can cut a day or two off most deep-sea trips. 
Lines may also quite often change their schedule, by removing a port of call, 
thereby speeding up port-port transit time on a key corridor (1: 23). The 
inevitable reality though, is that such amendments or enhancements to a line's 
service schedule are relatively easily copied, and this fast reduces any 
differentiation advantage gained. 
6.3.3.2 Container requirements 
The standard ISO container is basically as a global homogenised product. While 
to a large extent this is true, it rather disguises the fact that the needs of each 
market can differ with respect to the various types of ISO container required. 
According to Sea-Land, for example, high-cube 9'6" high containers are 
preferred on the eastbound Pacific trade for light bulky cargoes (e. g. TV's) 
which are common on that route (I: I). But westbound on the Pacific there is 
demand for longer 45' containers (the latter also used in US domestic transport) 
although there are restrictions on the use of such equipment in parts of Asia 
where road width is limited. 
Mid East markets demand different types of unit, including reefers, high-cube, 
and controlled atmosphere (CA) containers. But return traffic is very limited, 
and most containers are shipped out empty (1: 8). A major benefit for a global 
carrier is that Asian hubs, where most traffic is generated, are located not too far 
from the Mid East, so repositioning is less of a burden. 
Eastbound from Europe to the Far East is regarded as a 'deadweight' trade, in 
that the ships can be full in terms of cargo weight before they are full in terms of 
the number of containers (1: 1). This is due to the types of heavy commodity 
moving eastbound such as machinery, paper, wine and spirits, and tending to 
favour 20' containers. On the return trip from Asia to Europe, the preference is 
for 40' units as cargo tends to be light and bulky (e. g. electronics, training 
shoes). Essentially, demand for specific types of containers in one direction, and 
for other types on the return leg in a given trade, results in imbalances in the 
flows of equipment, and this requires a high degree of coordination to manage 
effectively. 
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6.3.3.3 Non-containerisable cargo 
There are certain cargoes not ideally suited to containers such as automobiles 
and so-called out-of-gauge objects like buses, tractors, locomotives, yachts, 
boilers, transformers, and other 'project' consignments. Trade cars tend to be 
very low margin business, and are shipped in specially built car carriers, 
essentially multi-deck RoRo ships. RoRo or heavy lift vessels tend to carry very 
heavy items as the main problem for container ships is that containers cannot be 
stacked on top of such items, there tends to be a significant loss of container 
space, container crane booms/spreaders need to be adjusted, and all this takes a 
considerable time which delays port turnaround (1: 6). While Sea-Land do carry 
some out-of-gauge cargo, Evergreen generally "turn it all down for operational 
reasons" (1: 14). To Evergreen, "repositioning empty containers is considered to 
be more important than carrying non-containerisable cargo" (1: 14). 
6.3.3.4 Overall service 
Global carriers tend to have the capability to offer very similar service 
frequencies and fast transit times as their adversaries on key corridors. This is 
primarily a function of the type of ship in use, and many carriers will employ 
vessels either built by the same yard, or fitted with a similar propulsion system. 
Pressure for faster and more frequent services is coming from shippers, and both 
Evergreen and Sea-Land appear to have the capability to alter and improve 
timetables in line with market demands. Service demands from North-South 
trades are not so intensive as the main East-West routes, although carriers do 
appear to be striving to improve service offering all round. 
Demand for different types of containers varies by market and by trade route 
and this is the same for all lines. Nevertheless, acknowledging that all deep-sea 
trades suffer from equipment imbalances, and empty repositioning cannot be 
avoided, ISO containers of whatever type do, to a large extent, provide what 
might be considered a universal service with little need for adaptation across 
national markets for a large proportion of goods. Thus, in terms of universal 
needs, a high degree of global integration is facilitated, but with the caveat that 
global carriers still need to slightly vary the 'product' (i. e. the type of container 
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and service profile) in order to meet different local needs in a number of 
markets. 
6.3.4 Access to raw materials and energy 
Access to raw materials and a cheap and plentiful supply of energy can force 
activities to be located in a specific area. Prahalad & Doz (1987) quote 
aluminium smelters and paper mills as examples. These operations then have to 
be integrated with downstream processing activities in other parts of the world. 
Shipping services are clearly unlike heavy manufacturing industry, and their 
need for access to a cheap and plentiful supply of raw materials and energy 
appears to be less relevant. Given the absence of any raw material needs, energy 
needs of global shipping lines primarily relate to bunker fuel for ships. 
However, according to Lim (1994), bunkers account for just 4% of a container 
line's total operating costs (based on a 4,000 TEU vessel). Cargo expenses, 
which mainly comprise container costs, terminal handling and inland transport, 
make up 53% of total operating costs, while ship costs account for 13%, 
administration expenses 21%, and other expenses 9%. This fits in with Sea- 
Land's statement that most of a container business's costs are on the landside, 
not at sea. 
Both Sea-Land and Evergreen centralise their respective global bunker fuel 
purchases. Sea-Land fix bunker supply contracts on a corporate basis together 
with parent CSX in order to leverage lower prices (D). Evergreen too negotiate 
bunker contracts with global suppliers such as Chevron and Shell (1: 16). 
Bunkers are supplied to both carriers' vessels at the main hub ports such as 
Rotterdam, Los Angeles and Singapore. Evergreen suggested that lower fuel 
costs can be obtained at certain ports, in Jeddah for instance, although there has 
been some doubt concerning the quality of fuel there (1: 15). The price of fuel is, 
however, subject to change and carriers can charge shippers a 'bunker 
adjustment' surcharge if fuel costs increase above a certain level. The nature of 
contracting for fuel supplies on a global basis suggests a high degree of global 
coordination and integration. 
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Although 'energy' costs are important to container lines, clearly the greatest 
proportion of costs are incurred on landside operations, in administration and in 
other expenses which, when taken together, account for over 80% of costs, 
while fuel and ship operating costs combined represent under 20% of total costs. 
Nevertheless, a line employing older and less fuel efficient ships compared to its 
competitors may have greater overall fuel consumption and hence may incur 
higher fuel charges. As Sea-Land has an older fleet profile than Evergreen, this 
could be an area of some advantage for the latter, even given the small share of 
fuel costs in terms of total operating costs for container shipping. Continued 
advances in diesel engine technology leading to reduced fuel consumption per 
TEU carried will be expected to favour a line regularly building new vessels. 
Table 6.2 Global integration differences between Sea-Land and 
Evergreen 
Sea-Land Evergreen 
Stable, but shortening Technology intensity Stable, but shortening 
life cyclesfor ships life cyclesfor ships 
Sharing equipment Cost reduction Efficiency gains through 
Downsizing more intensive use of 
capital assets 
Universal containers Universal needs Universal containers 
Routelschedule changes Routelschedule changes 
Container imbalance 
focus 
Less significant in this Access to raw Less significant in this 
industry materials/energy industry 
Table 6.2 surnmarises key differences identified between Sea-Land and 
Evergreen with respect to integration of activities. For both carriers, ship and 
port technology is fairly stable although there is some evidence of shortening 
life cycles for ships in particular. To reduce costs, Sea-Land concentrates on 
sharing equipment and downsizing, whereas Evergreen' focus is on efficiency 
gains and more intensive use of capital assets. Containers are becoming more 
universally accepted and lines are able to alter service schedules and begin new 
services in line with market needs. There is also a need for lines to effectively 
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manage equipment imbalances, and Evergreen has a strong focus on this aspect 
of the business. Access to energy requirements appears to be the same for both 
lines, although this criterion seems to be less significant in a service industry. In 
summary, most of these industry pressures facing container lines suggest the 
need for a high degree of global operational integration. 
6.4 Pressures for local responsiveness 
6.4.1 Differences in customer needs 
Businesses which aim to satisfy a diverse set of customer needs, most of which 
are nation- or region-specific, will face pressures to adopt a locally responsive 
strategy. This is in contrast to the pressures created by 'universal' needs 
discussed above. If products and services can be adapted to suit local customer 
requirements, and be marketed profitably, the business may feel little pressure to 
coordinate and integrate activities with sister companies in other parts of the 
world. If these conditions are combined with low breakeven points and 
economies of scale which can be achieved on the basis of locally generated sales 
volumes, subsidiary companies staffed by local employees who are familiar with 
local conditions and permitted the independence to set strategy accordingly, may 
be a more suitable recipe for success. 
While "a box is a box", according to one Sea-Land executive (1: 9), different 
customers in different countries will still demand varying levels of service. For 
example, the level of container shipping service to and from different regions 
can vary in terms of service frequency, container type, transit time, and 
reliability. 
Shippers of foodstuffs will only accept containers if they are clean, unlike 
shippers of scrap metal, who care less about the condition of a container, while 
most perishable products and just-in-time (JIT) cargo require fast transit times, 
whereas for some low value goods transit time is less important. What is 
important, according to Sea-Land, is that "carriers must caterfor each shippers 
specific needs" (1: 19). 
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Global shippers (and major forwarders) are not all based in the same country - 
they are worldwide. These big shippers demand lower rates and lines must be 
able to deal promptly with the needs of each shipper at the local level, at their 
HQ, or wherever the transport function is controlled. Payment of freight 
accounts also tends to differ by country; payment may take longer in Europe 
than in the US, even for the same customer (1: 10). In some countries freight is 
nearly always pre-paid because collection at destination is difficult. Other 
peculiarities include the need for very high cargo security in certain markets, 
such as Russia and Brazil Q: 19). 
Sea-Land treats its global accounts very differently from other customers. A 
global account is over one year or more and "takes the customer out of the 
transaction business into a new consultative relationshipý' with Sea-Land (I: 11). 
Sea-Land's global account managers must "understand the customers business 
and provide an adequate response" (1: 24). According to Sea-Land, "the 
difference between Sea-Land and Evergreen is that Sea-Land control and 
manage the customer relationship" (1: 21). By providing value-added services 
(e. g. through logistics subsidiary Sea-Land Logistics) tailored to suit a particular 
customer's needs, Sea-Land is able to provide a custornised solution. The 
company can place personnel inside its customers to assess their needs, if 
necessary, to identify where value can be added by helping to re-engineer the 
supply chain. In effect, Sea-Land try to "make the customer benefitftom our 
knowledge and this enhances their global strategy". In carrying out such 
activities, Sea-Land claims it has a better balance between assets and 
capabilities than Evergreen (1: 19). 
Sea-Land view Evergreen as "a very good carrier", but suggests a typical 
Evergreen customer is a forwarder/consolidator, which makes Evergreen a "Tier 
I" supplier (1: 8). Forwarders are mainly interested in low freight rates, container 
availability, and a port-port service, according to Sea-Land. Conversely, Sea- 
Land's "competitive advantage is based on the right process, technology, and 
intellectual capital", and this allows every customer's needs to be addressed 
through the provision of a fully integrated service (1: 21). This means, according 
to Sea-Land, that they must learn all about a customer in order to define their 
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total logistics needs. Sea-Land's response to the globalisation of industry is to 
"begin to integrate ourselves within their (i. e. the customers) activities and this 
raises the switching costs" (1: 24). This expertise has allowed the company to 
manage the global supply chain for major companies such as Ford and GM. 
The difference between Sea-and and Evergreen was summed up by one Sea- 
Land executive, who stated that, "Evergreen traditionally move boxes .... Sea- 
Land move more than boxes, Sea-Land provide a total transport service which 
includes value added services" (1: 25). Drving this strategy is the assumption that 
not only will each customers total logistics needs require a different "tailored' 
solution, it is also inevitable that "each customer's business changes year after 
year so we (i. e. Sea-Land) need to change with them" (1: 25). This implies a 
significant degree of local responsiveness with respect to customer needs. 
Responsiveness in this sense also relates to service changes such as offering a 
faster transit time between two points, providing a new direct call at a particular 
port to cater for new traffic flows, or even altering a sailing time or day to meet 
the needs of a given production facility. 
Evergreen argues that it also competes for big traffic flows emanating from 
global shippers who have sophisticated logistics requirements. Indeed, in early 
1998, Evergreen were one of only three carriers nominated by Unilever (the 
others being P&O Nedlloyd and Hanjin) to carry virtually all of that company's 
traffic in the East Asia-Pacific Region, with flows amounting to some 15,000 
TEU Per annum (Eller, 1998). Unilever had initially selected eleven carriers to 
make presentations and bid for this business, including Sea-Land. The final 
carrier selection decision was based on a range of criteria including - range of 
port calls, scheduling, FAK rates, ability to respond quickly to requests for 
information, plus speed and accuracy of documentation. In reality, both Sea- 
Land and Evergreen deal with forwarders and large global shippers, so there 
could be somewhat less difference in client base than Sea-Land maintains. 
Evergreen point to varying weight of cargo for different trades being a key 
difference between customers, with heavy cargo outbound from Europe, lighter 
bulky goods from Asia (1: 13). Average weight of a European container is 14 
tonnes, a US container 12 tonnes, and an Asian container 10 tonnes and, 
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according to Evergreen, these differences materially affect the overall container 
lifting capacity of a ship. To the US the trade is dominated by 40' containers; 
from the US to Europe there is a mix of 20' and 40% 40' containers are most 
common on the Pacific and from Asia to Europe; and from Europe to Asia 20' 
units are preferred. Clearly, there are considerable variations in demand on all 
trade routes, and this implies that a carrier has to provide a different level of 
service in each region. 
Approximately 80% of Evergreen cargo is carried in ordinary dry freight 
containers. The company has few 'special' types of container, but are now 
moving into the reefer business. Reefer business used to mean a lot of empty 
repositioning but Evergreen is now carrying a variety of return cargo in 
temperature controlled units including pharmaceuticals, film, and even Bailey's 
Irish Cream (1: 13). 
Evergreen stress the need to have a presence in important markets as without a 
local office the company claims it would be unlikely to secure very much 
business (1: 13). The Scottish market is a case in point and Evergreen suggested 
that having an office in Glasgow dealing with sales quotations, cargo 
reservations, and documentation, provides a level of service deemed essential if 
it wants to capture a share of the important worldwide Scotch whisky market. 
Evergreen's strategic alliance with Lloyd Triestino has also helped the carrier 
make inroads into the "difficule' Italian market (1: 14). These factors suggest that, 
for Evergreen, it is also essential to have a locally responsive strategy, although 
customer considerations for the Taiwanese line may differ slightly from Sea- 
Land. 
In summary, shippers' needs in different countries or markets do tend to vary 
and all carriers must be aware of these needs. Local representation in key 
markets/regions appears to be very important for both Sea-Land and Evergreen. 
Sea-Land has a particular focus in developing global accounts, supply chain re- 
engineering, and offering added-value services in order to become more 
integrated within its customers activities. More scepticism of global accounts 
was evident within Evergreen, although there is evidence to suggest that the 
Taiwan line can secure large global contracts in competition with other global 
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carriers. Evergreen's focus is nonetheless more on offering an efficient and 
competitive shipping service, port-port or door-door, compared to Sea-Land's 
"total transportation service" (1: 25). 
6.4.2 Differences in distribution channels 
Prahalad & Doz refer to differences in distribution channels to mean pricing, 
product positioning, promotion and advertising. The term 'distribution' to some 
extent seems inappropriate, or even misleading, as sales issues related to this 
criterion go much further than mere distribution. 
Nevertheless, where sales channels differ from one country to the next, the 
pressure for local responsiveness will be greater. A locally based and locally 
managed organisation is much more likely to deliver an appropriate response to 
these pressures. Attempts to direct these sort of practices from overseas are 
likely to suffer from lack of understanding and appreciation of local cultures and 
conditions. Attempts to impose standardised policies from abroad may run into 
similar problems. 
6.4.2.1 Price 
As a conference member, Sea-Land must charge the set conference rate for 
containers moving on a given trade, unlike Evergreen, the latter having the 
independent flexibility to alter rates as necessary in order to secure traffic. 
Moreover, conference rates on each trade route differ depending on which 
direction the container is moving; for example, eastbound from Europe to Asia 
the rate is almost half what it is westbound, reflecting directional variations in 
demand and traffic composition. There are also differences in pricing for 
markets remote from hub ports, with conference rates increased to cover the 
added costs involved (i. e. in shipping a container from Rotterdam or Felixstowe 
hubs onwards to regional ports like Grangemouth, Dublin or Oslo). In the US, 
conference tariffs must be filed with the Federal Maritime Commission, which 
suggests that control of tariffs is somehow necessary to avoid barriers to trade 
(Conlon, 1980). There is no such regulation in Europe or in Asia. 
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6.4.2.2 Place and promotion 
Liner operators are forbidden to establish their own agency office in certain 
countries such as India, China and in the Mid East. This seems to present little 
difficulty for Evergreen, the line preferring to use agents wherever possible, 
although the Taiwan carrier tends to take a financial stake in each of its agents, 
and prefers them not to represent other competing lines in order to avoid any 
conflict of interest (1: 14). In some countries, notably Latin America, distributor 
laws protect long-term agency agreements to the disadvantage of the principal. 
A problem highlighted by Sea-Land is that many of the agents in less developed 
countries have difficulty recruiting skilled people (1: 19). Accordingly, where 
possible, Sea-Land prefer to use own staff in branch offices which do not have 
to be registered as separate companies and thus avoid having to pay local 
corporate taxation or comply with local reporting requirements. 
6.4.2.3 Product (service) 
Shippers in many countries prefer to receive direct calls from mainline vessels 
rather than use transhipment over ports in neighbouring countries and this is an 
issue for all carriers (1: 6). Thus, Belgian shippers prefer carriers to call at 
Antwerp rather than having to send goods to Rotterdam; French shippers prefer 
Le Havre to Antwerp; Canadian shippers prefer Halifax to New York; UK 
shippers prefer Southampton or Felixstowe rather than Rotterdam; and 
Malaysian shippers prefer Port Klang to Singapore. These preferences mean 
lines have to carefully consider their mainport call strategy. 
Sea-Land are seeking to use IT more in an effort to control shipments, for 
pricing, and for promotion of services. But some customers see IT as a threat as 
they believe lines are using IT to integrate into shippers information systems 
(1: 6). In less developed countries, use of IT may be less dominant and therefore 
a carriers' approach has to alter accordingly in such markets. Although many 
larger shippers are in favour of EDI, Sea-Land suggests there is still some 
apathy amongst many customers. 
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6.4.2.4 Carrier selection 
A key issue facing all carriers concerns the fact that terms of sale differ by trade 
and sometimes by commodity. This is important because the entity paying the 
freight generally decides cargo routing and carrier selection. Lines' therefore 
need to have a presence in local markets, and market their service directly to 
these decision-makers. For example, according to Sea-Land, the US-India trade 
is primarily CIF (i. e. price of goods inclusive of "Cost, Insurance and Freight"), 
which means that the carrier selection decision rests with the seller in the US 
(1: 8). Sea-Land do not accept goods shipped to markets such as India on a 
collect basis anyway, partly because the company has difficulty getting money 
out of the country due to strictly enforced exchange controls. The US-Mid East 
trade is largely FOB ("Free-on-Board", i. e. freight payable at destination), which 
means carrier selection probably rests with the consignee. It is suggested that 
national exchange controls make life very difficult for container lines as do 
currency fluctuations, and that "where freight is to be paid is a big learning 
processfor bookings staffand represents a huge learning curve" (1: 17). 
Evergreen suggests its non-conference pricing flexibility gives it added market 
power, citing its success in attracting a large increase in market share in 1994 
after the conference lines formed the TAA (TransAtlantic Agreement) and 
increased rates across the board (1: 13). Evergreen simply reduced rates just 
below the new conference level and shippers responded positively. 
Whereas Sea-Land primarily use alliances with other carriers to reduce asset 
requirements, Evergreen claim to use alliances only as a "stepping stone" to gain 
access to difficult markets in which the 'distribution' systems are to a significant 
degree closed to outsiders, for instance in Italy (1: 14). Hence the company's 
alliance with Lloyd Triestino. The Japanese market is also considered by 
. 
Evergreen to be difficult to penetrate as shippers there prefer to use Japanese 
lines. Many shippers and shipping lines in Japan are part of the same trading 
house and will tend to support each other where possible, making it difficult for 
outsiders to penetrate the market. 
Within each nation or region the customer base can also differ significantly. In 
Europe, forwarders are prominent, particularly in Germany. Within the UK, 
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forwarders are prominent in the south of England (1: 1) but in Scotland and the 
north of England, shippers tend to deal direct with lines (1: 13), resulting in the 
need for a different sales approach. In the US, Evergreen negotiates directly with 
a mix of shippers'and forwarders. There are many forwarders involved in the 
Europe-Far East trade, according to Evergreen, less so on other trades. 
Standard freight rate quotations also differ by trade route. For the Europe-Far 
East trade, Evergreen quote only for door-port container movements because in 
Asia the consignee arranges and pays for inland transport (1: 15). This is also the 
same for Japan and India, where the terms of carriage are delivered port. 
Between the US and Europe a door-door quote can be given. 
According to Evergreen, many shipping lines still attempt to secure business 
by entertaining clients to lunches, or even paying their costs to attend major 
social or sporting events (e. g. golf tournaments, football games etc. ). This type 
of 'promotional' activity is frowned upon by Evergreen, where the emphasis is 
on being "a shipping line, not an entertainment company' (1: 14). 
Sea-Land point to previous difficulties in markets such as India, where 
customs support for private warehousing/logistics centre activity was not 
allowed (O'Mahony, 1990). Things are changing, however, and several global 
lines, including Sea-Land and APL, now have logistics activities in India. 
There is a push towards standardisation of value-added and intermodal service 
across many countries, but it is difficult to break. down some of the barriers. 
When a trainload of Sea-Land containers full of beer arrived in Kamarova 
(central Asia) on the Trans-Siberian Railway, the containers were off-loaded and 
sent to their final destination nearby by road, but the train waited for the empty 
containers to come back straight away to ensure they did not get lost (Burrows, 
1993). 
While there is undoubtedly a significant degree of standardisation across 
national markets in terms of pricing, product/service requirements, promotion 
and sales channels, it is also certain that many difficulties and peculiarities still 
persist, and most of these are nation or region specific. This indicates that, for 
both Sea-Land and Evergreen, as well as for other global lines, there is a 
continuing need for local responsiveness. 
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Key differences still exist between Sea-Land and Evergreen, however, in the 
way each line seeks to overcome sales channel barriers. For example, Sea-Land 
offer a conference rate, whereas Evergreen need only offer a competitive rate; 
Sea-Land prefers to have its own offices and employees, Evergreen is content 
using agencies; and Sea-Land enters into alliances to reduce costs, whilst 
Evergreen uses partnerships only to gain a foothold in difficult markets. Aside 
from these differences, all carriers have to consider the different terms of sale 
prevalent within each market in order to decide who (i. e. shipper or receiver) is 
responsible for carrier selection in each market (and hence who to target the 
marketing effort on). 
6.4.3 Availability of substitutes and need to adapt 
If customer needs in a given national market are being satisfied by locally 
produced products with differing price-performance relationships, and if the 
business' own product must be significantly adapted to be locally competitive, 
then a locally responsive strategy is indicated. This implies that the local culture 
determines local taste and demand, and that a standardised product/service is not 
generally acceptable. In recent years, experience in many markets indicates a 
gradual breakdown of this preference for traditional products, and resistance to 
standardisation. This implies a declining need to adapt products in order to be 
competitive in these markets, and a reducing pressure for local responsiveness. 
Container shipping is increasingly seen as a commodity service but there are, 
at least for some cargoes, other alternative ways of transporting goods around 
the world. Aviation services targeting time-sensitive and higher value cargo are 
an example of this. For certain kinds of traffic a combined sea-air routing may 
be advantageous. Other combinations are possible, such as goods being 
transported between Asia and the US East Coast, which can be shipped on the 
all-water route direct via the Panama Canal, or via Suez, or alternatively via a 
US West Coast port then by rail to the East Coast. 
Global reach and virtual universal use of the container disguises the fact that 
certain goods which could be containerised are still transported by other (i. e. 
substitute) means. This is certainly true for refrigerated cargo, and there still 
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remains a large fleet of conventional reefer ships, operating on either a dedicated 
or tramp basis worldwide and carrying a wide range of commodities including 
meat, bananas (Boyes, 1994) and apples. However, container lines are making 
inroads into reefer markets and most container ships now offer significant 
refrigerated container carrying capacity. Sea-Land point out that global partner 
Maersk's new 6,000 TEU vessels actually have greater reefer capacity (i. e. 
around 1,000 TEU each) than the largest conventional reefer ships currently in 
service (1: 4). 
Sea-Land carry a large volume of automobile components and CKD cars in 
containers for the major car manufacturers, but relatively few built-up cars as 
this type of cargo is not really suited to containerisation. The company has made 
attempts to modify containers for the carriage of cars and this has met with some 
success, yet by far the majority of trade cars still tend to be shipped by 
specialised vehicle carrying ships. 
A third type of cargo now being carried more and more in containers is liquid 
bulks. Special tank containers allow container operators to carry a wide variety 
of commodities such as chemicals, wine and spirits. Dry-bulk cargo is another 
sector in which container lines are now becoming more involved in. A key 
problem with many dry-bulk commodities until recently was that their low value 
precluded them from being shipped on more expensive container liner services. 
Shippers of commodities such as coffee, sugar or potatoes had to wait until they 
could put together sufficient cargo for a full shipload and then send the goods by 
conventional tramp service. According to Sea-Land, as ocean freight rates have 
reduced, so a great many of these low value bulk cargoes have now come within 
the reach of the container (1: 23). 
Thus, both Sea-Land and Evergreen can and do offer all-sea or sea and 
landbridge options, as do other carriers. Both lines are also targeting refrigerated 
and other cargo including low value bulk traffic. And each line must also 
compete against substitute transport services. There are clearly still a number of 
substitutes to containers for certain goods flows, and this indicates a locally 
responsive strategy is necessary. Container lines have demonstrated their 
responsiveness by adapting equipment to suit a larger number of commodities 
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and this, coupled with lower freight rates, has tended to erode the 
competitiveness of alternative substitute shipping systems. 
6.4.4 Market structure 
"Market structure includes the importance of local competitors as compared to 
multinational ones, as well as the extent of their concentration. If local 
competitors tend to control a significant portion of the market andlor if the 
industry is not concentrated, then a locally responsive posture is most usually 
indicated A ftagmented industry with local competitors indicates that there may 
be no inherent advantages to size and scale, unless product and process 
technology can be changed " 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987: p. 21). 
Although it has recently been suggested that the commercial container 
shipping industry structure is dramatically fragmented, despite some operational 
consolidation arnong the principal lines (Kadar & De Proost, 1997b), there are 
clearly differences between the main East-West trades, between North-South 
trades, and in respect to intra-regional trades. Approximately 80% of traffic on 
the main East-West trade lanes is controlled by global liner groupings and other 
lines among the top twenty carriers. Recent industry concentration amongst the 
leading global carriers is expected to continue, and both Sea-Land and 
Evergreen forecast fewer mainline carriers in future, not more. 
North-South trades such as Latin America, Africa and the Indian Sub 
Continent are a different proposition. National lines are still heavily involved in 
some of these trades, and the UNCTAD 40: 40: 20 agreement, which allows for 
national line retention of 40% of their country's seaborne trade, is still in 
existence. However, according to Sea-Land, many national lines do not have the 
cap acity (or the right technology) to carry 40% of their national trade. India is a 
prime example, and shippers prefer to use reliable international transport 
companies employing superior tonnage for access to markets like the US and 
Europe Q: 5). Moreover, few developing country national lines offer global 
coverage, or an advanced service network, and many in fact have failed to have 
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any impact in what is now a more liberal shipping regime (Ihcduru, 1992). 
Evergreen nevertheless cautions that a strong desire continues to exist among 
many shippers in certain countries to ship their goods with their own country's 
national line, and this represents a barrier the global carrier still has to overcome 
(1: 16). 
While global carriers are becoming more and more dominant, there are also a 
number of strong single trade-lane carriers such as ACL and CAST on the 
Transatlantic route. These 'niche' carriers have been subject to intense financial 
pressure in recent years, yet have been able to survive and still offer significant 
capacity to the detriment of global carriers (1: 23). Moreover, single trade lines 
are increasingly entering into combined carrier agreements with carriers serving 
other trades, and this means their trade lane reach is extended. For instance, 
ACL now offer through bills of lading for traffic between North America and 
Mediterranean destinations, with transhipment via Liverpool. 
Intra-regional container trades tend to suffer from intense competition, 
especially in Europe and Asia (1: 9). Bankruptcy of European feeder operators 
Bell Lines and Currie Line in the mid-1990's reflected this intense competition 
and rate erosion. In both Europe and Asia, there are dozens of small independent 
short-sea container lines, and with few barriers to entry new entrants frequently 
establish additional services. However, global carriers are fast penetrating intra- 
regional trades through the introduction of more direct services employing 
mainline vessels carrying containers on wayport calls (Ma, 1996; Baird, 1997b). 
For example, on its Asia-Europe services, Sea-Land are now carrying containers 
from Mediterranean ports to ports in northern Europe, whilst in Asia, Evergreen 
are carrying traffic between Japan, Taiwan, and Malaysia, on ships which are 
primarily geared towards the Transpacific trade. 
In the US, coastal trades are protected and reserved for national lines only. 
This prohibits Evergreen and other foreign-owned carriers from carrying goods 
between states in the US. Sea-Land are heavily involved in all US 'coastal' 
trades, of which Puerto Rico, Alaska, and Hawaii are particularly significant. 
One of the few other countries that still 'protects' its trades by giving national 
carriers exclusive transport rights (for trade between the home country and the 
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territory) is France, whose territories include certain islands in the West Indies 
and Indian Ocean. 
Thus, as global carriers become more active in intra-regional trades (with the 
exception of the US), lines have entered into a very fragmented market in which 
local competitors control a significant portion of the market. The main East- 
West trades are rather more concentrated, yet there still remains a significant 
degree of competition, particularly from other global groupings, but also from 
niche operators. In respect of North-South trades, a plethora of national and 
regional lines continue to offer services. Where market structure for each trade 
differs to such an extent, this will inevitably imply that a locally responsive 
posture is indicated. 
Nevertheless, as Prahalad & Doz (1987) suggest, global operators (through 
becoming active in all trades) may be able to make the industry structure evolve 
in their favour. For example, Sea-Land and Evergreen now serve North-South 
routes in South America and Africa, and Sea-Land/Maersk has recently 
introduced a new service to Australia and New Zealand. In the longer term, 
national lines, niche carriers, or intra-regional shortsea. operators, will find it 
harder to compete against the vast scale economy advantages enjoyed by global 
carriers (Nayar, 1996). The immense bargaining power of these lines, with ports 
and other suppliers, added to their sophisticated global networks facilitating 
global contracts with major shippers, could leave the smaller players exposed. 
Furthermore, the advent of the global corporation rather diminishes any 
prejudices shippers may once have demonstrated in favour of national lines. 
6.4.5 Host goverranent demands 
Rules and regulations imposed by national governments may force businesses to 
adapt their products or systems to be able to compete locally. According to 
Prahalad & Doz, governments do this for reasons of national economic 
development and national security. This includes measures such as health and 
safety regulations, reserving government contracts to local suppliers, and local 
content rules for foreign investors. Any of these could prevent a business from 
pursuing a policy of worldwide standardisation and integration. 
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Global shipping lines must work within literally hundreds of differing national 
regimes worldwide. Some regimes offer a range of advantages to global 
companies, others disadvantages. For example, under Danish law, generous tax 
advantages permit national shipowners to write down the cost of new ships built 
in that country in only one year (I: 10). A high one-off depreciation charge 
reduces tax exposure and provides an incentive to regularly build new ships. 
Maersk Line is a particularly notable beneficiary of this policy (and so, 
indirectly, is Sea-Land). Evergreen managers in the UK believe the Taiwan line 
also benefits from a similarly advantageous tax regime in relation to capital 
investment in ships and containers, and this partly explains its continual 
newbuild programme. It has been difficult to find out more information on these 
tax advantages, although this is clearly an issue that merits further research. The 
key point here is that certain competing lines may benefit from national policies 
that help generate effective competitive advantage over adversaries. 
There are many other examples of national policies either enhancing or 
diminishing carrier competitive advantage. For instance, Sea-Land used to have 
difficulty shipping cargo between the Greek ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki as 
this internal trade was reserved for Greek flag ships only (1: 9). However, under 
an EU ruling, Sea-Land is now permitted to use an EU flagged vessel for such 
movements, with similar dispensation in other EU countries. In Japan, higher 
harbour fees are imposed on ships operated by non-Japanese lines, and in the 
US, US flag vessels incur a lower rate of port dues than foreign-flag ships. In 
each instance the objective is to give advantage and protection to the national 
merchant fleet (Nayar, 1996). 
A further issue relates to the fact that shipping lines often find it difficult to 
plan properly in markets where there is a high degree of political instability, 
such as in certain Latin American countries, or countries of the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU). According to Sea-Land, many such countries are characterised by 
excessive bureaucracy, and their level of sophistication varies, particularly in 
terms of communications, social infrastructure, and crime (1: 8; 1: 19). Many 
young democracies want to emulate the West, "but there are always firinge 
characters who want to turn the clock back" (e. g. Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
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Guatemala), according to Sea-Land. There are generally monetary problems in 
such countries (e. g. Mexico), and the government is usually underfunded, whilst 
"local business communities tend to profit in the good times and disappear in 
bad' (1: 19). Security issues in these countries do not just relate to goods, they 
also relate to people, and shipping line staff have themselves been the victims of 
kidnapping. 
Sea-Land's policy is not to pay off (bribe) officials but it was suggested that 
the most corrupt governments are to be found in Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and India (1: 23). Further barriers arise "when you have to factor in the nuances 
of each trade" (1: 19). For instance, a container arriving at the Indian port of 
Neva Sheva, then taken by road to Delhi, is only permitted to leave the country 
by the same route in reverse. Sea-land (and other lines) must also post a bond 
for each container arriving in India, and containers cannot stay in the country for 
more than 90 days. 
A number of countries also have their "rule of the dcV'; in effect this means a 
different rule or regulation may be imposed depending more or less on what day 
of the week it is (1: 23). Such rules may comprise a sudden ban on certain 
commodities, such as imports of scrap. In this situation any containers of scrap 
already landed would simply be left in the port. It may also lead to containers 
being discharged at other ports, and being delayed there for some time. In India, 
the Port Trust's have the power to confiscate or arrest a container and to levy a 
fine on the line. It has been known for arrested containers to be out of 
circulation for up to a couple of years. 
In Mid East countries, to comply with local regulations Sea-Land must use a 
"trading famil)ý' agency to represent the company. The trading family is also 
responsible for ten-ninal and trucking activities thus limiting Sea-Land or other 
lines in what they can do, particularly on the landside. In India, a certificate is 
required before a company can become an intermodal operator, and it is 
uncertain whether non-Indian companies are entitled to licenses. In 1991, Sea- 
Land was prevented from gaining access to Korea's intermodal market and this 
prompted the FMC to propose sanctions on Korean-flag vessels calling at US 
ports. The FMC dropped its proposed fines of $100,000 per vessel in return for 
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a dispensation to allow US carriers access to the Korean trucking and rail 
market. The FMC also argued on behalf of Sea-Land for the latter to be allowed 
the same access rights in China as the Chinese carrier COSCO is allowed in the 
US (Knee, 1993). 
Evergreen point to increasing involvement of the European Commission (EQ 
in putting pressure on conference lines serving European ports (1: 14). For 
example, the EC decided that conference lines should not be permitted to jointly 
set intermodal tariffs, only tariffs for the ocean leg. This was followed by EC 
fines imposed on TACA member lines for anti-competitive practices. 
"In the US there is a lot of red tape", according to Evergreen (1: 16). With 
tariffs being filed with the authorities, this also means that rates are transparent 
and Evergreen can gain access to information on all carriers rates to the US; in 
the US trade "there is no rate confidentia1hy', according to Evergreen (1: 13). 
Lines found guilty of malpractice (i. e. charging rates below the officially filed 
tariff rate) can be heavily fined by the FMC. The Far East, in contrast to the US 
and Europe, is deemed to be relatively free from government interference. 
However, evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggested that deregulation in the US 
(through OSRA 98) should reduce this bureaucracy, although Asian countries 
increasingly appear to be considering introducing new regulations for liner 
shipping. 
Host governments may offer 'incentives', such as help with finding premises, 
tax benefits, and assistance with staff training, to get lines to locate their 
regional headquarters in a particular port/city. Some port-cities (e. g. Hamburg) 
treat major shipping lines in 6 similar way to any other inward investment (e. g. 
manufacturers), even though the direct employment impact may be less. 
One market that has been particularly difficult for Evergreen to gain access to 
is China. Prior to 1997 China did not allow any direct service between Taiwan 
and China and Evergreen was forced to tranship all its Chinese cargo over Hong 
Kong. Now that Hong Kong has reverted to Chinese rule, Evergreen's 
subsidiary company Uniglory has surprisingly been permitted to serve China 
direct from Taiwan. 
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National governments have also been able to influence manufacturing capacity 
and hence liner shipping activity through the creation of export processing zones 
(EPZ's). Multinationals locating within EPZs generally create significant 
demand for improved liner shipping services, as the maquiladora operations in 
Mexico confirm (Fawcett, 1990). Governments have also been instrumental in 
creating free trade zones within or nearby major ports, Dubai's Jebel Ali, for 
example, thus also influencing liner operators to call at such ports (Boyes, 
1993b). 
Clearly, different national regulations in each market will affect virtually all 
global carriers accordingly and, in certain instances, such regulations will inhibit 
or event prevent full or free access to markets. Moreover, political instability, 
corruption, and what Sea-Land term the 'nuances'of each trade also need to be 
taken into account. In addition to differing host government requirements, 
supranational bodies, particularly in the EU and the US, demonstrate a growing 
interest and involvement in liner shipping activity. 
The demands imposed by host governments on global shipping lines are 
clearly many and varied. Although there are signs that the overall extent of these 
demands may be diminishing, especially in the US, it is evident that global 
carriers are more or less forced to be locally responsive in numerous national 
markets in order to comply with a wide variety of differing host government 
demands. 
Table 6.3 summarises key differences between Sea-Land and Evergreen 
evident from this analysis in terms of local responsiveness. Sea-Land again 
appear to focus more attention on the specific needs of global shippers, and to 
providing customers with a tailored service, whilst Evergreen's main orientation 
is to compete aggressively in the market for all available business. In terms of 
sales channels, Sea-Land must charge the going conference rate on most trades, 
and prefers to have its own offices, whereas Evergreen prefers to retain the 
independence to charge a competitive rate, and is happy to employ agencies as 
well as its own staff in certain key locations. Both lines compete against the 
same substitute services and options, and each must recognise global, regional 
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and local competition in terms of market structure. Finally, carriers' must 
address different regulations and nuances evident in many host country markets. 
Table 6.3 Local responsiveness differences between Sea-Land and 
Evergreen 
Sea-Land Evergreen 
Focus on global Differences in Focus on competing 
customers and customer needs aggressivelyfor all 
tailored services business 
Conference rate Differences in sales Competitive rate 
Own officelstaff channels Agents 
RegionInational RegionInational 
differences differences 
Reefer Substitutes and need Reefer 
Car carriers to adapt Car carriers 
Landbridge etc. Landbridge etc. 
Global Market structure Global 
Regional Regional 
Local Local 
Regulatory differences Host government Regulatory differences 
National differences demands National differences 
Trade nuances Trade nuances 
6.5 Summary: Pressures for integration and responsiveness in the 
global container shipping industry 
6.5.1 Evaluation of the framework 
The methodological approach adopted has helped to establish, in a structured 
manner, the main pressures for global integration and for local responsiveness in 
the container shipping industry. In applying the Prahalad and Doz (1987) 
integration-responsiveness framework to the industry, it has been possible to 
establish key pressures faced by lines in different markets, and to identify some 
of the solutions employed by carriers to help overcome such pressures. The 
framework has also permitted a degree of comparison between Sea-Land and 
Evergreen, and has therefore helped in identifying the different strategic 
approaches adopted by each line as they seek to overcome pressures associated 
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with global operational management. As Prahalad & Doz claim, the framework 
permits the researcher to establish the existing rules of the game in a given 
industry. 
Notwithstanding these rather more positive aspects relating to the framework, 
this analysis did raise a number of questions and issues related to its general 
applicability, in particular: 
u At least one of the framework's criterion headings did not fit very well. For 
example, during the study 'distribution channels' was taken to really mean 
(sales channels', and not 'distribution' in the sense that transport researchers 
normally associate with the term. This was a little confusing, and the term 
'distribution' should probably ideally be changed to 'sales', or some such 
similar description. 
Prahalad & Doz had clearly modelled the framework around product rather 
than service industries. However, they do not distinguish between product or 
service organisations, and the framework appears to be suited to either. For 
certain service sectors the criterion 'access to raw materials and energy' will 
be less relevant, although it does apply to container shipping in respect of 
ship bunker fuel requirements. 
In several instances it was evident that factors were interrelated. For 
instance, similar findings and issues were evident when evaluating 
differences in customer needs, differences in distribution (sales) channels, 
and availability of substitutes. Although not necessarily a criticism of the 
framework, this does tend to result in some duplication within the overall 
analysis. 
u Analysing pressures for integration and responsiveness raised a wide range 
of issues, yet the framework did not contain a mechanism for weighting each 
factor in order of relative importance. In hindsight, any weighting of 
pressures would be fraught with difficulties. The value of the framework is 
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perhaps better reflected in the extent of qualitative data collected and 
analysed in a structured manner. Moreover, although a weighting 
mechanism could be designed for the framework, this might rather 
downplay the fact that all pressures need to be taken into account. 
Aside from analysis of the framework itself, findings from the interview 
survey and analysis of competitors in the global container shipping industry 
raised several issues which require to be highlighted. These are surnmarised 
below under the three headings of pressures for global coordination, global 
integration, and the need for local responsiveness. Although the case study focus 
was on two industry competitors, Sea-Land and Evergreen, it is argued that the 
pressures identified must, to a greater or lesser degree, be faced by all 
competitors in the global container shipping industry. 
6.5.2 Pressures for global coordination 
Based on this analysis of both carriers, the key pressures imposing a need for 
global coordination in container shipping are summarised in Table 6.4 below. 
The significance of MNC customers of shipping lines is emphasised by 
restating that 3% of Sea-Land's customers account for over 90% of its business, 
and that much of this trade consists of inter-company shipments. Sea-Land has 
responded to this pressure by enhancing its capability for global pricing and this 
necessitates a high degree of global coordination. Evergreen must compete for 
the same global shippers business, yet also deals extensively with forwarders in 
many markets who tend to require a port-port rather than a door-door service. 
Lines need to monitor the activities of competitors on a continuous basis 
globally. Global carriers such as Sea-Land and Evergreen face the same 
competitors in each market. Competitors in any given trade may be national, 
regional, or global. Other global carriers are regarded as the main competitors, 
because of their global scale of activities, their ability to secure large global 
contracts for lengthy time periods, plus the fact that they control a large market 
share of traffic carried on the main trades. Combined, these factors suggest 
significant pressure for global coordination. 
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Table 6.4 Pressures for global coordination in the container 
shipping industry 
Presence of multinational customers 
" examples of MNC's who operate globally and are moving towards single sourcing 
container transport 
" increasing emphasis on global pricing 
" MNC's becoming more important in all trades 
Presence of multinational competitors 
top 20 carriers account for over half of capacity worldwide 
top 20 carriers account for 80% of containers carried on* East-West trades and growing 
proportion of North-South trade 
" examples of global competitors and of competitors who only operate on specific 
regional trades 
Investment intensity 
" evidence of significant capital costs, particularly for ships, terminals, containers and IT 
capability 
" evidence of sharing of costs through global alliances and other forms of partnerships 
Global carriers require assets (e. g. ships, terminals, containers etc. ) costing at 
least $2 billion and this large scale investment must be leveraged across world 
markets, again demanding a high degree of coordination. However, Sea-Land 
and Evergreen make different choices with regard to specific assets and resource 
configuration (the specific issue of strategic choice is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 7). For example, Sea-Land has tended to purchase second-hand ships, 
and use charter ships and leased containers to a greater extent than Evergreen. 
Sea-Land has also invested in developing an extensive tenninal network. 
Conversely, Evergreen builds new vessels on a very regular basis, has less 
involvement in terminal investments, and manufactures its own containers. Sea- 
Land prefers to share assets in partnership with other carriers, in an effort to 
reduce costs and risks and help minimise capital investment requirements, 
whereas Evergreen adopts the opposite approach. Use of IT also differs between 
these lines with Sea-Land's DYM$ system seeking to maximise the financial 
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yield of each container movement, and to enhance 'value-added' services, whilst 
Evergreen's IT capability is rather more focussed on vessel operations and in 
maximising equipment utilisation. 
6.5.3 Pressures for global integration 
The key pressures imposing a need for global integration in container shipping 
are surnmarised in Table 6.5 below. 
Table 6.5 Pressures for global operational integration in the 
container shipping industry 
Technology intensity 
" technology not very intense/complex in this industry although ship lifecycles appear to 
be shortening 
" use of few key hub ports in strategic locations facilitates global operational integration 
of activities 
" use of sophisticated IT systems becoming more important 
Cost reduction 
economies of scale - increasing ship size and terminal throughput 
economies of scope - regional offices dealing with multiple trades 
efficiency gains through more intensive asset utilisation 
asset sharing 
" flagging out/downsizing 
Universal needs 
" container is a global homogeneous product (although container type/size differs by 
trade) 
" trend towards increased containerisation of world trade 
" schedules can be altered to take account of changing demand/competitor action 
" new routes introduced to extend global coverage 
" need to counteract imbalances in container types and physical flows 
Access to raw materials and energy 
" raw materials not important in this service industry 
" fuel requirement arrangements requires more coordination (for purchasing on global 
basis) than integration 
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Dependence on a number of geographically dispersed hub ports located in key 
markets around the world, and shipping service networks linking them, 
inevitably implies a need for global operational integration, and this will be the 
case for all global carriers. However, the technology of containerisation cannot 
be said to be especially complex in that the system is not prone to very rapid 
change. The technology appears to be mature, both in respect of ships and 
terminals, and is not subject to rapidly changing product life cycles as is the case 
in many other industries. Nevertheless, there are indications that the lifecycle of 
ships may be shortening, as larger and faster vessels come into service pushing 
existing ships onto routes with lower traffic volumes. 
Lines are striving to reduce costs through a variety of measures including - 
strategic alliances and asset sharing, flags of convenience, plus the drive 
towards bigger ships/terminals and resulting economies of scale. These 
developments all result in pressures for integration. Economies of scope 
obtained by global carriers' through organising each regional office to deal with 
multiple trades is a benefit not enjoyed by single trade competitors, and 
demonstrates another pressure for global integration. Repositioning of 
containers to take account of trade imbalances is also easier for the multi-trade 
global carrier compared to a single trade line. 
Increasing containerisation of world trade emphasises the universal application 
and nature of the technology, although a variety of container types and sizes are 
still required to cater for different commodity groups and shipper needs. 
International trade continues to grow, and with more and more commodities 
appearing to transfer to containers (e. g. perishable and bulk goods), world 
container traffic flows are expected to expand further. Nevertheless, the 
standardised container is to a large extent already a homogeneous global 
product, and the trend towards increased containerisation of world trade reflects 
the increasing reach of this mode of transport. 
Service schedules can be changed and port calls altered to take account of 
changing customer demand or in answer to competitor actions. Carriers can also 
quickly introduce new routes and services or revise existing routes where 
demand or competitive response warrants this. Global carriers appear to be 
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regularly introducing new routes/services to extend their global coverage. This 
corresponds with the notion that global carriers must offer services to all 
locations where global producers want to do business, and highlights the need 
for global operational integration. 
Raw materials needs clearly do not figure largely in this analysis of what is 
essentially a service industry. Whilst energy needs in the form of ship bunker 
fuel are an important consideration, in container shipping this implies a greater 
degree of coordination in terms of purchasing than in the sense of operational 
integration, as fuel costs represent a relatively small percentage of total 
operating costs. 
6.5.4 Pressures for local responsiveness 
Key pressures imposing a need for local responsiveness in container shipping 
are summarised in Table 6.6. 
Customer needs can differ by trade, and in relation to the specific requirements 
of local/global shippers. This therefore implies a degree of local responsiveness 
is necessary, suggesting that for global carriers a local presence is still required 
in many markets. Sea-Land are heavily involved in tailoring supply chain 
solutions for each customer, Evergreen less so, and this also necessitates a 
degree of local responsiveness. Some shippers/commodity groups also have 
different service needs in terms of transit time, port-port or door-door 
arrangement, and value added requirements. Global shippers looking for global 
contracts obviously require a carrier with multiple trade coverage. 
Different freight rates apply for each trade, with pricing depending on factors 
such as conference or non-conference affiliation. Country-specific pressures 
such as different terms of sales for goods, currency fluctuations, restrictions on 
carrier operating licences, and the need for tariff filing, places additional 
demands on lines to be locally responsive in many markets. In addition, some 
shippers still insist on direct calls at local ports rather than being served by 
feeder vessel. Other shippers appear to exhibit opposition to EDI links with 
carriers, and in some markets the use of information technology may be lagging 
behind, whilst certain markets still demand local carrier representation. 
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Table 6.6 Pressures for local responsiveness in the container shipping 
industry 
Differences in customer needs 
different customer groups (e. g. MNC's, forwarders, small shipper, shippers of high/low 
value products etc. ) demanding different levels of service (e. g. global contracts; transit 
time/reliability; door-door/port-port; value-added services; tailored service; local 
representation; multiple trade routes) 
Differences in distribution (sales) channels 
rigid conference versus flexible non-conference pricing arrangements 
local representation laws 
shipper preference for direct call as opposed to feeder 
shipper acceptance of EDI 
shipper selection of carrier - decision depends on terms of sale which differ by trade 
route/preference for national line etc., 
Availability of substitutes and need to adapt 
containers penetrating substitute shipping services (e. g. reefer, bulk) 
falling freight rates bringing low value cargo into reach of container 
Market structure 
same global competitors in most trades 
local competitors in most trades 
national lines may benefit from national customer loyalty 
intra-regional competition (where global carriers are wayporting) 
trades reserved through national legislation (e. g. US coastal trades) 
Host government demands 
many different regimes and legal requirements 
market distortions and state aids 
political instability, cultural factors, and trade nuances 
increasingly important role of large global trading blocs 
Substitute products are available for some customers (e. g. reefer ships, car 
carriers), although container services appear to be targeting and attracting a 
greater share of such traffic. The lowering of freight rates has also improved the 
potential for certain low value, transport-cost-sensitive bulk commodities to be 
containerised, thus moving towards a universal need and away from a distinctly 
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locally responsive solution. In targeting refrigerated traffic (global carriers have 
been building new ships with much greater reefer carrying capacity than before, 
and are now ordering large volumes of reefer containers) global carriers are 
aiming for a share of the growing worldwide transport of perishable produce. 
Ongoing expansion of container traffic also reflects the fact that companies are 
sourcing products from further afield. This translates into more freight moving 
over longer distances. Aside from the issue of local responsiveness, these factors 
(i. e. increased trade, conversion of traffic to containers, and shipments over 
longer distances) all favour the global carrier offering worldwide transport 
capability. 
The continued presence of national lines and single trade carriers demands a 
degree of local responsiveness, although the extent of such competition varies 
by trade. Global carriers increasingly see the same global competitors in all 
trades and view these carriers as their main competitors. Competition with intra- 
regional carriers is also fierce as global lines seek to lift more short-haul traffic. 
A barrier for many global carriers relates to access to certain reserved trades 
(e. g. the USA), the latter permitted to be served only by national lines. 
Carrier subsidies, govermnent trade protection, political instability, and the 
"nuances" of each trade also imply a high degree of local responsiveness is 
necessary in many markets. Cultural and legal differences further imply a high 
degree of local knowledge is essential. In addition, increasing pressure is being 
placed on container shipping lines from the major trading blocs, in particular the 
US Federal Maritime Commission and the European Commission Competition 
Directorate, with the main emphasis concerning competition and conference 
issues. 
6.5.5 Implications for global carriers 
What are the implications of these findings for a global container shipping 
business? Clearly, certain elements of strategy, like service capacity, technology, 
and key global customers, may have to be managed centrally. On the other hand, 
competitors, landside activities, and other customers may have to be managed 
both regionally and locally. As Prahalad & Doz suggest, this implies that 
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managers cannot make a one-time choice on which of the two dimensions to 
leverage. Managers must therefore simultaneously focus their attention on 
aspects of the business that require global integration, and aspects that demand 
local responsiveness, and on varying degrees of strategic coordination. This will 
inevitably have implications for an organisation's structure, as managerial 
decision making will need to reflect multiple points of view. 
This analysis has also established how and why Sea-Land and Evergreen, each 
emphasising different modes of operation, make use of available resources in 
different ways in order to compete in the same global industry. Findings confirm 
the hypothesis that container lines can indeed provide a global service in 
different ways, reflecting the different strategic choices they make. Chapter 7 
explores this issue further and, linking with this and previous chapters, outlines 
a theoretical framework which sets out the principal strategic choice options 
facing competitors in the global container shipping industry. 
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CHAPTER 7 
STRATEGIC CHOICE IN 
LINER CONTAINER SHIPPING 
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7.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter a new theoretical framework - strategic choice in the global 
container shipping industry - is presented, setting out the principal options 
facing global container shipping lines in relation to alternative modes of 
operation (Figure 7.1). The theoretical framework has been developed during 
the course of this study, building on the industry trends and developments 
identified in Chapter 3, and following analysis of organisational pressures 
provided in Chapter 6. The Chapter 5 evaluation of container shipping strategy 
also aided formulation of categories that are contained within the framework. 
This is not a business environment analytical framework. Traditional theories 
of the business environment seek to analyse the significance of both internal and 
external environments, and take account of, among other things, factors such as 
customers, employees, trade unions, culture, investors, government regulations, 
economic and political conditions, and societal influences (Johnson & Scholes, 
1993; Clarke-Hill & Glaister, 1995; Dobson & Starkey, 1994). In other words, 
they consider environmental influences that impact in some way or another on 
the performance and activities of a business. 
The strategic choice framework is instead specific to the global container 
shipping business in that it outlines the key strategic options relating to the way 
a carrier may decide to provide a global service. The choices a carrier makes 
will inevitably depend, to a large extent, on internal and external environmental 
influences (e. g. availability of capital, labour etc. ), and this will necessitate 
separate analysis. 
The strategic choice framework sets out the choices facing competitors under 
two broad headings - assets and operations. Assets refers to the 'hardware' (e. g. 
ships, containers, terminals etc. ) a global carrier must put in place in order to 
provide a global service, explaining choices relating to the way in which such 
assets may be configured. 
Operations refers to the 'software' carriers also need to have in place in order 
to compete globally. This includes factors such as organisation structure, service 
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networks, and operating/trade agreements, again outlining the main options in 
relation to each. 
Essentially, the framework implies that there is not one single specific 
approach, but several alternative ways whereby competitors may provide a 
global container transportation service. Choices set out in the framework refer to 
senior management decisions concerning aspects of corporate strategy; hence 
the title reflects this. 
Assets II Operations 
Linehaul ShiDs II Orzanisation Structure 
Feeder Ships II Overseas 
I Containers I 
Terminals II Service Network 
Inland Transport II Trade 
I Value Added Activities I 
Figure 7.1 Strategic choice in the global container shipping industry 
The framework is not an alternative to existing business environment 
theoretical frameworks firms employ to assist strategy formulation. Rather, its 
purpose should be seen as more of a complementary nature, to be used in 
conjunction with other, general business environment analytical frameworks, as 
an aid to strategic planning. Neither does it suggest which choices are best; it 
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merely sets out the choices which may be available (assuming sufficient 
resources), and which are most commonly adopted by industry competitors. 
When applied as an analytical tool, it is argued that the framework represents a 
valid and practical contribution. For instance, the framework can be used: 
u To help facilitate comparison and analysis of strategic management in the 
container shipping industry; 
u As an aid in the decision-making processes of global container shipping 
competitors, and; 
Li As a mechanism to reduce some of the complexity surrounding the industry, 
thereby facilitating greater understanding. 
In describing the framework, industry examples are provided to illustrate each 
of the asset and operational choices in practice. Reference is also made in the 
text to relevant data obtained during interviews with industry executives (in Sea- 
Land and Evergreen) which is used in order to highlight some of the advantages 
and disadvantages associated with certain choices. Additional relevant 
information, based on secondary data sources, is introduced reflecting strategic 
choices/decisions made by other carriers. 
7.2 Assets 
The first part of the strategic choice framework concerns physical assets 
necessary to provide a global container service. There are six separate asset 
groupings listed, and these are linehaul ships, feeder ships, containers, terminals, 
inland transport, and value added activities. Choices available to carriers under 
each of these headings are considered in more detail below (see Table 7.1). 
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Table 7.1 Container shipping assets: Choices r global carriers 
Linehaul Ships Feeder Ships Containers 
build Build build 
own own own 
lease part ownership lease 
charter lease "grey box 
flag out charter shipper-owned 
contract management flag out 
slot sharing contract management 
second hand common-user 
Wayporting 
Terminals Inland Transport Value Added 
Activities 
Own1part-own Own1part-own fteightforwarding 
build-operate-transfer lease consolidation 
leaselexclusive use contract supplier warehousing 
contract out common-user distribution 
preferential berth packaging/sorting 
common-user information 
inland terminals 
7.2.1 Linehaul ships 
Global carriers are faced with several alternative options in regard to provision 
of linehaul ship requirements. These options include ownership, leasing, 
chartering, or slot sharing with another line (or lines). Most global shipping 
lines appear to adopt a mix of these options (1: 6). Certain major carriers also 
own shipyards at which they place most of their orders for newbuildings (e. g. 
Maersk, Hyundai, and Hanjin). While lines like Evergreen and Maersk prefer to 
own their linehaul ships (1: 14), P&O has a significant proportion of its fleet 
under a sale and leaseback arrangement with financial institutions. 
Most major carriers also charter ships to supplement their owned/leased fleet. 
Charters can be short, medium or long term. For example, in May 1998 Sea- 
Land chartered the 2,700 TEU "Houston" for six months at a rate of $14,700 per 
day, and the 2,058 TEU "Diman IP for just one month at a daily rate of $9,200 
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(The Commonwealth Group, 1998). Conversely, Korean carrier Cho Yang Line 
operates Greek owned containerships on long-term four year charters. 
Other options in regard to linehaul ship arrangements include flagging out to 
take advantage of lower labour costs, and/or placing vessels under contract ship 
management schemes whereby crewing and technical arrangements are left in 
the hands of third party specialists; in 1995, for instance, Sea-Land contracted 
out crew management of five vessels to V Ships of Monaco (1: 20). It has been 
argued that the selection of both flagging and ship management are closely 
interrelated; as flagging out begins to develop, a shipping line's demands for 
separate ship management increases as the cost-effectiveness of this becomes 
apparent (Lee, 1996). 
A second-hand vessel purchase market also exists, and this enables lines to 
acquire capacity quickly and usually at low cost. Second-hand ships may be 
obtained through acquisition by one line of the assets owned by another line, 
often involving competing companies (e. g. NOL's takeover of APL, P&O's 
acquisition of Cunard container interests, and Maersk's purchase of East Asiatic 
Company). Sea-Land's purchase of the containership fleet formerly owned by 
bankrupted United States Lines provides another example of second-hand ship 
acquisitions. Sea-Land expect to see further "cheap assets" becoming available 
in future years pending continued market consolidation (1: 8). 
7.2.2 Feeder ships 
The principal options facing global carriers with regard to feeder (or relay) 
vessels are broadly similar to linehaul ship options - purchase, lease, charter, 
flagging out and contract management. Generally global carriers will use a mix 
of these options. 
Several carriers build, own and operate a proportion of their own feeder ship 
fleet, just as they do with deep-sea ships. Most notably, such carriers include 
Maersk, Evergreen and Hyundai. These built/owned ships will generally be 
supplemented by chartering in other feeder ships as required (1: 14). Another 
option, which is used by Evergreen, is to take shares in its feeder operation, in 
Evergreen's case its affiliate company Uniglory. Evergreen receives additional 
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benefits from its relationship with Uniglory, aside from simply being able to use 
its ships (1: 13). Firstly, smaller ships in the mainline Evergreen fleet are 
regularly displaced by bigger newbuildings, and these smaller vessels 'cascade' 
directly into Uniglory's fleet. Secondly, Evergreen also builds and manages 
Uniglory's fleet of containers as well as its own, and this generates significant 
scale economies. 
In most trades independent common-user feeder operators contract to carry 
containers between hubs and relay ports on behalf of deep-sea lines. All global 
carriers employ common-user feeder services to a lesser or greater extent in 
different regions of the world (1: 9). 
Finally, global carriers are increasingly able to avoid higher feeder costs 
entirely through wayport calls; that is, carrying cargo between ports within a 
region on their large linehaul vessels. The opportunities for wayporting appear 
to be increasing as global carriers introduce new services providing more direct 
calls. In effect, wayporting represents a low cost substitute for feeder services 
(1: 23). 
7.2.3 Containers 
The principal choices facing global carriers in regard to containers are either to 
build/own, or lease units. Carriers building their own containers include Maersk, 
Evergreen and Hyundai. Maersk has a sister company manufacturing containers 
in Denmark, while Evergreen has its own manufacturing plants in Taiwan and 
Indonesia (1: 16). Most other global carriers, including Sea-Land, acquire their 
containers from independent container manufacturers. Almost all carriers, 
however, supplement their owned container fleet with leased units. In the case 
of Sea-Land, leased containers account for half the carrier's fleet, whereas with 
Evergreen and Maersk the leased proportion is typically less than 30%. 
A further option increasingly favoured by global carriers is the concept of the 
'grey box', that is, a neutral container without logos and shared between lines. 
Within global alliances lines' are now sharing containers in an effort t6 cut costs 
and improve asset utilisation (1: 24). A further possibility is the shipper-owned 
unit, although these are relatively uncommon and tend to comprise the more 
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expensive 'special' containers such as tanks used to carry specific commodities 
like chemicals. 
7.2.4 Terminals 
In order to counteract variable service quality in many ports, carriers have 
sought to control more of their terminal activities through a variety of alternative 
approaches. Again, most carriers use a mixed approach involving a combination 
of options, rather than trying to implement one universal policy worldwide. 
Global carriers operating tenninals with their own staff generally lease 
facilities from the local port authority concerned (1: 7). Port leases tend to be 
long-term, often between 15-20 years or more, reflecting the nature of the 
investment. Under a lease agreement, the carrier will pay the port authority a 
guaranteed minimal annual payment. Port authorities' generally finance the 
infrastructure, with the carrier investing in handling equipment and other 
superstructure such as buildings, gatehouse etc. Q: 14), although a mix of options 
exist (e. g. the port authority may also buy the container cranes, as happens in 
some US ports). There are also instances where a carrier may take a financial 
stake in a strategic terminal (e. g. Maersk Sea-Land has a 30% share in the new 
Malaysian hub Port Tanjung Pelepas - PTP). 
A number of global carriers are now actively participating as partners in 
consortia bidding to build and/or operate new terminals. Carriers involved in the 
bidding to build and operate a new container terminal in Thailand, for instance, 
include P&O, NYK and Mitsui OSK Line. Other BOT container terminal 
schemes involving global carriers are taking place at a number of ports 
throughout Asia, Latin America, and Europe. Sea-Land successfully tendered in 
partnership with local firms to build and operate a new container tenninal in 
Aden (1: 23). 
Once the terminal arrangement is in place, a carrier may choose to contract out 
terminal operations by appointing a local stevedore to operate its terminal. At a 
number of US ports, although carriers lease their own dedicated terminals, often 
local stevedoring companies are employed to operate them (1: 14). In some cases 
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the stevedoring company may be partially or wholly-owned by the line leasing 
the terminal. 
There has recently been some terminal rationalisation due to the formation of 
global alliances between carriers. Rather than each line having its own terminal 
in a given port, as in the past, a degree of terminal sharing is now possible and 
this has helped to reduce costs and maximise utilisation. Sea-Land and Maersk 
provide an example of this; in Algeciras the two lines simply tore down the 
fence separating their respective terminals in order to make one large terminal. 
Similar Sea-Land/Maersk terminal rationalisation has taken place in Kaohsiung 
and Yokohama (1: 20). 
Many global carriers still also make use of common-user terminals around the 
world. Ports such as Felixstowe, Singapore, and Hamburg each offer only 
common-user facilities where larger carriers will generally negotiate a priority 
berthing agreement so that ships do not have to wait for a berth (Baird, 1996; 
Charlier, 1996). However, there is increasing pressure on these ports to provide 
terminals dedicated to each global alliance (1: 21). Other researchers have noted 
that carriers, through alliances and mergers generating substantial volumes, are 
gaining greater control over ports (Meersman, Moglia & Van de Voorde, 1999). 
In this regard, port authorities are now facing much larger players, and this has 
altered the balance of power in favour of carriers. 
Carriers may also establish inland terminals distant from ports which can be 
used to store empty containers and to accept full containers for on-carriage to 
seaports. Often these inland terminals will have customs clearance facilities, 
allowing goods to be cleared prior to arrival at or after departure from the port. 
Sea-Land operate a number of inland terminals in the USA and in Russia; P&O 
operates, a network of 'containerbases' in the UK; and Evergreen has similar 
inland facilities in Taiwan and in China. Very often these inland terminals will 
have direct rail connections with ports. 
Global carriers therefore tend to have a mix of terminal arrangements in place 
and very often the mix will be dependent to some extent upon local regulations 
concerning the activities of foreign-owned enterprises. What Sea-Land and other 
global carriers seek to do, wherever possible, however, is to retain the utmost 
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control over their main hub terminals (1: 16; 1: 23). Within Sea-Land, the 
company's global terminal portfolio is widely regarded as one of its key 
strengths (1: 19). The logic of this philosophy dates back to the early days in the 
company's development when its founder, Malcolm McLean, argued strongly 
that control of terminals was crucial in facilitating access to markets. 
7.2.5 Inland transport 
Inland transport of containers mainly involves transport by road, rail, or 
waterway. However, virtually all containers will be delivered to the final 
destination by road, even in instances where rail or barge transport is employed 
between the port and an inland terminal. Thus, the importance of trucking 
services cannot be over-emphasised. Indeed, as noted earlier in this thesis, the 
significance of trucking services is a further reflection of the fact that most of a 
global carrier's costs are incurred on the landside. 
Global carriers again tend to adopt a mix of approaches towards inland 
transport operations. These range from outright ownership of subsidiary 
companies, to contracting out inland transport to third party service providers. 
Sea-Land, for example, employ the trucking services of sister company CSX 
Intermoddl in North America, although a significant volume of containers are 
also moved to and from ports in the US by independent trucking firms (1: 19). 
Whilst Sea-Land has built up its own trucking interests in Hong Kong and 
China, in most other markets the carrier contracts out road transport to third 
parties. In the UK market, both Sea-Land and Evergreen have exclusive road 
haulage arrangements with one trucking supplier (1: 4; 1: 15). 
With regard to rail transport, few global carriers actually own rolling stock, an 
exception being another Sea-Land sister company CSX Rail. Of all global 
carriers, Sea-Land appears to be one of the most pro-active in rail transport, with 
extensive services in North America, expanding services in Russia, China, and 
in Northern Europe, and the possibility of new services in India and Latin 
America (1: 25). The rather fragmented nature of Europe's rail system has until 
now inhibited Sea-Land from expanding its services there, however, the carrier 
now jointly operates block train services from Rotterdam to several inland 
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destinations in partnership with other global carriers Maersk and P&O- 
Nedlloyd, in conjunction with Dutch Railways (1: 21). 
Relatively few global carriers operate their own container barge services, 
although a P&O subsidiary does provides barge services for containers on the 
Rhine. Otherwise, global carriers employ independent barge operators wherever 
inland waterway transit is preferred to rail or road. 
7.2.6 Value added activities 
Freight forwarding, consolidation, warehousing, distribution, labelling and 
packaging are typical of the value added services global carriers may decide to 
offer customers. Value added services can also include managing component 
flows, matching subcomponents, and even certain assembly functions. Other 
activities include provision of specialised services for goods such as clothing, 
refrigerated, and hazardous products. Often these and other logistics services 
will be provided through a carrier's subsidiary company, for example, Sea- 
Land's affiliate Sea-Land Logistics (formerly Buyers Consolidated). P&O- 
Nedlloyd, Maersk Line, and Hanjin also have subsidiary companies offering 
value added services. 
According to Graham (1998), providing value added services offers carriers 
the opportunity to become more competitive through product differentiation. 
Scope for differentiation is lowest in the basic port-port services, argues 
Graham, and highest in value added services. However, as more carriers become 
logistics service providers, scope for differentiation may be expected to reduce 
(1: 19). Moreover, Evergreen argue that the majority of shippers do not need to 
purchase value added services from liner operators (1: 13). 
Yet according to Sea-Land, "offering value added services enable us to get 
beyondprice" (1: 24). The company believes that the relationship between carrier 
and shipper has shifted and the shipper now looks at total logistics costs, as 
opposed to simply the traditional port-port or door-door movement. In answer to 
this, the "new" role of Sea-Land is: "to consider the total transport chain of its 
customers and to take costs out of the total logistics system" (1: 2 1). 
Strategic Management in the Global Container Shipping Industry 221 
Chapter 7- Strateeic Choice in Liner Container Shippini! 
A global carrier could simply continue to offer a "basic transport service", or 
what Sea-Land terms a customers "Bill of Rights", which consists simply of 
shipping goods, processing documentation, ensuring equipment availability, and 
service reliability at an agreed price (1: 19). Sea-Land's goal, however, is to get 
beyond the basic transport service and "to provide so much value that will 
attract customers to use (Sea-Land) at a premium rate" (1: 21). For example, 
through investments in information technology, it is possible for a global carrier 
to feed back information on shipments to manufacturers, and this can bring 
about alterations in distribution and stockholding patterns: "clothing fashions 
changing over time, for instance, and this has implications for consolidations" 
(1: 22). Track and trace is another area Sea-Land is currently working on. 
Through logistics affiliates, carriers are therefore seeking to tailor services to 
suit customer needs. A key motivation for this, suggests Sea-Land, is that "the 
more sophisticated customers pay more money, and these are the companies 
that are expanding their activities globall)P (1: 24). These companies, suggest 
Sea-Land, look for total cost benefits and to outsource activities. Essentially, by 
providing value added services, a global carrier starts to provide "a total 
transport service", and this is becoming more important as most trade is inter- 
company, which means that the buyer is the same firm as the seller (1: 24). 
Other activities in supply chain engineering, such as placing an employee 
inside a customer for a period to assess their logistics needs, is what Sea-Land 
consider to be "providing an integrated service" (1: 2 1). By developing a number 
of these strategic accounts that deal on a long-term basis, the global carrier seeks 
to enter into a "long-term partnership" with the customer (1: 21). The carrier 
then becomes more integrated within its customers activities and this raises 
switching costs. This comprises Sea-Land's response to what it sees as the new 
market demands, and enables a global carrier to become a "Tier 3" supplier 
(1: 17). With one or two exceptions (e. g. Evergreen), most global carriers now 
appear to be offering shippers a range of these and other value-added services. 
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7.3 Operations 
The second component part of the strategic choice theoretical framework refers 
to business operations in container shipping. That is, the key operational choices 
and subsequent decisions that must be taken by a line seeking to maintain a 
global container service. 
Operational choices are considered under the six headings of organisation 
structure, overseas representation, information systems, service network, trade 
agreements, and operating agreements. The principal options relating to each of 
these operational aspects are surnmarised in Table 7.2, and described further 
below. 
Table 7.2 Contai er shipping operations: Choi ces for global carriers 
Organisation Overseas Information 
Structure Representation Systems 
centralised own sales offices in-house systems 
decentralised independent agents off-the-shelfsystems 
divisions/matrix part-owned agents global networks 





Service Network Trade Agreements Operating 
Agreements 
end-to-end conference member slot exchange 
pendulum rate agreements slot charter 
round-the-world stabilisation agreements consortialpooling 
hub & spoke partial membership global alliance 
wayport calls independent 
7.3.1 Organisation structure 
The way in which a global carrier structures its organisation broadly means 
whether to take a centralised or a decentralised approach within a 
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divisionalised/matrix structure. Sea-Land, for example, has centralised activities 
by relocating its three main trade divisions - Atlantic, Pacific and Americas - 
within the Charlotte, North Carolina head office. Each trade division is headed 
by a Vice President, a General Manager, and a Sales Manager. Finance, Marine, 
Equipment, Global Sales and Marketing divisions are also headquartered in 
Charlotte. Sea-Land's regional offices now primarily coordinate local business 
activities (1: 24). Traditional liner companies such as P&O tend to take a similar 
'trade' perspective, appointing management teams to coordinate activities on 
each specific trade route (e. g. North Atlantic, Far East, Australasia etc. ). 
Conversely, Evergreen has adopted an altogether different approach by 
delegating responsibility for regional sales and pricing to each regional head 
office located in the USA (New York), Europe (Hamburg), Japan (Tokyo) and 
Asia (Taipei) respectively. This means that each regional head office has 
responsibility for pricing all outbound cargo from that region to anywhere in the 
world (1: 15). The Taipei global head office nevertheless retains control over 
ships, equipment, and worldwide marketing. This suggests a somewhat more 
decentralised organisation than Sea-Land, yet still basically within a matrix 
structure. 
A typical regional division, whether centralised or decentralised, will tend to 
have a wide geographic area to consider. Sea-Land's Americas Division, for 
example, is responsible for trade with 23 countries and also deals with traffic 
between Europe/Asia and Latin America (1: 19). The division is responsible for 
strategy and pricing, which is relatively easily coordinated together with other 
functions given that these are all now located together in the Charlotte head 
office. 
However, Sea-Land believes it is not a centralised organisation as such, rather 
"it is now an integrated carrier" (1: 21). Dealing more and more with global 
customers meant the old model of locating separate trade divisions in different 
regions of the world was becoming a constraint, and Sea-Land is now building 
on its strengths by locating both marketing and operations expertise within the 
one global head office. Sea-Land reasons that "because there is a time lag in 
being responsive to customers, a single integrated network now helps" (1: 24). 
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Sea-Land nevertheless rccognisc there is still a need to have a local presence in 
many world markets, and that the needs of emerging markets differ from 
mainstream markets in North America or in Europe. Somewhat paradoxically, 
the carrier suggested the presence of customer differences even within the same 
national market. For example, as one Sca-Land manager noted in regard to 
shipper needs, tariffs, container types and so on: "the local market in New 
Orleans differs from the Los Angeles market" (1: 23). Consequently, local 
expertise is still required, and carriers need to have trade division personnel who 
know every market well. 
A line will have a number of choices with regard to personnel policy. 
Although most senior staff in Sea-Land's Charlotte HQ are US nationals, there 
is a trend towards recruiting people of different nationalities (and expertise) 
from branch offices across the world to locate in Charlotte. This form of 
approach significantly widens the knowledge base of the global HQ (1: 18). 
Local branch offices tend to be staffed, in the main, by local nationals, 
particularly in more developed markets such as Europe and North America. 
Evergreen adopts a quite different personnel policy to that of Sea-Land. The 
company has a US management structure, with deputy vice presidents, vice 
presidents, senior vice presidents, presidents etc. But, according to one 
Evergreen employee, "no non-Taiwanese national could ever get above senior 
vice president" (1: 13). Evergreen recruits hundreds of graduates in Taiwan each 
year as management trainees. These management trainees are then posted for 
two years to an overseas branch office. There they are "groomed for senior 
positions" within the company (1: 14). Danish carrier Maersk Line adopts a 
similar approach, first giving (mostly Danish) trainees its customised Maersk 
International Shipping Education (MISE), followed by expatriation for 24 
months. Posting overseas is designed to allow the trainee to learn the local 
language and become familiar with the culture and habits of the country. 
According to one Evergreen employee, a consequence of this policy is that 
"the company has been accused of being too heavy with home nationals and this 
has led to complaints from some customers in the US" (1: 15). An example is 
Evergreen's New York office where, out of a total of 300 staff, 200 are Taiwan 
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nationals. The London and Hamburg offices are also predominantly staffed by 
Taiwan nationals. The company is described by insiders as not being easy to 
work for "as the oriental style of management can be very strict, takes a lot of 
getting used to, and saving face is crucial to them" (1: 13). Staff in the US and 
Europe are encouraged to learn Mandarin and "meetings can be ftustrating as 
Taiwan staffwill often talk among themselves in Mandarin" (1: 13). 
For many global carriers, personnel policy seems to mainly comprise 
recruitment and training home country nationals, followed by positioning of 
these employees around the world as local managers. Establishing the rationale 
behind such a policy is an aspect of the business that could merit further 
research. 
7.3.2 Overseas representation 
Principal options relating to the way a global carrier maintains overseas 
representation includes either establishing wholly-owned subsidiary branch sales 
offices, forming part-owned agencies with local companies, or appointing 
independent agents to act on its behalf In general, a global carrier will seek to 
establish its own offices at each of the major hub ports where linehaul vessels 
call. However, differing national and regional laws can restrict the use of 
wholly-owned subsidiary offices, which means that in some cases a mix of agent 
representation will be necessary (1: 23). 
Evergreen Line normally establishes overseas agencies in joint ownership with 
a local partner, with Evergreen stipulating that the agent only works for the one 
line (i. e. Evergreen) (1: 13). In key markets such as the US, Germany and the 
UK, Evergreen has subsequently acquired outright control of its agents. Once a 
year, all Evergreen agents are invited to Taipei to hear the annual message from 
the chairman, and to discuss strategic issues. This event is known as the 
"General Agent Talks" (1: 13). 
Sea-Land prefers to set up its own local Sea-Land offices rather than employ 
independent representatives. Latin America was previously entirely agency 
territory but Sea-Land has now established its own companies in the region 
supported by fewer agencies. According to Sea-Land, "an agent has an agent 
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agenda, not a Sea-Land agenda", and this can be costly for a line in the long 
term (1: 19). Sea-Land regrets not being allowed to have its own agency office in 
countrics whcrc the law prcvcnts this, such as in the Mid East, whcrc a locally 
owncd company is ncccssary, or in India and China whcre a local partncr is 
essential (1: 23). 
7.3.3 Information systems 
Information technology (IT) can be used to link offices to each other, to connect 
with customers and suppliers, and to provide the capability to further optimise 
asset utilisation (e. g. yield management, minimise container imbalances etc. ). 
Information systems could have been considered under assets in the framework, 
however, in the context of the global container shipping industry, it was 
considered more appropriate to assess ways in which information systems are 
used to enhance operational capabilities through transfer of information. 
Nowadays it is possible to have a line management system iýhich links 
together globally dispersed operations, using either off-the-shelf software, or 
mainframe linked systems created in-house (1: 22). Current basic systems 
comprise a cargo manifest database, freight bookings, tariff, pricing and all 
other commercial data; a container database with all container history records; 
and a financial database, with all revenue and expenses. 
Aside from systems providing basic office functions, Evergreen Line employs 
a sophisticated computer system to track the levels of surplus container 
equipment via its four regional offices in Hamburg, New York, Tokyo and 
Taipei, in an effort to ascertain future requirements by location. This worldwide 
reporting system enables Evergreen's equipment department to forecast 
equipment needs by port and region, helping direct the flow of empty containers 
to areas of demand (1: 16). 
Sea-Land's DYM$ (Dynamic Yield Management) system goes a little deeper 
than this, actually telling the carrier what specific commodities and traffic 
origin/destination to target in order to "put the best paying cargo on its ships" 
(1: 18). To begin with, the DYM$ system costs out thousands of possible 
container routes between all available origins and destinations. Variable (but not 
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fixed) costs are calculated for empty and for loaded units. The system also 
considers vessel capacity and other constraints, such as the number of containers 
in circulation. With this system, Sea-Land is able to calculate the "opportunity 
cost" of a container movement as DYM$ can calculate the net benefit of each 
and every shipment, thereby permitting easy comparison (1: 22). The system can 
also help sales guidelines and improve repositioning by allowing cargo to be 
ranked; some cargo may in fact be suboptimal (i. e. not worth carrying) and the 
system permits Sea-Land to improve the cargo mix above this level (1: 18). 
While airlines have the flexibility to vary rates using yield management 
systems, there is no such flexibility (yet) in shipping. DYM$ (a Sun Workstation 
system) nevertheless represents a significant change of thinking in the sense that 
a line can now move away from the traditional approach and mistaken belief 
that 'filling slots at any cost" was the only option (1: 24). It demonstrates that, in 
certain cases, a ship can actually be productive with lots of empty containers on 
board. However, one problem with DYM$ is that "business cannot be turned on 
at will" (1: 20). The system may inform more precisely what pays well, and what 
pays not so well, but so long as competition between carriers remains fierce, 
often the final decision on who gets the cargo will still depend to a large degree 
on price. 
IT is nevertheless regarded as an important competence within Sea-Land. The 
company has appointed a Director of Technology, based in Charlotte, and also 
has a field director within each trade division responsible for local 
implementation and integration of IT systems. There is a feeling that shippers 
contact with lines should have been paperless by now, but that this will happen 
soon as bookings are already being made via the Internet via carrier websites. 
Sea-Land's view is that "the business is about moving information and cargo 
simultaneouslyP (1: 21). A common language is being developed (e. g. a booking 
is a "transaction 22") and further automation is planned (1: 23). 
Information systems may also enhance communication between lines working 
in strategic alliances (1: 5). Global carriers are now using the OCEAN system in 
North America, which is a technical collaboration between lines that also 
permits importers and exporters to exchange information with them. The 
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equivalent system in Europe is EDISHIP, with most major shipping lines 
already committed to it. 
Global carriers are also forming EDI links with port and other suppliers. For 
example, Felixstowe's FSCP system can provide lines with real time 
information regarding bayplans and container inventory, cargo clearance, and 
links with forwarders and inland transport providers (1: 12). Other ports offer 
similar EDI systems designed primarily to speed up the transfer of containers 
through the terminals. While port EDI systems have tended to be directly used 
by, and are specific to, local customers (e. g. lines, forwarders, hauliers etc. ), hub 
ports worldwide are also developing direct connections between them to 
facilitate the transfer of information relating to ship arrivals, departures, cargo 
etc. (1: 7). In addition to the above, information systems can also be used to 
enhance a global carriers value added capability (e. g. storage, distribution etc. ), 
as noted in section 7.2.6 above. 
7.3.4 Service network 
Global carriers have three main options concerning the way they configure their 
deep-sea liner service networks. These options are end-to-end services, 
pendulum services, or round-the-world (rtw) services (Lim, 1996). Global 
carriers will generally employ a mix of two or more of these service options in 
order to ensure adequate coverage of the principal East-West routes. 
In a Transpacific end-to-end service, vessels steaming from Asia to the US 
then return to Asia. Similarly, on the Transatlantic trade, end-to-end vessels 
steaming from the US to Europe will then return across the Atlantic to the US, 
and so on. 
A pendulum service is where the service is extended to take in ports on 
another trade lane. An example of a pendulum service is Maersk's Transatlantic 
service operating between Europe and the US, with ships then proceeding 
through the Panama Canal to the US west coast, and across the Pacific to the Far 
East before returning to Europe via the same route (i. e. the US and Panama). 
There appears to be significant fleet savings possible from operating a pendulum 
service. For example, Maersk's Europe-US-Far East pendulum service only 
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requires nine vessels to maintain a weekly sailing frequency, whereas 
maintaining two separate Atlantic and Pacific services would require a total of 
twelve ships (1: 20). 
Round-the-world (rtw) services generally involve committing two separate 
fleets of ships, with one fleet circumnavigates the globe in a westbound 
direction, the other eastbound. Ports need not be exactly mirrored in each 
direction as ship capacity and sailing frequency is geared to the volume of traffic 
on each leg, which differs due to trade imbalances. The rtw concept essentially 
acts much like "a hoover, with shipsfunctioning like vacuum cleaners calling at 
hub ports, sucking in very large quantities of containers" (1: 23). A major 
advantage of both rtw and pendulum service options is that they offer carriers 
the opportunity to reposition empty containers quickly to areas of demand in a 
way that is not always possible for end-to-end regional operators. 
Irrespective of which option(s) carriers select, this will still mean a hub and 
spoke network is being employed, and there will be a need for some traffic to be 
transhipped and fed between hubs and remote locations. Another option, or 
alternative, to hub and spoke to some extent (especially in Asia), is to offer 
wayport calls within intra-regional trades using mainline vessels in an effort to 
avoid high feeder costs. However, as ships get bigger the current multiport 
itineraries could lose out as carriers introduce more dedicated deep-sea hub-to- 
hub shuttle services and connecting feeder links. 
7.3.5 Trade agreements 
Choices open to global carriers in respect of trade agreements principally relate 
to whether to become a member of the relevant liner conference (or rate and 
stabilisation agreement) for each trade, or to operate outside of such agreements 
as an 'independent' carrier. So-called 'establishment' lines such as P&O- 
Nedlloyd, Hapag Lloyd, Maersk, Sea-Land and NYK have tended to operate 
within the conference system, while independents, most notably Evergreen, 
COSCO, and DSR Senator Line, have preferred to remain outwith the 
conference system. 
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Separate agreements covering rates and capacity now exist on the Europe-Asia 
and Transpacific trades. While conference lines have tended to join both rates 
and capacity agreements, independent lines have generally opted to join only 
capacity management programmes, which set capacity ceilings on a given trade, 
and to remain outside of rate agreements (1: 23). 
On the Transatlantic trade, the Transatlantic Conference Agreement (TACA) 
controls both rates and capacity. Evergreen Line has no involvement with 
TACA, disagreeing with its rate setting function (1: 13). However, certain other 
independent lines have what is known as 'partial membership' of TACA, which 
means their customer files and operations are only policed to a certain extent by 
the TACA Secretariat. 
Conference affiliation is becoming more cumbersome to deal with, according 
to Sea-Land (1: 23). This is partly due to shipper pressure, and global customers 
in particular, who want global contracts (1: 24). As each conference is still only 
concerned with one trade lane, this means a conference line must comply with a 
particular set of freight rates on each trade, and this will tend to make 
negotiating a global contract more complicated than it would otherwise be. 
A carrier's choice of strategy in relation to trade agreements will often signal 
its general pricing policy. For example, lines signing up to rate agreements are 
obliged to charge accordingly (although members may still take 'independent 
action' on rates when this is considered necessary), whereas independent lines 
have the freedom to undercut conference rates should they so wish. Whether 
lines actually have the power to set rates is ultimately a moot point, given the 
increasing bargaining power of global shippers (1: 15). 
7.3.6 Operating agreements 
The main choices facing global carriers with respect to operating agreements 
with other lines range from simple slot exchanges, to consortia and ship pooling 
arrangements, through to full scale global alliances. 
Slot exchange agreements, also known as space sharing, refers to the 
allocation of a certain number of ship-board container slots by one company to 
another. Such slot chartering need not necessarily be reciprocal. 
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In the early days of containerisation, consortia (i. e. joint service) or pooling 
arrangements were the preferred mechanism whereby lines were able to 
participate in what is a very a capital intensive business without having to invest 
excessive amounts individually (Heaver, 1994). Although consortia lines pooled 
their ships to provide joint services on particular trade routes, individual 
members retained responsibility for their own sales and marketing. During 
recent years, such consortia have begun to disintegrate (e. g. Trio, Scandutch), 
with some partners seeking new arrangements, and others leaving the industry 
entirely. Some consortia arrangements ended when partner shareholdings/assets 
were bought by remaining members of the group (e. g. OCL, ACL). 
Global alliances are considered to be the successor to the old style consortia 
(Ma, 1996). A global alliance will tend to differ from previous consortia 
arrangement in two principal ways. First, a global alliance will encompass 
activities on all major East-West trade lanes, and perhaps some North-South 
trades as well. Second, in a global alliance member lines will tend to share more 
than just ships. For example, carriers may also share terminals, feeder services, 
containers, and there may be joint arrangements for inland transport. Services 
will, however, continue to be marketed separately by each partner. 
It may be practical for a global carrier to employ a mix of operating 
arrangements covering a number of trades (1: 14). For example, Evergreen 
operates its rtw service independently of any other line, but the Taiwan carrier 
has a reciprocal slot sharing arrangement with Lykes Lines on the Transatlantic 
leg only; this permits both carriers to offer a twice weekly Transatlantic service. 
Evergreen also charters slots from Italia Line on the latter's US-Mediterranean 
service. In addition, Evergreen operates a joint pendulum service between the 
Mediterranean-Asia-US with another Italian shipping company, Lloyd Triestino 
(the latter now owned by Evergreen). 
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7.4 Summary 
Analysing and understanding any complex industry will inevitably be difficult. 
The theoretical framework proposed in this chapter helps to reduce that 
complexity in the context of the global container shipping industry. The 
framework can be used as a strategic management tool in helping to assess 
organisational competencies and employment of resources. As an applied rather 
than a general theoretical framework, it is industry-specific, and explains the 
different ways in which competitors can elect to compete in the global container 
shipping business. 
There is a clear relationship between the two main components of the theory - 
assets and operations. For example, the requirement for assets such as ships, 
containers, and terminals, will be influenced by the form of trade and operating 
agreements entered into, as well as the preferred type of service networks 
employed. Moreover, value added activities will be likely to be influenced by 
the information technology capabilities of a line, and its affiliates. 
It is evident that global carriers may exhibit quite different emphases in regard 
to certain assets, and specifically towards the methods of procurement and 
employment of these assets. Sea-Land, for example, appears to be increasingly 
moving out of owning assets such as ships and containers, and into landside 
activities, especially terminals, inland transport and value added activities, 
reflecting a more intermodal orientation. Evergreen, on the other hand, 
concentrates on building ships and containers, with rather less interest in 
terminals and other landside activities, reflecting a strong maritime orientation. 
These two carriers also adopt a very different posture as far as key operational 
issues are concerned. For instance, key strategy differences include: 
u Centralised (or integrated) as opposed to decentralised organisation 
structures; 
u Owned offices as opposed to using agents; 
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u Using information systems to maximise net revenue, as opposed to 
maximising equipment utilisation; 
o Offering round-the-world, plus pendulum, rather than end-to-end plus 
pendulum networks; 
u Conference or non-conference affiliation, and; 
u Global alliance as opposed to less elaborate single trade slot sharing 
affangements. 
Essentially, the framework sets out key asset and operational choices global 
carriers must make in deciding on a preferred strategy. A key question, however, 
relates to the practical and theoretical usefulness of the framework. In this sense 
it can be argued that the framework may be used in a number of ways, for 
example: 
u In assessing whether a firm has the resources necessary to support its 
preferred strategy, and to alter the strategy to fit in with available resources; 
c3 In establishing if a firm is employing its resources in an optimal manner (e. g. 
by comparing other options with the current choice); 
a In helping to benchmark a firm's performance by comparing its choices 
against that of competitors; 
u As a stepping stone towards identification of key strategic competencies and 
cap i ities; 
u To aid decision making and strategic planning: and 
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a As a teaching tool to help explain (to employees, students etc. ) the principal 
ways in which firms compete in the global container shipping business. 
It was stated in the introduction to this chapter that the framework is not a 
substitute for any business environment theoretical framework. Rather, it should 
be applied together with other analytical tools to provide for a more 
comprehensive analysis and evaluation of strategy, and therefore as an aid to the 
corporate decision-making and strategic planning process. 
While decisions relating to choices outlined in the framework may often 
reflect, rather than determine a company's strategy, there are clearly going to be 
other environmental influences (e. g. the availability and cost of capital, skilled 
labour, regulations etc. ), that will effect the position of a company in the global 
marketplace. In this sense, the assets will tend to follow, not lead the strategy. 
Ultimately, however, the nature of the asset base is likely to be compatible with 
the dominant corporate philosophy, whether that be intermodal, maritime, or 
any other orientation. 
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8.1 Introduction 
The initial objectives for this research study as set out in Chapter 1 were as 
follows: 
u To identify and analyse strategic management issues in the global container 
shipping industry; 
u To compare and contrast different approaches to strategic management in the 
global container shipping industry; and 
u To analyse organisational pressures facing competitors in the global container 
shipping industry. 
This concluding chapter provides a discussion and review of the achievement 
of each of these objectives. Further, given that many questions, as well as 
answers, have been raised by the findings from this research, a number of 
potential future research topics are suggested. The chapter begins with a 
discussion and critique of the research methodology employed, highlighting 
some of the constraints associated with the work. 
8.2 Constraints and limitations 
Gaining access to senior managers is generally exceedingly difficult for most 
researchers (Bonoma, 1985). While sufficient access , was allowed to 
collaborating organisation Sea-Land management, access to Evergreen 
management (a direct competitor of Sea-Land) proved to be more difficult. 
However, the interviews that were undertaken with Evergreen -managers, 
coupled with the earlier pilot study, generated sufficient data to ensure a degree 
of comparison. Ideally, the research would have benefited from two 
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collaborating organisations, rather than one, although obtaining agreement from 
two competitors would inevitably be very difficult to achieve. 
A number of limitations to the research were highlighted in the methodology 
section (Chapter 2). In addition to difficulties commonly associated with 
interviewing senior management of organisations, the principle limitations of 
the research relate to the relatively small sample size, and the dominant focus of 
interviews on the collaborating organisation. These limitations, which relate to 
the research design, inevitably raise questions concerning the validity, 
reliability, and generalisability of the results. 
However, the alternative of widening the sample was not available, given the 
resource implications this would have entailed (e. g. travel costs), in addition to 
difficulties associated with gaining access to organisations competing with the 
collaborating entity. Moreover, the very high level of management access that 
the researcher gained (within the collaborating organisation) has arguably 
resulted in collection of substantial primary data that would not have been 
possible in the absence of a collaborating organisation. Collaboration has 
therefore added considerably to the richness of data presented in the thesis. 
A further difficulty concerned the geographic location of interviews. Any 
attempt to investigate global organisations, and their activities, inevitably 
demands a degree of attention be paid to activities and management in each of 
the major global trading regions. This is a difficult challenge for the researcher 
to overcome, not least because of the high cost of travel. 
Although interviews with Sea-Land managers were held in the UK, in 
continental EuroPe, and in the United States, it was found that several of these 
managers had previously held senior positions in other locations, such as the Far 
East, Middle East, Former Soviet Union, and Latin America. To a lesser extent 
the same was true with Evergreen interviewees. Interviewees were therefore 
well aware of key issues involved in trading to and from most global regions, 
and were able to provide reasonably informed opinions and views relating to 
such issues. This therefore helped, to some degree, to militate against the 
absence of interviews held across all major global regions. 
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In addition to managerial access, and geographic limitations, the research also 
suffered to some extent from company and industry changes taking place over 
time. Like most global industries today, the container shipping business is 
subject to change. These changes range from constant merger and acquisition 
activity, and route/service alterations, to fleet expansion, in addition to socio- 
economic/political upheaval in certain regions. For example, during most of the 
period of the research, there was constant industry rumour of a Maersk Line 
takeover of Sea-Land. Maersk's subsequent acquisition of Sea-Land was finally 
confirmed in late 1999, just after data collection for this study had ended. 
VVhilst in the event of a takeover the pressures for global operational 
integration and for local responsiveness are unlikely to alter, it seems inevitable 
that a new owner with a different philosophy will alter somewhat the strategy 
and overriding strategic orientation of Sea-Land. This will imply a change in 
mode of operation and hence strategic emphasis, given Maersk's alternative 
choice of strategy (e. g. constantly building and introducing more ships and 
containers). 
Notwithstanding these constraints and limitations, the largely 
phenomenological ýcomparative case study research approach employed has 
permitted the researcher to analyse corporate strategy in the global container 
shipping industry in some detail. Application of a theoretical framework 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987) as a template to help facilitate data collection and 
analysis (Yin, 1984), aided categorising and enabled the researcher to gather 
primary data in a structured manner. The subsequent analysis of organisational 
pressures on organisations in respect of global integration and local 
responsiveness in container shipping brought out many issues. The analysis also 
enabled the researcher to highlight significant differences in strategies adopted 
by competitors undertaking business activities in the same industry. 
Further, the analysis provided sufficient themes and patterns to facilitate 
'grounding' out of a new theoretical framework (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) that 
explains strategic choices in container shipping. This framework can be used as 
a basis for interpretation of the global container shipping phenomenon from a 
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managerial perspective. It can also be used as a teaching tool to facilitate greater 
understanding of the industry. 
8.3 Strategic management issues 
The first objective' of the research was to identify and investigate strategic 
management issues in the global container shipping industry. 
A priority in any global strategy will be to achieve low costs and high 
efficiency (Porter, 1986). Container lines seek to achieve this through a 
combination of economies of scale and scope. Ever larger ships, terminals, and 
expanding market reach provide for economies of scale, while economies of 
scope are gained primarily through the sharing of physical assets across markets. 
Alliances offer a mechanism whereby lines can share assets, and thus enjoy 
these benefits. But alliances are not always the basis for, stable long-term 
relationships (Ohmae, 1989), and this is to some extent explained through Sea- 
Land's use of the term, "alliances among enemies", with specific reference to 
container shipping. However, while global alliances among liner companies 
appears to be the norm, Evergreen functions to a significant degree as a "stand- 
alone" carrier, typically only venturing into alliances as a "stepping-stone" to 
gain access to more difficult markets. 
Global container shipping activity is subject to the three 'countervailing 
powers' of state, shippers, and competition (Nayar, 1996). Liner shipping 
managers must deal with different legislation across and even within markets, 
although the statutory requirements in the USA appear particularly onerous, 
even with recent reforms (e. g. OSRA 98'). Introduction of new liner shipping 
regulations in certain Asian markets could inhibit the industry further. 
The (increasing) bargaining power of global shippers, coupled with the 
lobbying function of Shippers' Councils, also represents significant pressure, 
especially on freight rates. Meanwhile, intense industry rivalry between carriers 
constitutes a very real restraint on price increases, more often resulting in price 
cutting. 
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While the industry appears to have become even more concentrated due to the 
formation of several global alliances, the reality is that operational consolidation 
has not resulted in commercial consolidation (Kadar & De Proost, 1997). 
Essentially, a large number of competitors are still active in the market, although 
there are signs that this may change if the spate of recent mergers between major 
operators continues. Nevertheless, with so many carriers (and other entities) 
competing for business, a fundamental challenge for every competitor is how to 
differentiate services in the eyes of the customer, and thereby achieve 
competitive advantage. 
With most major carriers offering a standardised range of containers, similar 
service networks, and ports of call, differentiation has been notoriously difficult 
to achieve. A possible menu of solutions includes more targeted marketing, 
better customer segmentation, tailored services, and simpler pricing. Shipper 
surveys indicate that many customers want lines' to provide an "overall service 
package", combining an attractive service, competitive price, and value-added 
capability. The evidence also suggests that today's shippers consider liner 
conferences to be largely irrelevant, and larger shippers in particular are keen to 
build longer term partnerships with carriers themselves, rather than with liner 
shipping representative bodies (e. g. conferences). 
A further key motivation influencing provision of a global service relates to 
the need to counteract trade imbalances in the most cost-effective manner 
possible (Kim, 1987). Global carriers appear to achieve this objective in 
different ways. For instance, Evergreen is largely reliant on its Round-The- 
World services, and to a lesser extent on pendulum and end-to-end links, for 
moving containers to areas of demand. Conversely, Sea-Land appears more 
reliant on strategic alliances, and container sharing, to minimise repositioning 
costs. 
The study has encountered difficulty in probing in more detail the important 
aspect of finance in global container shipping. Most lines are ultimately reliant 
on parent companies to provide finance for investment. However, while the 
raising of capital is one thing, findings from this research suggest the focus of 
investment differs between Sea-Land and Evergreen. While Sea-Land largely 
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concentrates investments in landside activities, and terminals, less so on marine 
activities, Evergreen directs its attention towards investments in ships and 
containers. These and other differences associated with the strategies of both 
lines' are discussed further in section 8.4 below. 
8.4 Differences in management approach 
The second objective of the study was to compare and contrast different 
approaches to strategic management in the global container shipping industry, 
based on the hypothesis that firms can provide a global container service in 
different ways, in particular through configuring their resources and operations 
differently. To achieve this objective, Chapters 5 and 6 employed a comparative 
case study approach in order to undertake analysis of two of the leading global 
container shipping lines, Sea-Land and Evergreen. 
Although Sea-Land and Evergreen clearly adopt rather different approaches 
toward provision of their respective global transport networks (e. g. Evergreen's 
RTW service, Sea-Land's global alliance etc. ), it remains that both lines' vessels 
call at virtually the same ports worldwide, and where they do not call at the 
same port, they tend to call at a port nearby. This rather suggests, at least in the 
eyes of many customers, that both lines essentially provide homogeneous 
service (i. e. a container transported door-door via the same, or virtually the same 
ports), and therefore compete directly against each other. 
Where substantial differences do exist between Sea-Land and Evergreen, these 
relate to the way in which each firm goes about organising its assets and 
operations, what has been termed here as modes of operation (Jankowicz, 1995). 
These differences inevitably reflect choices carriers make in regard to the 
strategy selected in order to gain competitive advantage. Findings from this 
study suggest these different approaches are very much connected with the 
dominant philosophy prevalent within each firm. 
For example, Sea-Land adopts what is termed here an intermodal orientation, 
in that the company places great stress on its intermodal capability and terminal 
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operations, with rather less emphasis on ships (which are often chartered - and 
less frequently built new compared to other lines) or containers (of which a large 
proportion are leased or shared with other lines). The founder of Sea-Land, 
Malcolm McLean, maintained there was a need to retain control of terminals as 
a crucial element in the company's corporate strategy. This belief lives on today, 
even though port operations and labour practices, not to mention increasing port 
competition, has significantly altered (generally positively) over the past two- 
three decades. This intermodal orientation is to some extent justified by Sea- 
Land management stressing the point that, with most liner shipping costs 
incurred on the landside, "why bother about the ships? " 
Conversely, still headed by its founder Chang Yung-fa, Evergreen is described 
as maritime oriented in that the company are constantly building new vessels 
and containers, yet have significantly less investments on the landside where 
third party service providers (e. g. terminal operators, hauliers, railroads) are 
preferred to in-house operations. 
In each instance, the importance of what Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) describe as 
a firm's administrative heritage is clearly evident: the legacy of McLean, 
originally a trucker, lives on in Sea-Land's dominant landside orientation, 
whereas Chang's seagoing background heavily influences Evergreen towards a 
dominant maritime orientation. 
A further key difference relates to the respective corporate organisation 
structures. While all key Sea-Land trade divisions are headquartered in 
Charlotte, Evergreen devolves trade and pricing responsibility to separate 
headquarters located in each of the main worldwide trading regions (e. g. New 
York, Hamburg, Tokyo, and Taipei). Moreover, while Evergreen favours 
employing predominantly Taiwan nationals to take responsibility for key 
functions in most overseas markets, Sea-Land largely adopts a local recruitment 
policy, unless this is considered unrealistic given the limited skills available in 
particular markets (e. g. Central America). 
Clearly, a key challenge in any global strategy will be to determine which links 
in a firm's value-added chain should be centrally coordinated, and which links 
should be decentralised and managed locally (Kogut, 1985). According to Sea- 
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Land, a fundamental pressure for centralisation. (or rather what Sea-Land terms 
integration), relates to the fact that fewer shippers are nowadays controlling 
more world trade; just 100 shippers control an estimated 25 per cent of all East- 
West trade (Drewry, 1992), and these global shippers now wish to negotiate on 
a worldwide basis with just one office. Evergreen take an opposite view, seeing 
the global shipper as something of a threat in that an increase in bargaining 
power enjoyed by shippers can only mean one thing, lower freight rates. In turn, 
Evergreen prefers to leave pricing responsibility in the hands of regional centres, 
rather than centralise this function within the head office in Taipei. 
While Evergreen has a long-standing philosophical dislike of conference rate 
agreements, Sea-Land is a member of all relevant conference rate agreements. 
However, even for Sea-Land the benefits (of membership) are increasingly 
regarded by the line's own executives to be uncertain. Ultimately, pressure from 
global partner Maersk for Sea-Land to remain in the relevant liner conferences 
must also be a factor, as it would be unthinkable for one of the partners in an 
alliance to be a signatory, while others operated as independents, free to 
undercut rate agreement lines, and more especially its 'partners'. 
Evergreen's estimated market share of the main East-West container trades 
suggests it has a more dominant overall 'global' position than Sea-Land, the 
latter being especially weak by comparison on the Europe-Far East trade. Sea- 
Land, however, benefits from a protected position on US 'domestic' trades, and 
in the carriage of US military cargoes (although revenues from military cargo 
appear to be in long-term decline). 
Yet in terms of financial returns, Evergreen's maritime oriented strategy has 
been more successful than Sea-Land's intermodal orientation. Until the mid 
1990's, Evergreen consistently achieved higher profits (relative to the industry 
average) on what appeared to be a moderate asset base and revenues. Intense 
pressure on freight rates during the last few years of the 20 th century has 
succeeded in reducing Evergreen profits, while Sea-Land and many other lines 
have gone into the red. 
Differing profitability levels, and reasons for these differences, have not been 
analysed in depth during this study. The main focus of the research has been 
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directed towards identifying strategic management issues, and assessing 
organisational implications associated with operational integration and local 
responsiveness in a global industry. Differences in profitability must ultimately 
reflect the strategic choices liner operator management makes in regard to 
preferred mode of operation, the latter also reflecting each company's dominant 
philosophical orientation and beliefs. In this regard, given the evidence gathered 
during this research project, one must conclude that the overall mode of 
operation (reflecting strategic choices) favoured by Evergreen Line appears to 
be relatively more successful than that adopted by Sea-Land. Nevertheless, the 
issue of variable levels of profitability among competitors in liner shipping 
merits further research, and this issue is discussed in a later section of this 
concluding chapter. 
8.5 Global industry pressures on the organisation 
The third objective of the research was to analyse organisational pressures 
facing competitors in the global container shipping industry. In this study the 
'Integration-Responsiveness' framework' (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) was 
employed to help identify, and thereafter analyse, pressures for operational 
integration and for local responsiveness in the container shipping industry. 
Employing an established theoretical framework in this way permitted data 
collected to be categorised and analysed in a structured manner. 
Criteria explicit in the framework facilitated an extensive analysis of the many 
pressures facing competitors in the global container shipping industry., On its 
own, this depth of analysis was regarded as worthwhile and informative, and 
helped to facilitate greater understanding of a relatively complex phenomenon. 
The criteria contained in the framework were deemed to be comprehensive, and 
there did not appear to be any omission of significant factors or pressures facing 
global businesses in the context of the dual needs for operational integration and 
for local responsiveness. 
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However, it was noted during the research that the framework had been 
developed primarily for analysis of production industries. A consequence of this 
is that certain criteria, in particular 'access to raw materials and energy', were 
found to be less relevant so far as the service sector is concerned. The definition 
of 'distribution channels' was also questioned, as the terminology used in this 
context by the authors of the framework differed from the meaning normally 
associated with this activity by transport researchers. 
With regard to container shipping, key activities identified that require a high 
degree of global coordination included (global) pricing, and procurement and 
operation of major assets. The growing dominance of large multinational 
customers (shippers) has resulted in a greater element of single sourcing, and 
MNC's are clearly becoming more significant in all trades. These pressures 
imply a high degree of global coordination is necessary to enable liner shipping 
operators to meet the evolving demands of an ever-changing marketplace. 
Coordination is also essential when a global carrier is required to alter service 
schedules to take account of changing customers needs, or as a response to the 
actions of other global and regional competitors. 
In container shipping, the need for global integration is also high, in particular 
due to pressures to reduce costs, but also due to the universal nature of the 
container itself, the latter being what Levitt (1983) might describe as a 
standardised or homogenised global product. Lines tend to rely on relatively few 
strategically positioned global transhipment terminals as network hubs, and this 
too necessitates a high degree of global operational integration. While scale 
economies achieved as a result of each increase in available ship size appear to 
be especially important in the quest to reduce unit costs, the increased capacity 
of ships inevitably implies that global operational networks must be better 
integrated to ensure additional capacity is well utilised. 
Simultaneous to the need for global coordination and integration, diverse 
customer needs, local competition, and host government demands clearly make 
local responsiveness a critical issue. Even in today's global business 
environment, many customers still demand different levels of service on each 
separate trade lane. Further, different laws and regulations in each market forces 
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lines to be locally responsive. In addition, variations in market structure, with 
strong regional competitors present in some markets, forces global carriers to 
think local as well as global. 
These findings suggest that Sea-Land and Evergreen have to manage what 
Prahalad & Doz (1987) call a multifocal business, in which demands for global 
integration and for local responsiveness must be managed simultaneously. This 
means that, while certain elements of strategy must be managed centrally, other 
activities have to be managed regionally or locally. Managers must therefore 
focus their attention on aspects of the business that require global integration 
and coordination, and aspects that demand local responsiveness. As in other 
global industries, competitors in the global container shipping industry need to 
be aware of these conflicting pressures, and establish an organisation structure 
that permits managerial decision making to reflect multiple points of view. 
8.6 Strategic choice theoretical framework 
As more and more information was gathered during the study, gradually a 
pattern emerged that enabled the researcher to develop theory relating to the 
subject matter in question. Based on this grounded theory approach (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967), a valid theoretical framework has been developed which can be 
used as an analytical tool to help explain the principal strategic choices facing 
competitors in the global container shipping business. The strategic choice in 
container shipping framework sets out the principal options global carriers must 
select from in deciding the organisational and competitive approach they wish to 
adopt in order to compete in the industry. 
The framework contains two main component parts, assets and operations. 
With regard to assets, it is evident from this study that the two carriers 
investigated adopt quite different approaches. For example, Sea-Land readily 
admits to a strategy whereby the company is moving out of owning/operating a 
large fleet of ships and containers, and instead focusing attention on landside 
activities (e. g. terminals, inland transport, and value added functions). To a large 
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extent Evergreen adopts the reverse strategy, with major investments in ships 
and containers, and less direct involvement in landside activities. 
Within the framework, the link between assets and operations is particularly 
significant. For example, Sca-Land is arguably only able to move out of 
maritime hardware due to the nature of its global alliance with another carrier, 
Maersk Line. This agreement permits Sea-Land to share the Danish carrier's 
ships. Application- of the framework to the Sea-Land and Evergreen 
organisations also revealed different approaches in respect of aspects such as 
global organisational structure, overseas representation, operational application 
of information technology, and trade agreements. 
As Prahalad & Hamel (1990) have argued, the global challenge is to ensure 
that organisational capability facilitates strategy implementation. The strategic 
choice framework presented in Chapter 7 essentially sets out the important 
resource-base choices available to firms competing in the global container 
shipping business. The specific choices that are made by liner shipping 
managers will obviously be influenced by many factors, not least the availability 
of financial resources, as well as the quality of managerial skill and judgement. 
But ultimately, the organisation's capabilities must at least partly be determined 
by the choices liner shipping executives make (subject to the impact of wider 
business environment influences). It is these choices which, crucially, will 
represent the organisations capability at a given point in time. 
The framework can be employed by industry managers as an analytical tool, to 
be used alongside general business environment and other appropriate strategic 
management frameworks to aid decision making and strategic planning. It may 
also be used as a teaching aid for industry managers and trainees, and for 
students on transportation courses, to help explain and elaborate strategic 
management issues in the global container shipping industry. Finally, the 
framework could be applied/tested by other researchers in the course of further 
study into the global container shipping industry. 
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8.7 Directions for future research 
Many of the major lines operating within the various global alliances appear to 
be adopting a strategy similar to Sea-Land in seeking to provide what Cheon 
Kyu (199 1) described as a high level intermodal service and global network. 
This strategy includes providing fast transits, multiple and frequent service 
options, extensive intermodal capability, and value-added activities on a 
worldwide basis. 
Evergreen's success, however, would seem to suggest that not all of these 
service attributes may be necessary, although this must inevitably relate to the 
dominant customer segments targeted by a given line, segments within which by 
implication shipper needs may vary. An important issue to explore, therefore, 
and where further research is necessary, would be to identify different 
container shipping customer segments, and establish key requirements of 
each shipper segment in relation to overall liner container service 
provision. 
As Evergreen is constantly building new vessels, it is hypothesised that a more 
likely explanation for that company's superior profits, relative to the industry in 
general, perhaps lies in the area of vessel financing, and/or tax treatment in 
respect of capital costs associated with ship acquisition. Thus, a ftirther relevant 
research study would be to compare and evaluate container vessel capital 
cost financing and related taxation treatment (including depreciation) 
across countries. As Evergreen and the Danish carrier Maersk Line currently 
dominate the industry as far as container ship newbuildings worldwide are 
concerned, it is recommended that such a study should focus on ship financing 
and taxation regimes applicable to new vessels owned by these shipowners in 
particular. 
Further research could also be undertaken through application of the strategic 
choice framework to a sample of global container shipping competitors. 
Such research could, for instance, seek to identify the existence of strategic 
groups of competitors, with each group adopting and therefore being reflective 
of a common approach. This research could also permit identification and 
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further examination of differences in strategy. A key objective of such research, 
however, would inevitably be to test the framwork's applicability and, where 
appropriate, to refine it. 
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APPENDIX A: Interview Programme 
Sea-Land Service Inc. 
Number Date Name Position Place 
1: 1 9/11/1993 Nick Wilde# Marketing Director, UK & Eire Watford 
1: 2 8/12/1993 Ian Bell# Scottish Sales Manager Grangemouth 
1: 3 8/12/1993 Alan Paterson# Port Manager Grangemouth 
1: 4 13/7/1994 Kelvin Wilden* Operations Manager Felixstowe 
1: 5 13MI994 Colin Graves* Manager of Quality Felixstowe 
1: 6 13/7/1994 Nick Wilde* Marketing Director, UK & Eire Felixstowe 
1: 7 l3n11994 Phil Wise* Terminal Manager Felixstowe 
1: 8 27n/1994 Mark Tonge* International Marketing Manager Rotterdam 
1: 9 27/7/1994 Walter Vollemaere* Marketing Manager Intra-Eur. Rotterdam 
1: 10 27n/1994 David Sage* Director Financial Processes Rotterdam 
1: 11 27n/1994 Richard Van Arnen* Global Accounts Manager Rotterdam 
1: 12 13/7/1994 Bruce Coupland# Senior Terminal Planner Felixstowe 
Evergreen Marine Corporation 
Number Date Name Position Place 
1: 13 15/11/1994 Calum MacGregor* Scottish Area Manager Glasgow 
1: 14 21/4/1994 lain Phillips* Export Manager London 
1: 15 11/5/1995 lain Phillips* Export Manager London 
1: 16 11/5/1995 Peter Edward* Quality Manager London 
Sea-Land Service inc. 
Number Date Name Position Place 
1: 17 24/6/1996 Terry Grange- Director Corporate Marketing Charlotte, NC 
1: 18 24/6/1996 Klaas Moerkerken- Director Global DYM$ Charlotte, NC 
1: 19 24/6/1996 Michael Kramer- Director Americas Division Charlotte, NC 
1: 20 24/6/1996 Bob Szewczyk- Director Atlantic Division Charlotte, NC 
1: 21 24/6/1996 Will Middleton- Executive Vice President Charlotte, NC 
1: 22 24/6/1996 Jim Watkins- Vice President IT Charlotte, NC 
1: 23 24/6/1996 John Gilmore- AME Manager Charlotte, NC 
1: 24 24/6/1996 Paul Newbourne- Director Global Accounts Charlotte, NC 
1: 25 24/6/1996 Sunil Dhamankar- Director Operations Research Charlotte, NC 
# Interview covering general industry topics/questionnaire/research methods etc. 
Interview using questionnaire derived from the Prahalad & Doz (1987) framework 
Interview testing 'Strategic choice in container shipping' framework 
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APPENDIX B: Questionnaire 
STRATEGIC COORDINATION 
1. importance ofmultinational customers 
a) Dependence on global customers? 
b) Do MNCs demand the same level of service worldwide? 
c) Do MNCs have centralized vendor certification? 
d) Proportion of container services sold from the centre/locally? 
e) How is worldwide pricing and service strategy coordinated? 
2. Presence ofinultinational competitors 
a) Who are the main competitors operating in multiple markets? 
b) How does the organisation develop an understanding of MNC competitors 
strategic intent? 
c) What mechanisms are used to gather intelligence? 
d) Type of response required to effectively deal with competitors actions? 
e) Types of MNC competitors within the three trading areas of Europe, Asia 
and North America? 
3. Investment intensity 
a) How investment intensive is container shipping? 
b) How critical is there a need to leverage this investment worldwide? 
c) How critical is there a need for speed of development and implementation 
of service strategy worldwide in order to make large initial investments 
profitable? 
d) How important are economies of scale? 
e) Does a wider network of mainports make a company less or more 
competitive? 
f) What is the impact of consortia/VSAs on investment? 
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g) Are a major proportion of assets concentrated on busiest or more lucrative 
routes? 
OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION 
1. Technological intensity 
a) Does technological intensity necessitate concentration of operations in only 
a few selected locations (e. g. hub and mini-hub ports)? 
b) Does having fewer main operational sites allow easier control over quality, 
cost, and new service introduction? 
c) Which carriers enjoy proprietary technological advantage (or any other 
technological advantage)? 
d) Do carriers hub and spoke networks differ in the main trading regions of 
Europe, North America and Asia? 
e) What has been the impact of automated terminals, hatchless ships, etc.? 
f) How are sailing schedules integrated for mainhaul and feeder services across 
trades? 
2. Pressurefor cost reduction 
a) Are assets sourced from low-cost locations (e. g. ships, containers etc. )? 
b) Where are ships registered (crewing costs)? 
c) Ship capacities and economies of scale issues? 
d) Are you reducing the number of mainline calls at hub ports and extending 
feeders networks (hubs serving multiple national markets)? 
3. Universal needs 
a) What pressures are there for service adaptation across national markets? 
b) Regional/national differences in equipment types? 
c) Competing non-containerised services? 
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4. Access to energy 
a) Main source of energy? 
b) Are mainports where carriers gain access to a cheap supply of fuel? 
c) Can fuel costs influence port selection? 
d) Method of purchase for bunker fuel 
PRESSURES FOR LOCAL RESPONSIVENESS 
1. Differences in customer needs 
a) Where are customer needs national or regional specific? 
b) Do certain customers have similar needs across global markets? 
2. Differences in distribution channels 
a) Different methods/terms of sale in particular markets? 
b) What local/regional regulations impact? 
3. Availability ofsubstitutes and need to adapt 
a) On which trades can customer needs be met by a local substitute? 
b) Does container 'product' or liner service need to be adapted across markets? 
4. Market structure 
a) In which trades are local competitors strongest? 
b) Views on continuing concentration of global container shipping industry? 
5. Host government demands 
a) What forms can such demands take? 
b) What impactleffect/costs do they entail? 
Questionnaire based on Prahalad & Doz (1987) Integration-Responsiveness 
framework and adapted for application in the container shipping business 
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APPENDIX C: Glossary of technical terms 
ANERA Asia North America Eastbound Rate Agreement 
BAF Bunker adjustment factor (imposed due to fuel price increases) 
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer (container tenninal) 
CAF Currency adjustment factor (imposed due to adverse currency 
fluctuations) 
CIF Terms of sale inclusive of 'cost of goods, insurance and freight' 
EC European Commission 
End-to-end service Linehaul service on one trade lane 
EPZ Export Processing Zone 
ESC European Shipper's Council 
EU European Union 
FAK Single container rate for 'freight all kinds' 
Feeder service Small ship connecting with linehaul vessel at hub port and carrying 
containers on short sea routes 
FEFC Far Eastern Freight Conference 
FEU Forty-foot equivalent unit (container) 
Flag out Carrier registering vessels under flag of convenience 
FOB Freight payable at destination - freight payable to port of departure 
only - i. e. 'free on board' 
FMC Federal Maritime Commission (USA) 
GATT General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
Grey box Container shared by two or more carriers 
Liner service Regular, scheduled shipping service on a given route 
Linehaul ship Ship serving deep-sea or inter-continental trades 
MNC Multi-national corporation 
Newbuilding New ship 
NITL National Industrial Transportation League (USA) 
NVOCC Non-Vessel Owning Common Carrier 
OSRA 98' US Ocean Shipping Reform Act, 1998 
Out-of-gauge Cargo that does not f it into a standard container 
Pendulum service Linehaul service taking in two trade lanes 
Reefer Refrigerated container 
Relay ship A deep sea ship transhipping containers onto another deep sea (i. e. 
relay) ship 
RoRo Roll-on Roll-off ship 
RTW Round-The-World container service 
TACA Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement 
Shipper Customer of container line (e. g. exporter) 
Slot sharing Carriers sharing container ship (slot) capacity with other lines 
TEU Twenty-foot equivalent unit (container) 
THC Terminal handling charge 
UCC Ultra Container Carrier (hatchless ship) 
UNCTAD United Nations Convention on Trade and Development 
Wayporting Linehaul ships carrying intra-regional cargo (e. g. intra-Asia) 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
WTSA Westbound Transpacific Stabilisation Agreement 
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